by Laurence Jarvik on 9/18/2005 · 17 comments

For some two hours on the evening of September 14th, at the W.P. Carey Forum of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University’s Nitze School of Strategic and International Studies, Dr. Shirin Akiner faced critics of her controversial report: Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment. (PDF) Akiner spoke as a scholar sympathetic to Uzbekistan, advocating a controversial policy of support. What follows is a personal account of Akiner’s appearance, in the “Long Telegram” tradition of George Kennan:

The Rome Auditorium was full. There were 96 names on the list of registered guests, plus people in the auditorium who had not registered. Akiner faced the highest-level crowd one might imagine. Among the audience were representatives of non-governmental organizations that had expressed differences with her report, including the International Crisis Group, the Open Society Institute, and Human Rights Watch. There were correspondents from Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, and NPR. Two former US ambassadors were in the audience, as well as staffers from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the GAO, the RAND Corporation, the World Bank, and the National Endowment for Democracy. There were diplomats present from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as well as Abdurahim Polat of Uzbekistan’s Birlik Party. And there were academics from Johns Hopkins University, George Washington University, Georgetown University, the University of Montana, the University of Mexico, Princeton University, and the University of London.

Before the main event, the audience was treated to a free buffet of sandwiches, vegetables, salads, balkava and brownies. In addition to sodas and water, they were offered free Georgian wine, courtesy of the US-Georgia Business Council. Well-watered and well-fed, the crowd was ready for anything.

Free copies of Akiner’s publication were handed out to anyone who wanted one. As he leafed through the document, the Washington representative of the Uzbek-American Business Council was overheard telling his seatmate: “Who knows what the facts are?”

So when Dr. Akiner made her way down the center aisle, dressed in black, to sit at the onstage table, there was a bit of a buzz in the audience. Would this petite and elegant British scholar be able to hold her own before Washington, DC’s power elite?

The evening’s host, Dr. Fred Starr, introduced Akiner carefully, at first noting that her work on Tajikistan had been criticized by President Rahkmanov. He pointed out that she was “not an old friend, we just met a few minutes ago.” He asked that discussion be limited to the evidence, citing the fact that “there has been no CIA report that I know of.” ( Starr later added that the CIA has not released satellite photos of Andijan’s Bobur Square that could answer many questions. Starr said he knows that photos taken during the violence exist.)

When Starr asked her to speak from the podium, Akiner demurred. She preferred to sit, she said, because she was not tall enough. Sitting made the event seem more solemn, serious, sober. Akiner would not take the protection of the podium, merely a table and a microphone, with nothing to hide behind.

(It seems that she had little to hide. The post-lecture question and answer, while heated, was rather more personal than anything else. For example, Eurasianet’s Justin Burke asked Akiner why she had stopped her car for the night in Namangan on the way to Andijan. She answered that it was raining and she wanted to rest. He followed-up by questioning how Fred Starr and Akiner had “hooked up.” Irena Lasota accused Akiner of having written a “government report” that reminded her of Eleanor Roosevelt’s visit to the Gulag. While John C.K. Daly announced that he had been Akiner’s friend for 30 years so could vouch for her honesty).

Akiner started soberly. She said she knows the Andijan violence is a serious issue, and she is concerned about what happened, how it affected policy, and what consequences were likely to come from it. Because her report had been available for some time, Akiner declared that rather than repeating her findings, she would instead discuss issues surrounding the report, attempting to address the controversy she created.


“People believe I went to Andijan at the invitation and urging of the Uzbek government,” Akiner declared.

“Not at all.”

Rather, Akiner said she went to Uzbekistan to deal with the aftermath of the cancellation, due to the Andijan violence, of a NATO conference on religious extremism that she had organized. Once in Tashkent, Akiner said, “I squeezed out time for myself to go to Andijan.”

She said she wanted to see the place for herself, because “the reports seemed confusing and contradictory.” Yet, when she told her friends in Tashkent that she wanted to go to Andijan, they tried to talk her out of it. “They thought it was too dangerous.” When Akiner left anyway, her Tashkent friends tried to look out for her safety, and before leaving she told a young American friend her last wishes.

