Security Solutions for Afghanistan

The more I dive into the problems facing Afghanistan, the more I’m convinced it can be settled and modernized, just not with the current leadership in the West. It’s not that they’re necessarily incompetent, though I do feel that’s a factor; it’s more the system. No western military is flexible enough to properly deal with the new kinds of challenges facing it; similarly, political concerns dominate strategic planning, trapping tactics and policies in a claustrophobic election cycle, rather than giving them the space they need to properly evolve and operate.

Afghanistan is a tricky beast, complex and imperfect in every way. Building a country from scratch was never going to be easy, but in this specific case the normal “security + aid” problem is complicated by government capacity and the drug trade. In my post partially laying the groundwork for reforming aid in the country, I mentioned The Golden Triangle of Conflict:

I have found this kind of graphic a useful way of visualizing why Afghanistan is in the state it is in. Each vertex of the triangle has its own unique problems and solutions, but none of these can be solved in isolation—they are so interconnected, and affect each other on so many levels, that any kind of a solution must incorporate all three to be meaningful in any real way.

I’m bringing this up because there must be some sort of framework for untangling what is going on. One of the notes I keep getting back from real editors on the drafts I send them is that the very complexity of the situation in Afghanistan makes it incredibly difficult to discuss, at least with any hope of doing so with a realistic eye toward a favorable end state.

I’m writing the above caveat because it’s important to recognize that simply focusing on the military will not help. However, below the jump I am going to try to create a framework for a long-term security-based solution to the deteriorating situation.

The General Situation

One of the big positives to come out of Donald Rumsfeld’s retirement is the partial discrediting of RMA, the Revolution in Military Affairs. By this, I mean the overuse of Network-Centric Warfare concepts like pared-down ground troops, a heavy reliance on C4ISR (a “system of systems” approach to operations) and air power, and the conscription or co-optation of local militias to do the bulk of the fighting.

It was the broad strokes of the initial campaign in Afghanistan: small groups of special forces rallied the Northern Alliance warlords, and they then reclaimed territory from the Taliban with air support from the U.S. In this, they were highly successful, and the Taliban were routed, scattered into the countryside and the tribal areas of Pakistan within a matter of weeks.

The problem came in the aftermath. American troops are highly skilled at killing a lot of people very quickly, which is why they are the most powerful and effective military in history. At conventional war, nothing can touch them. But what happens after war? More specifically, what happens when you mistakenly use conventional war assumptions, when you are really fighting something very different?

From the start, American policy makers should have realized the enemy they were fighting was different. Even ignoring President Bush’s constant use of the term, “a different kind of enemy,” it was obvious the Taliban were not a traditional fighting force: they had no uniforms, no official standing army, and no international legitimacy. Even today, years after the initial invasion, the Taliban still lose every single engagement with Western forces because that is not their strength.

The Taliban have learned the lesson every guerilla force eventually learns: power comes not through guns, but fear. Decades of brutal global war have conditioned western forces to be mindful of innocent bystanders during combat operations, and make honest attempts to minimize collateral damage. The Taliban have no such concern, which makes them powerful. They see nothing wrong with hiding while the troops are on patrol, then executing whomever might get in their way. This is why, despite the recent use of Iraq-style suicide bombing, most of the civilian violence in Afghanistan is in the form of small-scale assassinations: a teacher here, a recalcitrant politician there. The Taliban don’t want to kill a lot of Afghans, nor do they want to “occupy” a given territory, at least in the same way NATO does. They simply want to control it. And the only way to control an area you cannot afford to physically occupy with overwhelming force is to effectively leverage fear.

That is the secret to the Taliban’s success. They don’t have to sweep an area to effectively control it. They just have to murder the right people to sow sufficient fear that the locals will not cooperate with or trust the eventual NATO patrol.

In other words, the Taliban could not be wedged into the DoD’s guerilla warfare framework. As David Kilcullen showed in his already-classic 2006 essay Counterinsurgency Redux, the Taliban do not behave like a traditional, “conventional” guerilla force: they do not have a guerilla counter-government, which is one of the primary attributes of a normal guerilla war. That is because creating a state may not be their ultimate objective:

Particularly in AQ-linked insurgencies, the insurgent may not seek to do or achieve any practical objective, but rather to be a mujahid, earning God’s favor (and hope of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself.

