On October 13th, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov made some rather startling remarks, speaking before the Andijon Council of People’s Deputies (Kengash). While those remarks are just now becoming subject of attention outside Uzbekistan, observers inside the country have been discussing and trying to parse them since last week.
What was startling is that for the first time, Karimov said that an uprising in Andijon in May of 2005 – which was put down by a bloody massacre of civilians by government troops – was at least in part due to the malfeasance and nonfeasance of local government officials – especially Andijon’s Hokim (governor), Saidullo Begaliyev. Specifically, Karimov said local officials had ignored the needs of the citizenry, and that “extremists” had then “taken advantage of the local authorities’ myopic policies,” and “lack of attention to peoples’ needs.” He also spoke of large amounts of public funds that had been “misused.”
With the puppetmaster looking on, the Kengash replaced Begaliyev with an Interior Ministry official said to be more trusted by Karimov.
This week, Karimov followed that action with the sacking of the Hokim of the Ferghana District, Shermat Nurmatov, replacing him with the former Hokim of Margilan City. Again, Karimov spoke of the need for more responsiveness to public needs and cited poor economic performance in the region and high unemployment – a subject that is rarely officially discussed – much less admitted.
It is not remarkable that Karimov would sack a Hokim or two, he does it with relative frequency. What is remarkable is that laying at least partial blame for what has internationally become known as the Andijon Massacre on local government officials is a complete and fairly radical departure from previous statements. For more than a year and a half, the official Uzbek line is that the Andijon events were entirely the product of “extremists” who were financed by “foreign sources.” In the past, some statements have directly pointed the finger at the United States and Western Europe.
In the days following Karimov’s appearance before the Kengash, Uzbekistan’s state-run and state-controlled media have widely reported on his remarks throughout the country – a clear signal that a point is being made. The question is what exactly is the point? Eurasianet has a fairly lengthy analysis of the situation, but the fact is analyses of events in Uzbekistan are for the most part pretty subjective, regardless of the source. Some have suggested Karimov’s remarks and moves in Andijon and the Ferghana Valley are meant to signal a desire for a warming of relations with the West. Others believe it is because he is sensing that public sentiment is again nearing a level of explosiveness.
Time will tell whether the meaning of Karimov’s statements and actions will become more clear.
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My guess is that papa is taking lines from his neighbor to the north. The two have been spending more time together and these changes may be advice taken from KZ – it’s possibly a preemptive shot to show that he’s ready to keep ‘weeding out the bad guys’ as well as position himself as a populist and reformer for the upcoming (election? referendum?).
That doesn’t infer that anything which he said is remotely true or accurate, it’s simply good print/press for Axborot or Yoshlar, or whatever TV the Uzbek-language public is force-fed. It fits in quite conveniently with his ‘dumbing down’ of the population as well…regretfully.
Many observers (writ: westerners) continue to promote ‘wishful thinking’ that his admitting some failure in domestic policy is a sign that he’s under political duress. I don’t see that. Same with attempts to warm to the West.
I think karimov is hiding something that the public he doesn’t want to know of..
The 400 possible reasons Harimov mat have done this will be excellent fodder for the “Taskentologists” of the world, but placing the blame on local officials is a typical authroitarian measure, let alone Soviet way of doing buisiness. Are we to give credit to Karimov for admitting what happened, while he denies any personal involvement? Are we to believe that something like Andijon can occur without his knowledge and approval? Poor guy can’t even control his own people?
I think it’s more than a typical authoritarian measure — I think it’s a typical element of post-Soviet politics. In all the august analysis of the move, there’s been hardly enough attention paid to the fact that this may well in fact simply be Karimov going after a regional political network that he has long been uneasy with.
As Bertrand rightly notes, analysis of Uzbek politics is highly subjective, and I would add, it shows whatever the author wants to see. So, I am unsurprised that Daniel Kimmage of RFE/RL would say that this might be about foreign policy towards the West — that’s kind of his thing lately — but I am hardly convinced it is a more economical explanation than is one that this is about regional politics.
It is typical of post-Soviet politics, but it is not unique to the region, or the time period. During the Soviet period the “excesses” of the periphery, or the “crimes of raion wokers” (Azerbaijan Republic Central State Archives of Political Parties and Social Movements, fond 1, opis 74, delo 146, list 167) were blamed for the problems facing the Soviet state. These were often followed by purges of local authorities (not just the bloody “Great Purges”) as scapegoating measures. They were used to crush local political networks as well, followed by a restaffing of more “politically reliable” elements. And one non-Soviet example I can think of off the top of my heard concerns Syria after the massacre of Homs. Anti-regime demonstrations were bloodily crushed, with the local bosses subsequently blamed and taken down. This is nornal operating procedure in mnay states. In Russian history, it’s usually helped promote the myth of the “good Tsar” surrounded by corrupt underlings. This may be what Karimov is trying to play, while taking out people he dosen’t like along the way.
I’m not sure how this can be viewed as an exceptional move at all. While it may represent a reversal from previous statements, that in itself is not exceptional.
Karimov may be seen to be attempting to achieve two aims with one action: he removes an official who, probably for reasons unrelated both to Andijon and any of the stated reasons, has displeased him.
He simultaneously makes that person a scapegoat for the Andijon event, and thereby admits some government culpability for the situation. He may offer that action as at least a partial response to cries that Uzbekistan hold an international investigation– that they internally identified both the direct and indirect culprits.
It might be considered clever if it weren’t so transparent. Nathan makes a good point. It’s the “good Tsar” game. Turkmenbashi plays this game continually by firing (or imprisoning) his underlings. Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan does it by continually rotating his cabinet around until they reach a position so far outside the realm of their experience that they cannot possibly function.
Well, I must respectfully disagree on this particular issue. I do believe the move is exceptional and I’m not the only observer in Uzbekistan who thinks that way.
I do agree – as I wrote earlier – that it is not unusual for Karimov to dispatch those who displease him for any number of reasons. However, for those who have witnessed the barrage of state run/controlled media blaming Andijon on terrorists with foreign (western) funding and training for more than a year and a half, the notion of now suddenly scapegoating in the form of blaming local government is, as I wrote, startling. He’s had plenty of time to do that in the past, but has made clear it wasn’t the government’s fault. Now he says it was, at least partially.
It may be this is a least a partial response to the calls for an indepedent investigation. That, to me, is then part of the “warming up to the west” theory.
Karimov plays the “good Tsar” game all the time. Nonetheless, I continue to view this as an aborration.
Totally agree with johnnie b. baker on this one. to me it reminds Rashidov’s fall.