She noted, “That I was met by a deputy governor is not surprising, my friends called him.” That did not mean she was on an official government tour. “There were no police on the streets of Andijan,” other than traffic police. “We stopped where I wanted to stop, talked to whom I wanted to. I asked Uzbek friends to help me. They were present, but not on top of me.” She added that she felt she had some leeway because she was considered a “sympathetic outsider.” She admitted that she had government cooperation, but distinguished that from sponsorship.

To the rhetorical question, “If no one was allowed into Andijan, how come me?” Akiner answered that although journalists were not permitted to enter, other people were able to visit. These included diplomats, who were told after the first official tour ended that they would be permitted back at their own risk and expense. (Akiner says she didn’t know of any who took up the offer).

Akiner said she was well-known to people in Uzbekistan because she had been going there for a quarter of a century. Some of her former students were now senior people in the government. Because they knew her, they knew she would come to her own conclusions. Therefore, they could not manipulate her. They knew, like Tajikistan’s president Rakhmanov, that “I said what I thought. I speak my mind.” Akiner referred the audience to page 10 of the printed report, for a summary of her stated opinions. She indicated that she didn’t clear them with the Uzbek government.

Akiner pointed out the first draft of her report had been written “as a private document for NATO headquarters and conferencegoers.” She had not intended it for publication. Only much later, after it had been posted to the internet without her knowledge or authorization, did Akiner agree to permit publication, in order to have a version she could stand behind.

Akiner said that she double-checked reports of casualties, because initial numbers were relatively low, then grew to thousands, eventually as high as 10,000. Akiner says she went to Bobur square, and paced it out in person, to cross check such claims. Her conclusion: “It was impossible to have 4,000 people there.” Other reports were not accurate.


At this point, Akiner made a plea for a level playing field when it came to discussing Andijan. It is good that people were skeptical of her report, and good that people were skeptical of the government of Uzbekistan, Akiner said. In addition, she felt, people should “also be skeptical of all other reports.”

Her rationale was that reports from human rights organizations relied primarily on eyewitness accounts, yet “we know that eyewitness testimony is unreliable.” She said eyewitnesses often report things that did not occur. For example, in the case of the Brazilian shot by British police in the London tube, their eyewitness accounts did not match the scene captured on video cameras. “Those who gave evidence thought it was the truth,” said Akiner, but like testimony in a street accident, conflicting eyewitness testimony cannot all be true. And if eyewitness testimony does not conflict, if it is all the same, it is all the more likely to be suspect.

For that reason, she urged the audience to cross check and ask for corroboration of all reports of the Andijan violence. Akiner pointed to cases in Northern Ireland where “it has been decades before we knew what really happened.”


An independent investigation was not in the cards, Akiner said, because Uzbekistan has a functioning government, although authoritarian. It is not a failed state, and that is the only justification for an international investigation. Akiner felt it was legitimate for Uzbekistan to claim national sovereignty and not to cede jurisdiction over the investigation to outsiders.

“Think of your own government,” she said. “Take the case of the young Brazilian. Brazil wanted to conduct its own investigation. The British government was not happy. The public was outraged.” In the end, the Brazilians were not allowed to act independently.

Akiner said she was shocked to hear “outrageous statements” characterizing the violence in Andijan as a “bloodbath” or “massacre” coming immediately from British politicians like Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. She questioned why these terms were deployed at such an early stage. Akiner said she doubted the authenticity Straw’s private sources of information, noting that Western governments do not have even as good sources in Uzbekistan as they possess in Iraq—and that the same government’s conclusions about Iraqi WMD were wrong.

One problem, Akiner noted, was “force of habit.” She had a “gut feeling of neocolonialism.” Beating up on Uzbekistan was a way for British officialdom to say, “We are better than you.” It reflected, in her opinion, an attitude that there were “not many countries we can criticize with impunity anymore, let’s enjoy it.” Critics like Straw hoped that the Andijan incident could be used to “hasten regime change,” and condemnation would show how “utterly unacceptable the regime is.” Perhaps also electoral calculations were involved, that it was in the self-interest of politicians to be seen as champions of human rights.


