One of the challenges in the Russo-Georgian War is that is has characters we’re inclined to lionize and characters we’re inclined to villify. Hence, we have sweet innocent Georgia being bullied by big mean aggressive Russia, and this is the accepted wisdom in the American corps of flappy heads on TV news. The reality, of course, is substantially more complex, with neither country being properly villain or victim.
The Economist is running a series of people offering their analyses of what went wrong, and how we should be framing this conflict. I was a bit surprised to see David Axe appear in this debate, not because he said anything I find disagreeable, but rather because he just isn’t who I’d expect such a snooty publication to highlight. It turned out to be a great pick, however:
It is wrong to read the South Ossetia conflict as Russian aggression, and it is equally wrong to conceive of the West’s reactions—and planned reactions—as containment. We have been reading South Ossetia all wrong since the beginning, and the consequences are enormous and potentially tragic.
The bottom line: Russia’s incursion into South Ossetia was justified, both in the particulars of Russia’s relationship to Georgia, and in light of Russia’s evolving, but troubled, relationship with Europe and the United States.
His essay is worth reading in full. Axe’s work in examining the propaganda behind the war has aligned nicely with my own, and this is probably why we’re both more willing to challenge the traditionalist view of Imperial Soviet Russia versus brave and defenseless democratic Georgia.
Of course, this makes him (and, given the similarities of our analyses, me) nothing more than a Russian Dupe, according to some 2-bit Pajamas Media blogger. Axe contextualizes it as “a disagreement over Russia,” and in that he’s largely right. But what a weird agreement!
It is important to realize that the Right, still slowly realizing that our current war is not simple, easy, or quick, is longing for the simple old days of an easily identifiable enemy in the form of the Soviet Union. That’s why there was such eagerness to declare the new cold war, even as Robert Kagan announces his fondness for ignorance in favor of ideology.
Alas, such a simple framework won’t cut it anymore. Too bad a big chunk of the punditocracy still thinks it does.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1849 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua's writing has appeared in the Columbia Journalism Review, Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
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{ 11 comments }
In my opinion, David Axe’s problem isn’t his point of view, it’s his selective credulity. He’s properly skeptical–blistering–when it comes to pro-Saakashvili shills. But his writing suggests that he’s fallen into the trap of “if Georgian apologists are lying, then plausible-sounding critics must be correct.”
In “Georgia’s Propaganda,” you wrote:
“meticulous detail” is a link to this post at Axe’s “War is Boring” blog. Axe begins,
The remainder of the post is a reprint of Gordon Haupt’s evidence for his (and Axe’s) belief that Georgia was entirely responsible for the war–and thus, that Russia is blameless.
To Axe’s credit, he has not cleansed the post’s comments, four of which raise significant questions about the veracity and context of many of the items on the Haupt/Axe laundry list.
- Shevchuk 09.03.08 @ 5:27 pm
- Kurt Nicklas 09.03.08 @ 6:38 pm
- AMac 09.03.08 @ 10:45 pm
- Jeff 09.04.08 @ 3:33 am
Axe’s response? To ignore critics and continue to use this material as support for his Georgia-all-bad thesis. Axe’s tongue-bath treatment of Haupt would be unseemly if Hauptashvili was based in Tblisi and reciting Georgian government talking points.
True, Haupt and Axe are swimming against the media tide of Saakashvili glorification. But their methods are just as unworthy of praise as if their trumpets were pointed the other way.
Give me a break, Josh. You excel at criticism and seeing the implications of arguments. You should be able to find plenty of problems with Axe’s essay.
Axe’s essay is nowhere near as good as what he writes elsewhere, and an indication that he should forget about foreign policy and stick to conflict and defense. This one carries the tone of a selection from an anthology of foreign policy essays in tribute to Justin Raimondo.
The one decent point he makes is that the West should make a better effort to understand Russia. But one would be better served to instead read Dmitri Trenin’s essay, in which the same point is made much more intelligently.
