That’s the point though. The US is trying to change this by helping to create economic alternatives for these countries.

Take a look at the international financial statistics for countries like the Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, etc. What you will find is that they have large trade and current account deficits, or in Ukraine’s case, are barely solvent, even though they still pay less than world prices for their natural gas. The fact is that economically they are Russian dependencies, and that is unlikely to change anytime soon. So any such infrastructure the USG may hope to build is on a foundation of economic sand. If the USG really wants Russia not to exercise influence in these areas, the USG will have to write the checks. Since there’s no chance of that happening, these countries will come under increasing pressure, especially since the Russian government have stopped caring what we Westerners think of them.

I would characterize US policy a bit differently Josh, though I accept that it looks exactly the same to Russia. We have had a fairly consistent policy that the former Soviet republics are sovereign states and that they should stay that way within their current borders. Unlike the Russian form of respect for sovereignty, we have policies that actually back that up. They take many forms, but they all amount to building an infrastructure that allows these states to be independent of Moscow if that is what they choose and makes it far more difficult for any former Soviet territory to be regained by Russia. Of course that is perceived as threatening by Moscow because it weakens Russia’s hold, but to some extent they need to just learn to live with it and let go of some of their paranoia. The likelihood that anyone’s going to go rolling across the steppe to take Moscow as a result of these policies is incredibly tiny. Far more likely is that Russia’s sovereignty, though not its influence, will be limited to within its borders.

By all means though, we should send a strong message to Georgia that it is far easier to support them if they would do more to limit flare-ups with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If they’re willing to play though, we really should step up efforts to change the playing field in the negotiations over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And Russia should be reminded that supporting secession in the former Soviet Union is a dangerous precedent. Heaven forbid it be used in favor of Chechnya or Tatarstan.

Maybe, finally, the U.S. policy establishment has realized its rapid grab for power and influence has spooked Moscow, which has prompted some of its more aggressive actions. But there remains a very fine line to walk between encouraging economic and policial liberalism (and the generally improved view of America in the process) and outright resuming the policy of containment.

Mixed into this is the fact that Washington tends nowadays to support democracies over autocracies, especially where Russia and its former vassals are concerned. We should default to Georgia’s side, but we also shouldn’t absolve them of all wrongdoing.

Exactly what Nathan said, in other words.

While I certainly can understand Georgia’s desire to enter NATO (primarily to piss of the Russians, but then also to be protected from them), as unrealistic a proposition as it seems like that should be, what utterly dumfounds me is a certain other presidential administration’s warm and welcoming responses to Georgia’s clumsly and unrealistic overtures, the only possible logical motivation of which seems to also be to piss off the Russians.

It must be remembered that while NATO seems to have been transformed into some kind of weird, military country club that all the cool new countries want to be in, the basis of the NATO treaty remains–it is a common defense treaty. If any member is attacked, all others must come to their defense. While the Baltic countries, who have stable governments, tiny militaries, and no natural enemies (although I think generally the goal of their accession and acceptance was also basically to piss off the Russians), Georgia is a completely different case. It’s hard to speak of Georgia even as a unified country.

So what is it exactly that we, the primary military power in NATO, strategically would gain by adding Georgia to the treaty?
Georgian special forces to fight terrorism? Another name on the list of “coalition partners” to add to the 50 some Kazakh medical personnel that “served” in Iraq for a few months in 2003 or 04?

What we get, I submit, is a big fat ball of trouble. We would give an unstable country the right to call on all the militaries of Europe to its defense as it flips Russia the finger as often and as enthusiastically as possible.

Don’t get me wrong, I have to translate whole batches of Russian newspaper articles about their ridiculous “response” to
Georgia for a class I have now, so I am keeping in mind very well how unbalanced their rhetoric and their response has been–but that’s only more reason not to clearly choose sides (much less sign treaties that legally obligate you to stick with the side you have chosen) in this conflict, no matter how unfunny it becomes. The last thing the Russians want or need right now is another war in the Caucusus, no matter how much they bellow, that’s not what they have in mind. But they also aren’t going to let the whole Georgian government do the equivelent of a drive by bareass mooning out the car window without throwing some rocks at the proverbial car.

I am, though, still entirely a partisan and am a 100% supporter of Georgia over Russia

By the way, I didn’t include it in the main post, but Kramer said, and keep in mind I am paraphrasing it in far less diplomatic language, that the US views Russia’s actions as an unwarranted overreaction and entirely out of line with its claims to be a responsible world power. I entirely agree with that.