Akiner directly criticized human rights organizations, characterizing their reactions to her Andijan report as “not only harsh, but malicious.” She accused them of attacking her integrity as well as her work. “How do they have the right to do so?” She noted that she believed there was a representative from the International Crisis Group in the audience, then charged that “a senior member” of the organization had written to her colleagues to request that she be dismissed. In the letter, Akiner claimed that he “actually lied”, “was too lazy to check facts,” or thought “facts not important.” She said she had brought a copy of the letter with her. [NOTE: I have requested an official response from ICG to this allegation. They have not responded.]

Akiner asked: “If they can do that with me, how can we have confidence in what we say about places we don’t know about?” She said her experience made her think human rights organizations resemble “Soviet official hacks in full cry against some dissident…someone who thinks differently. Human rights organizations say, ‘We don’t respect your rights. We are the unique gatekeepers of truth.'”

Akiner elaborated that the personal attacks on her were “curious.” Why would they attempt to kill the messenger, if they had the evidence to support their views? She said she suspected that they were either “unsure of their material,” or there was some other motivation that had not yet been revealed.

Akiner accused the human rights organizations of creating a climate of fear surrounding discussions of Andijan. “Other people are intimidated and have written to me: ‘Don’t use my name,'” because she said they did not want to be attacked the way Akiner has been attacked. She concluded that human rights organizations have become “an unaccountable Fifth Estate” who operate in collusion with the press for the sake of sensational stories, rather than an honest searchers for truth. “‘Maybe we should look cautiously at what happened’ is not a good headline,” Akiner noted, “Ten thousand killed in bloodbath is a good headline.”


Akiner argued that the Andijan violence was a watershed event that has already yielded dramatic consequences, a number of them unfortunate for both Uzbekistan and the West.


The Uzbek clampdown on NGO’s should not have come as a shock following Andijan, Akiner said. Uzbeks were surprised, and not happy, that supposedly non-governmental organizations met with embassies, “especially the US Embassy,” on an almost daily basis. She drew a parallel to the Thatcher government’s unhappiness with British mine union leader Arthur Scargill’s visit to the Soviet Embassy during the miner’s strike. She said such involvement with diplomats raised justifiable suspicions. Akiner added that she believed the protection of NGOs by governments outside Uzbekistan actually cut them off from the people and kept them apart from society, so that NGO effectiveness was reduced to the extent that suspicions of surreptitious foreign involvement surrounded their work.


Akiner says the Uzbek intelligensia are angry with her, because they think her report was written to support the Karimov government. She believes that they don’t care about the reality of the situation, but would rather “use any stick to beat Karimov,” including the Andijan violence. She thinks this is a mistake that sidelines the intelligensia in Uzbekistan, reducing their possible role.


While admitting there are real problems of corruption and economic distress, Akiner believes the main problem facing Uzbek society is that there had been more access to justice in the Soviet period than is available today. Akiner believes the collapse of the USSR was “a major revolution” with long-term effects, and that regime change “won’t fix the problems.” The problem of access to justice needs to be resolved first, and the lack of a workable system of justice is a cause of much social discontent.


One reason regime change is a bad option for Uzbekistan at this point is a real danger from “religious extremists,” whom Akiner defines as those with the idea of creating an Islamic state. She says such people can already be found “in the Uzbek government.” Akiner warned that if such a state were created by violence, “it would destabilize the region.”

Akiner said she realizes that, “many people in the West say it [religious extremism] is a figment of the imagination, there is no such thing.” She disagrees, saying that it is a real danger. She noted that almost no one in the US paid attention to warnings from Karimov or Nazarbaev before 9/11, however, after 9/11 and Afghanistan those warning proved to have been prescient. Nevertheless, Great Britain permitted Hizb-ut-Tahrir to operate until July 7th, 2005. Only after the London bombings was a ban proposed. Akiner concluded the lesson from this experience is that “we take these things seriously only when they touch us. We don’t take them seriously in the region, when they affect only the region.”


Akiner believes the Andijan fallout has led to a rise in anti-Western feeling in Uzbekistan, even among the intelligensia who accept support from the West. She said Uzbeks believe the West is duplicitous. She told the audience that after Andijan, “there was a feeling in Tashkent that they would be bombed, as the West bombed Afghanistan, Iraq, and threatened Iran. I don’t think the politicians here thought about it.”

