Germany’s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, recently visited Georgia as part of a tour of the Caucasus exploring ways to reduce European dependence on Russia for energy. He commented on Georgian accession to NATO.
“Of course, it is in the interest of NATO and NATO members that new NATO members do not bring their conflicts into the alliance along with them,” Steinmeier, whose country holds the rotating EU Presidency, said at a news conference in Tbilisi.
“On the other hand, it doesn’t mean we should view the lack of a resolution as an obstacle to accession,” he added. “If we [view it as an obstacle], then we will enable third parties to drag out the rapprochement process endlessly.”
That is a controversial view, to say the least. But he does have a point. Western governments have sent the message that Georgia must take care of its conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia before it can become a member of NATO. And as good a friend as the West considers Georgia, it has shown little interest in assisting conflict resolution efforts. The subtext, which comes across loud and clear, is that Russia need merely keep the conflicts simmering to prevent Georgia’s entry into NATO.
But still, this is quite controversial, and I imagine that most other NATO members — most of whom are not nearly as vigorous as Germany in securing the southern fringe of the Soviet Union as dependable, friendly, pro-Western exporters and transporters of energy to Europe — will take quite a bit of convincing to come around to the German point of view.
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Nathan Hamm – author of 2040 posts on Registan.net.
Nathan founded Registan.net in 2003. He was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Uzbekistan 2000-2001 and received his MA in Central Asian Studies from the University of Washington in 2007. Since 2007, he has worked full-time as an analyst, consulting with clients on Central Asian affairs, specializing in how socio-cultural factors shape risks and opportunities. Follow him on Twitter or drop him a line.
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“Of course, it is in the interest of NATO and NATO members that new NATO members do not bring their conflicts into the alliance along with them,”
The alliance is still dealing with the tensions that came with Turkish and Greek membership back in 1952, so I’m not surprised that there is some reluctance to take on board new members with baggage.
But looked at another way, other countries have been accepted with baggage. The UK has a territorial dispute with Spain (not a shooting war, admittedly) and until 1998 had one with Ireland (which definitely was a shooting war). So I suppose the existence of such problems ought not to be an authmatic bar. Nathan’s point about gegraphy (that this is the southern fringe of the former SU and so a long way down many Nato states’ priorities) is important, of course.