Hizb ut-Tahrir on the Ropes in Kyrgyzstan?

The fear in both Western and Russian media that instability in Kyrgyzstan leading up to and following the collapse of Akayev’s government struck me as overblown. In Russia’s case it probably was for political reasons and in the West out of ignorance. Even amongst analysts who knew their stuff, the fear came off to me as so ill-defined that I had to wonder whether one needed to worry. Hizb ut-Tahrir, after all, didn’t give any indication that it had any kind of plan whatsoever to harness opposition against the government and its ideology runs so strongly counter to Central Asian Islamic tradition that it seemed unlikely that people would suddenly flock to the black banner – especially when part of the reason for its appeal, the lack of viable outlets for secular dissent, was rapidly evaporating as protests mounted against Akayev.

If Gulnoza Saidazimova’s latest article on Hizb ut-Tahrir for RFE/RL is right, there are some important things to keep in mind about the group.

First, the idea that genuine democratic processes and outlets for political frustrations undercuts the appeal of fantical ideologies appears to be strangling Hizb ut-Tahrir. I’ll be the first to admit that one month isn’t enough time to draw a final conclusion on how popular or unpopular the group is in the country, but if the new government builds and maintains democratic legitimacy in the eyes of the public, statements like this will be nothing more than preaching to the converted.

“Our position has always been the same. No matter who it is, a peasant or a head of state, our appeal remains unchanged — we urge them to do good and to avoid evil; we call on them to follow Shari’a [Islamic law],” Dilyor Jumaboev, a Hizb ut-Tahrir member, told RFE/RL from the southern Kyrgyz town of Kara-suu. “[The Kyrgyz revolution] was a democratic process based on a democratic ideology. Muslims didn’t play any role in it. It wasn’t a victory of Muslims or of Islam.”

Maybe I’m extrapolating here, but I honestly do think it is a universal human trait for moderate adherents of a faith to take quite unkindly to the self-appointed mouthpieces of God telling them they aren’t up to snuff.

The other thing to keep in mind – and worry about to an extent – is that the debate over the use of violence by Hizb ut-Tahrir is heating up as a result of the revolution.

Analysts say Kyrgyzstan’s March revolution, in addition to dampening Hizb ut-Tahrir’s appeal, has also deepened an already existing internal split in the group.

There have been suggestions that Hizb ut-Tahrir is no longer united in the goal of nonviolent methods to achieve its ends. One branch still advocates a peaceful, global Islamic revolution. But another is pressing for a shift to more forceful means and focusing on revolution in a single country rather than regionwide.

“Experts say this split started 1 1/2 to two years before the revolution, when opinions changed within Hizb ut-Tahrir,” said Alisher Saipov, an independent journalist from the southern Kyrgyz town of Osh. “These groups emerged after internal squabbling. At present, some Hizb ut-Tahrir members say the debate over the method of fighting is ongoing — as are the splits.”

If this is true, it is quite possible that Hizb ut-Tahrir could develop a terrorist problem of its own even as the group has fairly insignificant public support. The situation would be analogous to what happened in Uzbekistan last year with Jamoat (or whatever the hell its name was). The group was likely made up of radicalized HT members and the attacks were taking place even while IMU members in Pakistan were taking advantage of an Uzbek government amnesty program and returning to life in Uzbekistan. With little public enthusiasm and the old Islamists closing shop, Hizb ut-Tahrir and its violent offspring were basically in their own little world. The significant difference between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is that Hizb ut-Tahrir still holds some appeal to those with a big beef with the government in Uzbekistan.

And, point 2b, which is partially offered to hammer home the point and for my own satisfaction, is that pointing out that Hizb ut-Tahrir, though we may not like their ideology, is just a nonviolent religious party is an absolute load of crap. There are, of course, the orthodox adherents to the ideology who, though they don’t talk about it much, do believe that the caliphate will be restored not because they nonviolently wish real hard but through a massive, short spasm of violence. But more importantly, there is something of an inevitability to the ideology that members will get frustrated with the absolute and utter lack of anything resembling a plan and press forward their fanatical beliefs with violence. Turns out that Islam Karimov was basically right to say that Hizb ut-Tahrir radicalizes future terrorists.

And, as mentioned by Saidazimova in her article, there’s a bit of history that people have overlooked with the group.

In a 21 April commentary, Stratfor, a leading intelligence consultancy, focused on the issue of Islamism in Kyrgyzstan. It noted that one of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s founders, Asad Bayoud Tamimi, went on to establish the group Palestinian Islamic Jihad, thus setting a precedent for the radicalization of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Now, much of that Stratfor analysis was crap, but this is a golden little nugget.

As sunlight pours in in Kyrgyzstan, Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to be fading. If this keeps up, the already sound case for allowing Central Asian publics more freedom to undermine the appeal of extremism only gets stronger.