The result of Western hostility has been a change in public attitudes towards Iran. Even though they don’t admire the Islamic state per se, “now Iran is seen as a hero nation, because they stood up to the West and did not let themselves be pushed around.” This attitude, plus the tragic experience of the Tajik civil war, has affected the Uzbek view of what is happening, moving opinion in an anti-Western direction.


Andijan’s violence has had its effect on Uzbekistan’s neighbors, according to Akiner. She said that Bakiev and Kulov signed their truce in Krygyzstan on the 14th of May because “they perceived a threat of insurgency.” The initial reaction that they were dangerous insurgents only changed after Western pressure was brought to bear. On the other hand, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan continue to give cautious support to Karimov.

Akiner said that attendance at a Navruz-themed party at the Uzbek embassy in London gives a good indication of the real views of Uzbekistan’s neighbors. Despite the international condemnation of Karimov’s actions on May 13th, all the Central Asian ambassadors came to the Uzbek embassy on May 17th—and stayed for over an hour. “In London, this was an unheard-of statement of solidarity.” Akiner said it reflected their feelings that “We are Central Asians and need to protect our interests.”


Akiner concluded by asking some tough questions, in an attempt to put the Andijan events and world reaction into a policy context. She argued the answers might shape the future course of events in Central Asia, and perhaps beyond.

“Where are we going? What are we trying to achieve? A new Cold War? Containment of Iran? Then we want to be sure we are doing it the right way.”

Akiner said that she was disturbed by the tone of a recent event at Chatham House in London, where during a discussion of a the possibility of a new Iron Curtain, it was “very much us versus them.” Them included Russia, China, Iran, North Korea…and Uzbekistan.

“Do we need Uzbekistan as an enemy? Is Uzbekistan a cat to be kicked?” Akiner asked.

Human rights organizations were contributing to a dangerous hardening of positions, Akiner continued. “Are they trying to bring about improvements? Or, are they taking a stand to congratulate themselves? It reminds me of Soviet-era slogans like ‘Be on your toes against the enemy’—enemy Uzbekistan…you say Uzbekistan, automatic image—massacre. Think about it, take it further. We cannot afford to stray into a situation that makes the world a more dangerous place.”

Akiner’s warning seemed to be against further isolation or demonization of Uzbekistan. Her analysis suggests that such a policy risks turning into a slippery slope towards conflict between the West and a Russo-Chinese alliance. It appeared that Akiner does not believe that such a war in Central Asia is one the United States and Europe could win.

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Nathan September 18, 2005 at 10:08 am

There’s a lot to say about this, so I guess I’ll jump down here as I’m reading it. Disjointed as it may make my comments…

Though I do think she’s telling it as she sees it, I have to consider that another explanation for why no one tried to influence her findings is that they knew that they would not be bad for the Uzbek government.

I don’t think she understands what the point of the international investigation would be. God knows it would have little real impact and would itself be far from perfect. Rather, it’s a signal that the government has nothing to hide and is confident in its own findings. It’s a confidence-building measure.

Akiner seems to be the only person who thinks Western governments had a strong reaction immediately. While Straw’s was more forceful than that of others’, the whole West cannot be said to have immediately jumped to conclusions. (I’m not sure if she’s trying to do that or not, but it kind of seems that way.)

And I’m not sure I get this “force of habit” charge. It implies that Uzbekistan is some kind of long-suffering victim. And while I do think it does receive more attention than sometimes makes sense, much of that attention has only been in the past few years. There is no conspiracy against Uzbekistan.

Her critique of human rights organizations suffers from being almost entirely based on a suspect form of argument. Like she says regarding them, her argument would carry more force were it substantive. After all, there is plenty to criticize them over as she does when she points out their willingness to go with a sensationalistic story before it’s all checked out.

I agree with some of her characterization of the nature of Uzbekistan’s problems and the aftermath of Andijon. However, I don’t agree with the premise of her questions about relations between Uzbekistan and the West. In fact, she commits the very common sin of talking about Uzbekistan’s government almost as if it were passive. Perhaps there should also be some questions and concerns about what Uzbekistan itself can do to avoid a new cold war. Because, from where I sit, they are the ones saying the nastiest things and trying to wreck relations. And perhaps she might worry about which foreign policy orientation might best address the Uzbekistan’s structural problems and improve the lot of Uzbek.

