Afghanistan’s Precipice

It gets kind of tiresome to constantly churn out bad news about Afghanistan, but the complete lack of focus on the area is appalling. In yet another series of violent clashes with the NATO forces in Helmand, “dozens” of Taliban were killed. But what do these skirmishes accomplish? They certainly haven’t driven back the Taliban, as the Bundeswehr, the German command in-country, believe that major attacks on previously-stable Kabul are now imminent. The snark in me wonders if this nervousness is caused by the “dirty hands” such an engagement would necessitate from the Germans, but it really isn’t a cause for mockery: Kabul should be the success story, but instead the situation in districts just 10km south of the city has deteriorated so badly that troops don’t patrol at night.

But it’s gratifying to see previously strident defenders of Bush’s campaigns come around, even if it is also surely bittersweet—aside from mouth-droppers like the budget of the police trainers (which, at $1.1 billion, is approximately 1 week of the Iraq occupation), seeing those of us who really do want the Afghanistan campaign succeed utterly demoralized by the laziness and incompetence of this administration is depressing.

Two years ago, Reason ran an in-depth story about the poor state of the Afghani army and the bad strategic position of the peace keepers. In it, Ben Fenwick worried about a “Warlord War.” He was close—Afghanistan’s current security situation more closely resembles a Hobbesian war of “all against all,” with the government only one of the factions fighting for control. The various warlords have not united against the Taliban, as they did in 2001; rather, the resurgence of the Taliban, its tenacity and violence barely answered, has shown them that they may actually get their own autonomous territory. Indeed, Pakistani officials have begun clucking their tongues at NATO, urging a withdrawal from Taliban territory similar to their own.

Much as it galls, such a suggestion might actually produce a temporary peace long enough to get the rest of the country under control. If the northern and western provinces can be rebuilt, especially with proper deference paid to the country’s Muslim traditions, it is much more likely that locals in the south, in Helmand and Kandahar, will realize they won’t have to give up their religion to have working toilets and good irrigation. In Pakistan, the withdrawal has stopped local attacks against the Pakistani military; maybe a withdrawal will do the same in Afghanistan, allowing NATGO a chance to regroup and adjust strategy. Don’t expect the idea to gain much traction, however—withdrawals, however temporary, don’t play well at home, and at this point Bush can’t afford to cede any ground to his opponents.

This post was written by...

Joshua Foust – author of 1801 posts on Registan.net.

Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust

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