And your claim that the right yearns for the simplicity of the Cold War to substitute for the complexities of the war we’re in is strange. There are, however, many pundits on both the right and the left in the West who have framed the challenge in Cold War terms. The simplest explanation for why they do so is that it is a familiar narrative — they can whistle that tune perfectly. But then again, a lot of these same folks have whistled a variant of that tune in their writing about US foreign policy challenges after 9/11.
This is an issue that cuts across party lines and persuasions. Many of the Saakashvili hagiographers are “progressives.” On the other hand, Dana Rohrabacher, an icon of the “Right,” is quoted in today’s Telegraph as saying “The Georgians broke the truce, not the Russians, and no amount of talk of provocation and all this other stuff can alter that fact.” A couple of weeks ago, I checked responses to this situation on Daily Kos and Democratic Underground, and was surprised by the amount of Russophobia i found there. Many conservatives are going to be deeply troubled by what transpired here, once they become aware of the “true facts.” These are presently obscured by the smog generated by the Saakashvilistas. Should one yield to the temptation to make this just another variant of the “Is-Bush truly-evil-or-just-incredibly-stupid” meme, he will lose all credibility with people who might otherwise find his views persuasive.
As far as the ideological perverts out there, it is a mistake to attempt to remonstrate with them. They enjoy it too much.
AMac, you’ve probably already seen it, but there is a detailed reconstruction of this battle on the militaryphoto blog, entered by dux bellorum on 8-25-08.
The more I study on it, the less convinced I become that the Russians would have been obliged to sit on their hands until an attack on Tskhinvali was actually underway. I suspect a lawyer would say that preparations for an attack would represent an “anticipatory breach” of the Sochi Accords. In any event, I haven’t confirmed, but I’ve heard that the Dept. of Defense conceded, during the recent congressional hearings on this matter, that it still has not been able to turn up anything to confirm Saakashvili’s claims about tanks coming through the Roki.
archon,
Yes, the account posted by dux bellorum on 8/25/08 describing the Russia-Georgia war is the most complete description of events that I have seen. The perspective appears to be largely Russian, which is not surprising, given that this account is apparently derived mainly from Russian-language, Russian-media stories. Unfortunately, it is completely unsourced. That said, the Orders of Battle, descriptions of Georgian and Russian plans and tactics, and outlines of events themselves all seem plausible to me.
Georgia’s friends have yet to grapple with the implications of the abysmal performance of Georgia’s armed forces in the course of this war. And, in my opinion, they are worrisome, at many levels. Job One, shelling Tskhinvali… the mind boggles. Days later, in the midst of the collapse, El Presidente giving tactical orders by cell phone… the mind boggles for a different set of reasons.
Nathan,
I didn’t say the essay was perfect, merely that it was a good pick worth reading in full. My comments about propaganda are about more of his work generally, just as I didn’t like to any one post I had written on the topic.
That being said, you’re right that his argument is incomplete. While I agree with him that Russia’s incursing into South Ossetia was appropriate and probably not “illegal,” the moment they advanced into Georgian territory and began systematically disassembling the Georgian military they lost the moral high ground, moving Georgia from losing a skirmish to losing a war.
I suspect it is that dynamic which makes it easy for the pundits here to portray Georgia as the victim. Which doesn’t make it right, but that’s not what I was looking at.
Still, your criticisms here are 100% valid and I should have included them (since I agree). I blame my bad sleep all week.
One thing I have found very disturbing about the whole debate surrounding the war in Georgia and over South Ossetia is that we still, as a nation, haven’t had a proper discussion on what it means to invite and add the Ukraine and Georgia into NATO.
I discussed this on my site many times. And I have made my point clear as well: I am not in favor of either being a part of NATO for one very simple reason, they are both indefensible. With our armies currently bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and involved in incursions into Pakistan what could we defend the Ukraine or Georgia with? It’s a matter of numbers and facts and practicalities. We may wish to see a free Georgia and Ukraine. But our wishes and our capabilities are not aligned.