I don’t fully buy Kilcullen’s interpretation of the Taliban, as he supports this argument by quoting Osama bin Laden, rather than Mohammed Omar. And Al-Qaeda do have ultimate state objectives: in simple terms, the recreation of the ancient Caliphate, a global, conservative Islamic society centered on Mecca. The Taliban were trying to create the first “truly Islamic” state in Afghanistan, and they had Al-Qaeda’s help in doing so.

Whether or not they still have have the creation of their own state in mind, there is no doubt that the Taliban operate as spoilers to any sort of progress in Afghanistan. And ever since the invasion, they have not behaved like a traditional guerilla force, which is important. Similarly, the issue of neighboring states funding and supporting guerilla campaigns is one that has never been solved to my satisfaction: just as bombing Cambodia during the Vietnam war did nothing, not bombing the tribal areas of Pakistan has done nothing. The full and open cooperation of Islamabad, which will not come while Pervez Musharraf is in power, is a prerequisite to a peaceful end to the conflict.

What Went Wrong

Outside the DoD, very few analysts thought the war against the Taliban would go smoothly. When it seemed to in 2002, there was a collective exhalation as the U.S. prepared to invade Iraq. But the Iraq adventure ended up crippling the campaign to solidify Afghanistan.

For one, troop levels were never what they should have been. It was silly to think that a few thousand troops could establish order in a population of 31 million, no matter how eager they may have been. It was similarly silly to assume that the disappearance of Osama bin Laden wouldn’t create larger strategic headaches (Bush’s 2003 comment that he is truly “not that concerned about him” is the widest indication of this mindset). It was also silly to think NATO would do anything it said it would.

NATO always promises more than it delivers. It has been promising “more troops” since the start of their occupation, most recently at the Riga conference this past November. It is like pulling teeth to get a few hundred more troops here and there, all while other, sometimes larger, groups of soldiers are recalled.

Many NATO member countries refuse to let their troops behave like troops. At least Germany and Italy have publicized their so-called “caveats,” which are country-specific Rules of Engagement. Germany claims it is in the country to rebuild it, not to fight the Taliban. Italy isn’t sure it wants to be there at all, at least as long as the communists remain a significant faction in parliament.

Caveats and ROEs severely limit what the troops can do. Though only recently some, unspecified countries were reported to have allowed their soldiers to come to the aid of other soldiers under attack (how kind of them), even the British have hinted that there are instances in which they will not fire a shot.

As such, the occupation force in Afghanistan is stuck in a terrible position: it has too few troops to do the job, and large numbers of the troops are forbidden to do it. It is another way of telling the Taliban exactly where and how to destabilize the country.

Numbers matter. Having a smaller-than-usual force would make things difficult enough for the “hold” operations required to establish security; but saying there are 33,000 (or so) troops in Afghanistan is deeply misleading: the actual number available for security operations is far, far smaller.

Tying Together

Aid and opium have their own roles to play. It is difficult to explore how they interweave in a short space, but suffice it to say that steamrolling through an area and killing anyone dumb enough to wave a gun doesn’t accomplish much. Similarly, destroying the only reliable source of income for the locals (i.e. poppy) will not endear them to the inevitable highly-armed Provincial Reconstruction Team that follows, urging them to give up their sinful opium in favor of wheat or pomegranates. So the NATO unit moves on, considering the area cleansed of Taliban. Only, at night masked men come down from the hills, find one of the teachers at a school for girls, and slit her throat. They also kill a local councilman for good measure, telling anyone nearby that they cannot turn their backs on Islam.

How would the PRT react? We know they simply hole up in their compounds, and in bigger cities like Lashkar Gah (the capital of Helmand Province) the baazars and markets are off-limits for safety concerns. If the PRTs can’t interact with the locals, how could they craft an effective development policy? If all that happens to opium farmers is an annual spray, how can the “problem,” to include replacement income, be considered addressed in a sustainable way? How can anyone be assured the Taliban won’t continue to return if the NATO troops have moved on to the next security situation?

A tangled web indeed. But it is important to remember that development matters little without security.

Ways Out

There are, unfortunately, really only two solutions to the security problems: change NATO policy, or change national objectives. Each has benefits and major drawbacks. Otherwise, we are left with half-hearted troop increases of several hundred at a time and a continuation of the same security policy that has not worked the last few years.

