It seems I wasn’t entirely off my rocker in seeing Iran advance into Afghanistan over the next 15 years:
The rise of Hezbollah, with Iran’s support, has demonstrated the extent of Tehran’s sway in Lebanon, and the American toppling of Saddam Hussein has allowed it to expand its influence in Iraq. Iran has been making inroads into Afghanistan, as well. During the tumultuous 1980s and ’90s, Iran shipped money and arms to groups fighting first the Soviet occupation and later the Taliban government. But since the United States and its allies ousted the Taliban in 2001, Iran has taken advantage of the central government’s weakness to pursue a more nuanced strategy: part reconstruction, part education and part propaganda.
Iran has distributed its largess, more than $200 million in all, mostly here in the west but also in the capital, Kabul. It has set up border posts against the heroin trade, and next year will begin work on new road and construction projects and a rail line linking the countries. In Kabul, its projects include a new medical center and a water testing laboratory.
Ambassador Bahrami is correct in saying Iran has a legitimate security concern in making sure Afghanistan is stable… to say nothing of their probable nervousness at beefed up U.S. military forces on either side should things get too bad in both countries.
It would appear Iran is finally feeling in a position to flex its muscles as the returning regional power, given its activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan—a side effect of being a nuclear nuisance. Those activities include making things as difficult as possible for the American troops. This is unfortunate, as Iran and the U.S. actually cooperated in the initial campaign against the Taliban in late 2001. After Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, the Iranians backed off from their general offer of support and focused instead on securing their position within Herat province.
It has other implications as well. Rather than applying to work somewhere like Europe or the U.S., hundreds of thousands of Afghani citizens are applying for work visas in Iran each year. Despite the probable security concerns five years down the line, Iran certainly seems to have an easier time of PR than the U.S. does, which bodes poorly for the future of our efforts there. For the moment, the U.S. and NATO have a narrow margin in good vibes; this is unlikely to last, however, with Musharraf’s reckless border campaigns and continued low levels of “nation building” personnel.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1771 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor.
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Afghan’s may be applying for work permits in Iran but they aren’t receiving them. Iran has been trying to get rid of the already substantial amounts of Afghan refugees that settled in the country the last 30 years. They don’t want nor do they need anymore. I’m not sure where you got that info, but when I was in Iran a few weeks ago, one thing that was clear is that the Iranian government was doing everything in its power to throw the Afghans currently in the country out.
Well, I got the information on visa applications from the NYT article. And you’re right – applications do not mean awards. But it is significant that applications to Iran are vastly dwarfing applications to western countries. All I’m pointing out is how interest on the part of local Afghanis may be indicative of something larger at play, which is a loss of confidence in the NATO mission.
“Those activities include making things as difficult as possible for the American troops.”
Hmmm….
How so? What does this statement mean? How are heroin patrols, infrastructure projects, medical and public health initiatives making things difficult for American troops?
Perhaps you mean to say that these projects make it more difficult for American troops to be the sole “good guys?”
Or … Perhaps you mean to say that Iran’s activities are making it more difficult for the U.S. to have its way with the Afghan people and “win their hearts and minds” over to our way of thinking about the world?
Either way, it seems to me that no one is making it more difficult for the American (read NATO?) troops than the U.S. government itself. Iran is simply doing what any neighboring country with cash and strategy would do. To imagine that Iran’s every step is all about the U.S. is rather narcissistic on our part.
I should have clarified that Iran is making things as difficult as possible for the U.S. in Iraq—which is surely in their interest (they want their own Shiite puppet state with lots of oil). Iran’s ultimate role in Afghanistan, beyond the obvious fact of its growing, and thus far non-violent, influence is unclear.
Perhaps you’re right, but I do get a kick out of how we have 150,000 soldiers in Iraq, the biggest embassy and CIA station in the world in Iraq, and yet blame the Iranians for meddling in Iraq’s own affairs. How dare they try to turn our puppet state into their puppet state.
Should we act surprised?
Yes, it’s all so delightfully ironic. If you’re into Alanis Morissette.
If it’s written by Nazila Fathi it’s usually pretty reliable reporting. I also think it is very important to realize that not one single NYTimes reporter reported this article from Iran. Look at the stringer’s listed below: Damascus and Baghdad. No one reported from Tehran. Clear sign, in my opinion, that the article has some structural problems.
On last thing: Herat has historically been a part of the Iranian sphere of influence, if not a part of Persia. I think most people who studied the area before we overthrew the Taliban figured something like this would happen. It’s not necessarily a bad thing as well. The Iran’s are a status quo power in Afghanistan, not a revolutionary one like they might be in Iraq.
I don’t get it – the NYT article has major structural flaws (namely, the dateline of the authors) which call into doubt its reliability, yet the general thrust of the story, which is that Iran is solidifying its ties to western Afghanistan, is right? How can you have it both ways?
It’s easy: what they write about what Iran does in Afghanistan and Iraq and Damascus is probably very reliable. What they write about things that go on inside Iran or decisions made in Iran I take issue with. They aren’t there. If you’ve been to Iran you understand that the gulf between the reporters on the ground there and the reporters reporting on Iran in places like Damascus, or Cyprus and elsewhere is way, way out of kilter with the reality on the ground. It’s really quite simple.
It’s one thing to say, “hey, I am reporting on Hezbollah” and you’re in Lebanon or Damascus. But if a reporter doesn’t go to Iran to follow the rest of the story up they aren’t getting the whole story. Would the regime lie to the reporter if they made it to Iran? Sure, but a good reporter would know how to report around that. Same goes with the Taliban.
You know the photo of the quote from the Q’uran in the NYTimes article? It would have been much more powerful had the author included a similar photo of a similar quote/street sign from inside Iran. They are everywhere. Literally every 20 miles or so. That would have made it even more convincing.
I guess my point is that once you’ve been to Iran and you read reporting on it, you are always jaundiced and skeptical about it if they aren’t reporting from Iran because as I have said ad naseum, the relaity in Iran is vastly different from what we’re told. It’s like night and day.
I don’t doubt what you’re saying at all – in fact, that’s something Nathan and I complain about regularly. However, I still don’t see how that relates to your complaint about the article – it’s about how Iran is approaching Afghanistan diplomatically (which is, as you said, verifiable), and how the locals, at least in the west and in Kabul, are responding (again, verifiable).
My own speculation was limited to saying Iran has an easier time of PR in Afghanistan than the U.S. does, which kind of goes without saying. And the stuff about visas was related merely to the volume of applications – an indication of demand – and not an official immigration policy.
I guess I’m just confused as to where we disagree.
I don’t think we disagree. I was drawing attention to the fact that the article clearly had weakness as to the state of Afghanis in Iran, and how Iranians and the Iranian gov are treating them. Other than that, as you note, we’re pretty much in line.