Mind you, the Baltics are hardly defensible either, but that is old news. The question I keep asking people is are you willing to, or are you willing to have your children die to keep Georgia or the Ukraine (who I think the war’s message was directed too) free from Russian interference?
And even more important: are Georgian and Ukrainian freedom part of our vital national interests? I submit they are not.
It doesn’t get any more simple than the above questions.
NATO is a defensive military alliance. Not a political club, like the EU.
Ultimately it comes back to credibility; if the US cannot defend the Ukraine or Georgia and/or NATO is unwilling to, how harmful is that to our national interests?
Anyone asking that question?
Sean-Paul Kelley,
Your comment hits the nail on the head. In U.S. domestic politics, Georgia is established as the plucky, hapless, innocent nation victimized by the resurgent bear. Combined with the New Shimmer (“it’s a dessert topping and a floor wax!”) view of NATO, offering membership to Georgia and Ukraine is a natural response.
In her coming-out interview with Charles Gibson, VP pick Sarah Palin took this line. Thus, it appears to be the received wisdom of the Republican/McCain establishment. Needing to be seen as tough and strong, the Democrats don’t demur.
The events in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 didn’t serve any of the nation-states of Europe particularly well, as it turned out. Perhaps American politicans could reflect on those lessons, once in a while.
Hans Blix has now delivered himself of the opinion that South Ossetia, athough “de jure” part of Georgia, was “de facto” independent, with the result that Russia did not need leave of the Security Council to come to its defense (Dr. Hans Blix: Georgia and International Law, MaximusNewsNetwork 9-15-08.) On this view, it is not immediately apparent how the introduction of Russian forces into South Ossetia, even before the attack on Tskhinvali, could be considered an :invasion,” or “aggression.”
Niceties of “international law” aside, it seems clear enough to me that Russia, in 1992, gave fair notice that it would be acting as South Ossetia’s protector. The ojection has here been raised (perhaps with an uneasy eye on the Ossetian’s rights of ‘self-determination’) that the Russians were not acting “altruistically.” The issue, however, is not whether Russia came trailing clouds of altruistic glory, but whether it committed aggression.
The list of key players who contradict or fail to corroborate Saakashvili’s version of events continues to grow. The most recent of these is Irakli Okruashvili, a former Georgian defense minister. (Okruashvili came close to an untimely end in 2006, while experimenting with his theory that Georgia’s rights of sovereignty extended o the airspace above South Ossetia.) He claims that he collaborated with Saakashvili in 2005 in planning military operations against South Ossetia and Abkhazia (“Saakashvili planned South Ossetia invasion”: ex-minister, Reuters, 9-14-08.) Okruashvili is not, perhaps, a model of credibility, but the others appear more disinterested (see Georgians v. Georgia Government thread.)
Reuters 9/14/08, Saakashvili “planned S. Ossetia invasion” -ex-minister.
I first came across Irakli Okruashvili’s name in this 2005 article, A Report from the Field: Georgia’s War against Contraband and Its Struggle for Territorial Integrity.
So prior to his ascension to Defense Minister and subsequent fall, Okruashvili was deeply involved with the festering (from the Georgian point of view) problem of South Ossetian smuggling. He would plausibly be in a position to contribute expertise to the planning of military options, as claimed in the Reuters piece.
It is said that Saakashvili was greatly distressed by the revenue he was losing through his inability to control traffic coming through the Roki Tunnel. He didn’t want to set up customs and duties stations on the border between Georgia and South Ossetia because, well, that would imply South Ossetia’s “de facto” independence.
I came across some interesting comments in Putin’s CNN interview of 8/28: “Under the guise of units of Ministry of the Interior, they secretely moved into the conflict zone their troops, regular army, special units, heavy equipment and tanks.”
“What is more, when our troops began moving in the direction of Tskhinvali, they came across a fortified area that had been secretely prepared by the Georgian military, in effect, tanks and heavy artillery had been dug into ground there….”