Anodyne September 18, 2005 at 10:10 am

From the Akiner’s report: Under the circumstances, anyone who makes a good faith effort to ferret out and evaluate the evidence deserves our attention, respect and gratitude.”

Thank you, Laurence. I look forward to your continuing comments on Andijan, Uzbekistan, and policy issues in the region in the future.

Nathan September 18, 2005 at 10:27 am

Oh, forgot to mention. She deserves credit for calling for skepticism all-around.

David September 18, 2005 at 2:49 pm

Its all very well claiming that eyewitness testimony can be faulty, but when her evidence gleaned some time after the event (accompanied by Ravshan Alimov and various local officials), contradicts everyone who was there on the day (journalists, refugees, subsequent reportage from Andijan) you might begin to suspect that she is wrong and they are right. It is at least highly suspect to attempt an ‘independent’ report without interviewing the refugees, or addressing the detail of what eyewitnesses who were present have detailed. She has no sources detailed for most of her allegations, unlike other more credible reports.

Anyway, its easy to knock it down point by point, but the really interesting question is why does this strange cabal of supporters of Karimov exist in the West? What’s in it for them? Are their lives so sad that their social life will collapse without Uzbek embassy receptions?

Matt W September 19, 2005 at 8:58 pm

Agree with Nathan and David that there’s a lot to take issue with here, and that anyone with any Central Asian knowledge and/or critical thinking skills who has the patience to read Akiner’s entire report could pick it apart logically and factually if s/he wanted to dedicate the time.

One thing that is immediately clear to any reader is that Akiner had a very busy day. In fact, on closer inspection of the report, she had a nearly impossibly busy day. In any event, looking closer at how she spent her time can give readers an idea of how careful her research was likely to have been.

She says she was there for 12 hours (this was almost two weeks after the end of the events, by the way) and interviewed 40 people. That’s an average of 18 minutes per interviewee without even factoring out travel time in the city, meals, waiting for interviewees to show up. She says she also “walked around the city”, inspected the jail and the school, and paced out the entire square in front of the Hokimiyat in order to get a rough measurement – this would have all taken time too. Akiner, however, claims to spend 20 – 45 minutes with each witness – a mathematical impossibility.

She notes that she spoke with a classroom of about 15 madrassah students – and while it is somewhat disingenuous to pad the number of “witnesses” you had by counting all the participants of a class discussion, assuming that she included these 15 as witnesses make her account of her day a little more palpable, though still unlikely. Without the 15 madrassah students from the class discussion, it is actually 25 witnesses, that gives an average of about 28 minutes per interview (again, if Akiner spent every second interviewing people, which she clearly did not).

Akiner indicates that she spoke with 12 categories of witness (Akiner calls anyone she talked to a “witness”) besides madrassah students: madrassah teachers, imams, mahalla committee members, cemetery keepers/ gravediggers, doctors, prisoners, prison staff, bazaar traders, government officials, law enforcement officers, independent human rights activists, one hostage. So her remaining 25 interviewees were presumably divided among these categories (mostly official appointees or state employees with something to lose—notice the absence of anyone who was actually in the square, except for the hostage and perhaps law enforcement officials).

It also appears that at least several of these remaining witnesses were mahalla leaders, as Akiner relies on them for death estimates, citing a range of 3-10 deaths per mahalla (one would hope that she didn’t just ask two mahalla leaders to get this range) this eats into the remaining 25 witnesses with people whose testimony, as just neighborhood leaders, would not be particularly useful.

So really we’re talking about 20-odd interviews that probably lasted 15-20 minutes each after factoring in all of Akiner’s class discussions, inspecting of buildings, measuring public squares and walking around town. This is still an extremely tight interview schedule, which implies that someone was bending over backwards to get her all this face time (and presumably, most interviewees would be going through those who organized the interview and, thus, could be briefed or intimidated beforehand). Additionally, most of these interviews were of people who were either direct state appointees or de facto appointees (mahalla heads and official imams) who have to more or less tow the official line.

