Plus, as has been noted, Iran possesses, or shall soon possess, nuclear weapons. A wealth of rare minerals (oil) plus apocalyptic weapons (nukes) makes the stakes far higher with Tehran than with Tashkent. Indeed, Europe, even more than the U.S., has a compelling reason to quickly resolve the crisis in Iran in a peaceful manner; it has the luxury of taking its time with Uzbekistan, or so it thinks.

I’m sure none of us are blind to the inroads Russia, China, and even India have made into Central Asia. Europe and the U.S. are not the only economic powerhouses looking for ways to peacefully engage these countries and extract some kind of financial windfall. As Nathan noted, neither Russia nor China care about human rights (China having proved this with its recent interest-free loans to Sudan), and India has at best been sanguine on the subject. Worse, unlike Europe, which at least in theory is a natural ally of the U.S. and should have analogous interests, Russia, China, and India all have slightly divergent interests, though one in common: reducing the power and influence of the U.S. in their respective regions.

I grow uncomfortable with such state-level politiking, because it requires a lot of shortcuts, but it does closely match what is actually happening in the region.

I think we can’t avoid a certain degree of engagement: geography dictates relations with these regimes. And, cynical though it may be, we can’t accept their permanent alienation because there is too much to gain from economic cooperation. Perhaps a slight easing of sanctions, in exchange for more rigorous business and commerce laws? Say, dealing with the currency nightmare, the bad import laws, and fixing some of the state banks so they have a credit rating? That would be a good start.

Hell, China got a slow start with its capitalism programs. These things take time, and it’s not very fair or realistic to expect a full and equitable solution to happen in six months, or even in time for the next election. You have to take a longer view with dictatorships.

I got were saying, but I may have written in such a way that it seemed so. But it is interesting to note, as Josh did, that the US has its own set of policy double-standards.

His comment about the US not passing sanctions also bothered me. Diplomacy and policy-making aren’t dick waving contests, and European policy toward Uzbekistan has nothing to do with the US one way or the other. It’s fairly safe to take Germany at its word when it says that energy is the reason to engage and not that it’s using that as a cover for it having cold feet over the US not levying sanctions. Europe might not seem so reliant on the US in international policy if so many didn’t obsess over it all the time. On top of that, the US has shown a bit of virtue that Europe has failed to emulate.

Anyhow, Ian, I think that you’re right about the cold war vs. colonial difference to a degree. I don’t think it necessarily accounts for public rhetoric though, as you note.

I think Laurence might be right, but I’m not so cynical about Europe’s motives. Another reason for Iran getting a different kind of rhetoric from European (and American) intellectuals has to do with the different traditions at work. On the one hand, Uzbekistan gets the old Cold War treatment–Deletroz’s words come right out of the critique of Soviet human rights. Since the seventies this has pretty much been the default position of both the left and right in Europe. Iran, on the other hand, gets the post-colonial guilt complex that says that all countries outside of Europe have be treated with respect and on the level. It’s not so much that Uzbekistan is weak and Iran is strong–which is true, and I guess it might play a role in the kind of statements ICG makes–but that it’s easy to criticize a very Soviet-like dictator and difficult to dismiss a real regional force with a history of being abused by the West, like Iran.

I had a problem with Mr Délétroz’s superior tone as well – and I’m European! Anyhoos, great piece Nathan, but I hadn’t quite intended to make a direct comparison between EU-Uzbek relations and US-Iranian relations but rather between two strands of EU diplomacy, on Iran and Uzbekistan. Mr Deletroz, for his part, also pointed out, somewhat snarkily I felt, that unlike the EU, the US hadn’t even bothered imposing sanctions on Uzbekistan in the first place …