As for incomplete solutions? I thought the idea of creating “safe zones” in the country was novel, at least in that I haven’t heard it mentioned anywhere else. Think of how we defended Kurdistan from the predations of Saddam Hussein, how northern Iraq could almost be a stable functioning country as a result.

Similarly, sealing the border with Pakistan is a solution I have not yet heard elsewhere, and it would represent a dramatic shift in U.S. policy, since to date we seem more interested in holding Musharraf’s hand than stemming the cross-border traffic. Similarly, trying to bring Iran into the security process, which does have a proven record of success, often goes unmentioned in discussions of “fixing” Afghanistan.

I will, however, happily admit that you are right – this is all little more than a sketch, an outline of how it might come together. This is a blog after all, not a book.

Lastly, your complaint about the term “militarizing aid.” I agree with you that the U.S. military excels at MOOTW, the problem is I think that is a terrible misallocation of resources. While it is indeed nice to use the Army as a rapid reaction humanitarian force, it is really a killing force. The U.S. military is exceedingly good at killing people, and I am glad, because that tells me they are an exceedingly good military. But, and please correct me if I’m terribly mistaken, do you spend much time in basic learning about developmental economics? Health? the culture of the places you travel to? Language? Or do you learn about the military, how to use your weapons, military history and tactics, strategy, and Code of Justice, and so on?

This isn’t to disparage the military, and I recognize my argument skirts close to it. It is simply to complain of a misuse of resources. While the military can get to places more quickly than anyone else (except maybe World Vision or something) , that is still problematic.

There was a huge difference between the Navy sending in ships to process drinking water for tsunami victims (since no one else has that capability) and what is happening in Afghanistan, where the military and aid workers are so intermingled they are indistinguishable. This is a globally unique situation—in almost every other humanitarian situation on the planet, though aid workers and the military operate in the same country or area, they are kept distinct. When you cannot tell them apart, it creates an additional incentive to attack aid workers as soldiers.

Think of Medicins Sans Frontieres. They had been in Afghanistan for 24 years, including while the Taliban ran the country, but the deterioration from mixing aid and military got so bad they abandoned the country—making it on of, I believe, three in which they have done so (the other two being North Korea and Somalia). Similarly, there are reports out of the southern provinces that NATO forces drop leaflets in villages, telling the few who can read that they will not receive aid or reconstruction money if they don’t turn over militants.

Now, quibble with their arguments if you want, but the fact is, major aid groups are frustrated with how the development work has been taken over by the military—most of whom are plopped into the country with no language or developmental economics skills. While physical resources are great, and you’re right that the military is excellent at those kinds of logistical movements, aid is far more than simply money and roads. The missing key to Afghanistan – institutions – is what the military has no expertise in building.

Your conclusion doesn’t seem complete. I don’t find any concrete reform proposals or recommendations for changes in strategy. It’s clear thought at you are not satisfied with the current effort and you don’t like the Colombia model. It’s an added level of frustration to me, to read several half-formed suggestions, that, unless significanly differnet in undisclosed detail, amount to what we are already doing (in particular your comments about the police and anti-corruption).

And you come to a point common to my own view, that this is a generational effort. It takes 8 years, minimum, to quell an insurgency, 12 years, minimum, to build an army, and 20 years, minimum to build a nation. 40 is perhaps more accurate.

This is why I’m sceptical of any policy reform or tactical/strategic adjustment. These are minor shifts that have one thing in ciommon, impatience with a process that has only just begun. I don’t think there is anything productive to be gained by rearranging the deck chairs and there is the real chance that changes might result in a longer duration.

You are wrong, flat out, about “militarizing aid” (it’s even a silly phrase). No one in the world can provide more aid, faster, to more isolate areas, or dangerous enviroments that the military. No ne complained about “militarized aid” in the wake of the tsunami a few years ago. In addition, how silly is it to have a military presence, with all that skill and resource, simply standing by. The unarmed humitarian workers were already targets, nothing to do with us.

SGT Robert White
Camp Phoenix, Afghanistan

You’re also right about the army. I had a throw-off sentence in there about the dangers of militarizing aid. That’s a huge issue, especially in Afghanistan, and I don’t like that it happens. It blurs the line between combat and reconstruction, for one, plus it puts unarmed humanitarian workers out there as targets. Lastly, as you said: armies are for killing people, not building roads.

I also think attacking Iran is about the worst move my government could take right now. I explicitly think we need Iran if Iraq or Afghanistan are to be settled any time soon. Bush and his team probably thought they had scored a neat victory by placing hundreds of thousands of troops on either side of the Ayatollahs, but Iran has shown it has far more power than we gave them credit. We need them, in other words.

1. Taliban may have a shadow government in place over in Pakistan.
2. Musharaf’s departure may not necessarily produce a more cooperative ally; in fact the policy is more “Pakistani army” state of mind (think Maginot Line) than anything else. The fact that a civilian leader may be worse, need also be kept in mind, although unless the prospective leader agrees to tango with the army they can’t put a foot through the door sell.
3. Pakistan needs a security guarantee of sorts vis-a-vis India.
4. When it mattered (during the Loya Jirga and post-Bonn process) the Europeans were all for a more human rights centric approach. The US represented by Khalilzad actually threw all their babies out with the bathwater. True that back then Rumsfeld and his one time assistant Khalilzad flush with their Pyrrhic victory wanted to actually wrestle bears with their bare hands, but really why should the Europeans hold the bed pan now?
5. Army’s are good for fighting and security. This whole hearts and mind thing isn’t their job. Focus on security. Once that is in place, we can see economic progress. Otherwise, it’s an utter waste of time and resources. It takes three months and maybe 10,000 dollars to build a school, but two sticks of dynamite and a days worth of planning to bring it down.
6. Please don’t attack Iran.