So the real question is how did this report get so much attention? For God sakes, an entire lecture tour?!! Akiner herself even admits she is not writing as an academic, but as a layperson.

Oh, and Starr’s assertion in the introduction that HRW was hiding dead bodies in Tashkent is just plain ridiculous. It’s a shame that someone so detatched from reality is allowed to continue to teach. He should be sued for libel.

brian September 19, 2005 at 10:57 pm

Great deconstruction of events in the report Matt. And as far as having offical/well-connected help to arrange the interviews, I agree something’s amiss. Something I’ve commented on a couple times before is her interview for Uzbek TV, but read the paragraph where she discusses this:

“My companions on the journey to Andijan were themselves surprised by
how greatly the situation there seemed to differ from what they had learnt
through the press (these were mainly individuals who had access to foreign
media reports). One of them suggested that I give a television interview
about my impressions. I thought about this for a while and then agreed to do
it, since I strongly believe that important issues such as these need to be
debated in an independent, open manner.”

My questions are: Who were her companions? Considering they were “mainly individuals with access to foreign media reports” and were quick to suggest discussing it on Uzbek TV, this makes me suspect that they were Uzbek nationals and perhaps connected to the government or national media. This goes back to what Matt suggested.
Then the obvious question is why would she think interviewing on Uzbek TV would be discussing it in an “indpendent, open manner”?

squid123 September 20, 2005 at 12:27 am

Matt W., impressive deconstruction. But an even more damning criticism of her methodology is that she admittedly did her interviews while walking around with government minders. I quote:

“We stopped where I wanted to stop, talked to whom I wanted to. I asked Uzbek friends to help me. They were present, but not on top of me.” She added that she felt she had some leeway because she was considered a “sympathetic outsider.” She admitted that she had government cooperation, but distinguished that from sponsorship”

OK, so this lady is walking around with “Uzbek friends” asking strangers, many of whom have had relatives killed or injured, about what happened. Has anyone ever conducted an interview? In Uzbekistan? OK, I’ll tell you. You can’t just walk up to people on the street and expect them to tell you the truth. Much less with a group of (possibly) government goons (or that people would preceive as such). Much less when people are paranoid because their friends were shot and made to disappear last week!!!

Plus, and kudos to Matt for pointing this out, she relies on mahalla leaders for her statistics. Not only unverified, like HRW eyewitness reports, but as government employees, they are the absolute worst type of source imaginable to get accurate information. Those are the people to ask if you want to hear government propaganda–or maybe that IS what she wanted? Plus, she uncritically accepts the government’s explanation of who the insurgents were and their motives.

In short, a farce–a specious piece of spin that the Uzbek government would have paid a lot of money for if it had hired a PR firm.


David September 20, 2005 at 3:35 am

Wonderful mathematics, and that’s without even taking into account the key to interviewing in Uzbekistan: the plov factor. Nobody who doesn’t know you is really going to tell you anything close to the truth unless you’ve eaten plov with them, so for proper research you have to factor in large amounts of time eating and admiring your host’s rice and meat dishes. When I was young and naive i also thought I could do 8 interviews in a day in the Fergana valley. If I got two that was a good result, and that presumes that you’re with the non-drinking variety of plov eater.

On Akiner’s friends: she says she went to Andijan with Ravshan Alimov. He is a nice guy and has a reputation as relatively independent. But he’s still a government official. He used to be head of the Institute for Strategic Studies, the govt ‘think’tank, and a member of the security council. But last I heard he was apparently lecturing at the SNB academy. So you turn up with a Tashkent official with SNB connections, and expect people to talk freely with you? Its just not serious.

Kisa September 20, 2005 at 7:38 am

Bravo to Matt!!!

I just wish that you guys were there to say all of this to her while she was at SAIS. Although, Starr was shooting down everyone who was trying to object to Akiner’s report.

Gene Daniels September 20, 2005 at 9:03 am

First, I join the others in a bravo to Matt for the wonderful numbers crunch on Akiner’s report!

But the thing that really jumped out at me when I first read the Akiner report was that it was completely at odds with everything that one hears in the Ferghana Valley.