Changing NATO policy is the easier of the two. Right now, things are so shakey, Canada’s Senate is considering pulling its troops if the rest of NATO doesn’t pull its weight. This would be a gigantic blow to the mission, as Canada has been punching well above its weight in the south (the bravery and skill of the Canadian troops is rarely mentioned, but should be reiterated more often). Troop numbers must increase, in other words, and caveats must be removed so they can behave like a normal fighting force instead of armed humanitarian workers (its own problem I’ll have to address later).

The big danger of a troop increase is the same as in Iraq: too small an increase will only increase bloodshed without measurably increasing security—making the problem worse instead of better. It is also highly unlikely a major increase is forthcoming: according to the metrics laid out in the DoD’s new counterinsurgency manual, at least 620,000 troops should be in Afghanistan. Deploying even 10% of that would be a miracle.

The other main option is a radical shift in national objectives. This can take several forms, but the most likely one I see is radically redeploying troops to secure the major cities, with a significant force sent to secure the border with Pakistan. This must take place in the context of a major change in diplomacy, reaching out to Iran for help in re-securing the west (they assisted us in removing the Taliban, and have an interest in preventing their return), and hammering Pakistan for its tacit and explicit support for the militants.

Functionally, this would limit the Taliban to Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kandahar provinces. It would also push them into the countryside, and while that presents the troublesome aspects of the Soviet campaign, this time there is no countervailing superpower supplying them with high tech anti-helicopter missiles. By creating safe zones in the cities, and even between some of the calmer ones (particularly up north), some measure of stability might be achieved, allowing more complex development to take place. This would include the drafting and training of policemen, among other efforts like anti-corruption, with the eventual goal of expanding the safe zones to encompass more and more territory.

Enlisting Iran and Pakistan is far more challenging. Both are beyond the pure security outlook I’m discussing here, but in simple terms we have to concede to the Ayatollahs on some issues and basically close the border with Pakistan. Neither are very politically feasible, but Afghanistan will not settle itself as long as Iran takes a distant interest, and elements within the Pakistani government (notably the ISI) actively support the Taliban.

This obviously has some big drawbacks. For one, the obvious fact that building a country from scratch takes a lot of time will be lost on mose electorates, since few really look past the next Congressional or Presidential election. This kind of a solution will only work on the order of decades, however, so without a long view it will seem illogical, almost stupid. This solution also creates a de facto apartheid within Afghanistan, singling out provinces for isolation and effective starvation.

A much larger problem is two-fold: granting the Taliban a form of legitimacy, along with George W. Bush actually admitting a mistake. Frankly, I would bet money the former looms smaller in the White House than the latter, since Bush’s seeming perfection has been a talking point for years.

Another issue: it would make Afghanistan much like Colombia. I have complained repeatedly at the nomination of William Wood to take over the U.S. mission in Kabul. Having come right from Bogota, he is almost certainly being brought in to handle the anti-narcotics efforts. The trick is, Colombia is basically two states—the legitimate one centered in Bogota, and the FARC-run countryside, where all the cocaine is grown and processed for export. Turning Afghanistan into an Asian version of this would be extremely unpopular, but here’s the thing: the stable areas of Colombia are not suffering too terribly, violence has declined, and Lonely Planet named it one of their Top Ten global destinations.

This is not a permanent solution for Afghanistan, merely a stopgap measure that would allow a consolidation for an end game: the unification and stability of the entire country. The uncomfortable reality U.S. and NATO policy-makers need to face is that Afghanistan cannot be addressed on anything less than the long-term, and arguing over a few hundred troops is ultimately self-defeating. Looking for short-term solutions or victories is partially why NATO is bogged down the way it is. Its current strategy isn’t working. A more strategic, forward-thinking, dramatic change in policy is the only real way of considering an end to the fighting and an eventual withdrawal of all western troops.

This is why rumors of a major U.S. push for additional troops might offer some hope. However, a tepid increase of a few hundred to a few thousand troops with no corresponding change in tactics and strategy will simply make the death toll higher for the exact same outcome—stalemate leading into Western fatigue and withdrawal. A comprehensive new strategy is needed, one that addresses not just the numbers of troops but the way they are used. Anything less is simply prolonging the deadly, deteriorating status quo.

This post was written by...

Joshua Foust – author of 1801 posts on Registan.net.

Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust

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