What Waziristan’s Unrest Means for Afghanistan and the Rest of Central Asia

For the time being at least, there is a halt to the fierce fighting that has killed well over 100 people in Waziristan. It was mostly a fight between the “foreign jihadis” and the locals and Taliban (would they be “domestic jihadis?”). Only, the foreigners are the IMU.

That the Ferghana’s premier Islamist organization (Akromiya can eat it) found a more hospitable environment in the wilderness around Khowst shouldn’t be surprising—it is, after all, where bin Laden got his start, and has been a hot bed of radical Islam for well over two decades. It is also one of those places in Google Earth with suspiciously high resolution imagery.

What makes this fighting remarkable is the fighters themselves: for the most part, even when there have been disagreements, there was generally an “enemy of my enemy” mindset: the real enemies were the West, or non-Muslims, or however they were defined at the moment. Here, however, is evidence of a significant break: supposedly an Uzbek killed an Arab associated with Al-Qaeda, which then inflamed the local Taliban leaders into an escalating series of skirmishes.

Before everyone begins grinning at the “red on red” fighting (as some of the more bloodthirsty blogs have described it), it’s important to see how much this will negatively impact the entire region.

Let’s start with Musharraf. He has been facing increasing pressure from a large collection of lawyers in Islamabad over his treatment of a Chief Justice of the courts, which they claim violated Pakistan’s Constitution. This comes right before a major election. Ahmed Rashid (author of the best history of the Taliban, called Taliban), made a convincing case for why Musharraf has been crippled by the political upheaval.

In the rapidly unfolding crisis in Pakistan, no matter what happens to President Pervez Musharraf — whether he survives politically or not — he is a lame duck. He is unable to rein in Talibanization in Pakistan or guide the country toward a more democratic future…

Moreover, Musharraf is losing control of three key elements that have sustained his rule but are now either distancing themselves or turning on him completely. The first is the ruling Pakistan Muslim League Party, which has acted as the civilian appendage to the military but faces an election and knows that going to bat for the unpopular Musharraf will turn off voters. Party leaders and cabinet ministers are already distancing themselves from him.

The second element is the country’s three intelligence agencies, which are at loggerheads over control of Musharraf, Pakistan’s foreign policy, its political process and the media. Military Intelligence and the Inter-Services Intelligence are military agencies, while the largest civilian agency, the Intelligence Bureau, is now run by a military officer. Ironically, Inter-Services Intelligence, the most powerful agency in the country, has been the moderate element urging Musharraf to open up the political system to the opposition parties. The other two agencies are the hard-liners and are urging Musharraf to adopt even tougher measures.

The third loss for Musharraf has been the unqualified international support he has received since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Anger in the U.S. Congress and media, and particularly among members of the Republican Party, toward Musharraf’s dual-track policy in Afghanistan — helping to catch al-Qaeda members but backing the Taliban — is making it difficult for President Bush to continue offering Musharraf his blanket support.

Really, read the entire piece. He is advocating for a dignified exit for Musharraf, which I think would, given the last few turnovers in leadership, do the country well.

But here’s the thing: Musharraf thrives on crisis. He maintains and builds support like any other dictator, by doing so in the name of security. The infighting in Waziristan may make some giggle at the prospect of Islamists butchering each other for a change, but it provides a very good excuse for Musharraf to either cancel or rig elections in the name of stability.

Just to shortcut, I’ll link to other posts where I lay out the reasons why an open election in Pakistan will be the best thing to help stabilize Afghanistan (see here, here, and here). Suffice it to say, Musharraf is exactly what Afghanistan doesn’t need: a man fully opposed to Al-Qaeda, and thus on good terms with America… But supportive to a fault of the Taliban, his favored client government until 9/10/01. The Taliban are what is destabilizing Afghanistan, not Al-Qaeda—the Taliban are the ones blowing up girls’ schools, murdering female doctors, and running opium up through Tajikistan.

From a broader perspective, it should be interesting to see if Karimov does or says anything about his citizens stirring up trouble. My guess is he’ll stick to his line that he’s disowned them (which is basically true). But will Pakistan, or Afghanistan, or the tribal elders try to call him to account for foisting his problems onto them? Alas, probably not. But it’s worth remembering that there is a peculiar internationalist bent to the fighting.

As for the fighters themselves, there are, contrary to the weird salivation I see on a lot of milblogs, no grander strategic implications. It is a local dispute, and it looks to have been solved locally. The AQAM alliance is not going away, and it’s not going to collapse any time soon. But it should. This fighting shows just how tenuous the alliance holding together the Northwestern region is—and might offer ways of fracturing it to break the foreigners’ hold on the area.