I admit have not been back to Andijon since the uprising, but I have been there several times in the past and still live very near-by.

And true, this place can be a rumor mill, but it everyone lying? Is everyone out to make Karimov look bad? Even the Uzbeks who defend President Karimov’s actions admit that he likely killed 1,000+ people because “he had to or we would all be under Shahari law by next week,” or so the story goes.

And to all those who have spent significant time in Central Asia, doesn’t it seem awfully funny that Dr Akiner’s report yields numbers that are so close to the official Uzbek government line? I mean I have never seen anything close to honest numbers in even mundane things in Central Asia, how is it that the Uzbek government published honest numbers concerning this mess?

All seems rather fishy to me?

Matt W September 20, 2005 at 11:15 am

Yeah, there’s a lot of ways to attack Akiner’s piece. To follow up on what Brian and David pointed out about Akiner’s minders, in addition to Alimov and her other companions that made the trip with her, she states that: “I saw the prisoners in the presence of the governor, because I was not intending to ask them anything that I felt might be confidential.”

Perhaps more significantly, she notes: “At the border of Namangan province we were met by the deputy governor (hokim) of the Andijan province. He had been informed of my visit and he told me that he had been asked to help me see and do whatever I wished. He remained with us for the rest of the day,” and though she states “I was able to speak to people alone when I wanted to do so,” it’s hard to imagine his presence didn’t influence her interviewees, even when he then left them alone (although if Akiner didn’t think it necessary to ask the prison governor to allow her to speak privately with the prisoners, how often would she have exercised her right to meet without the deputy hokim present?). Mahalla leaders, official imams, and the prison governor would have surely known who the deputy hokim was (others would have seen a guy in a suit).

Did Akiner (who, unlike the deputy hokim in many cases, was meeting interviewees for the first time) make it clear that she was not an employee of the government and that it was not Andijon Province that was conducting the research, but her as a private citizen, or that this was, in fact research, and not a criminal investigation? I’m not suggesting she did not, but a clear introduction as to who she was, who she was not, and what she was trying to do would have cut into the already short time she had with her interviewees (and they didn’t know her and had no reason to believe her or be frank with her anyway, even when left alone).

Also, when a deputy governor comes to a hospital or school or morgue to introduce a foreign guest (or for any other meeting), it is customary for the director of the organization to come out and meet him, invite him into his/her office for tea and candies at least. Aside from increasing the amount of time needed for exchanging amenities with this honored visitor from the local administration (David’s “plov factor”), the organizations’ directors would be likely to either be the interviewees themselves or to be present at the interviews of their immediate subordinates (indeed, the office of the director of the organization is also where most interviews would take place). Directors of budget-supported organizations are direct political appointees, usually plugged into the same structure as the local hokim (relevant exceptions in Akiner’s case would be the prison director and police officials, who are part of local division of the Interior Ministry, though still active in the same local political scene that hokimiyat appointees are). So the line of appointment goes, for example, city hospital director-director of city health committee (Gorzdrav)-city hokim (often via his first deputy for social issues)-provincial hokim-President of Uzbekistan.

In residential communities, interviews generally unfold in a similar way: it would also be highly likely that mahalla leaders would meet guests and accompany the entourage when visiting residents. So even though the residents would be unlikely to know who the deputy hokim was, they would recognize their mahalla leader nervously leading around respected guests.

Kisa September 20, 2005 at 12:57 pm

Once again Matt, BRAVO!!!

I think that Akiner only discredited herself, not only as a “scholar”, but also as a person.
Fred Starr, don’t even start me on him. You are right, I am surprised, that he is still allowed to teach, especially in such a respectful school as SAIS.

Brian September 20, 2005 at 2:05 pm

Yeah, great stuff Matt!
Fred Starr… the guy who says in the introduction that the CIA or NSA surely must have excellent satellite photos of Babour Square showing “the truth”, but are keeping them secret. Oooooh yes… it’s a vast CIA conspiracy to help radical Islamists, get our base evicted and weaken our position in Central Asia.

Laurence September 21, 2005 at 5:58 am

For those who read Uzbek, here’s a link to the Voice of America Uzbek Service story in this regard:

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