Please don’t read any emotions into this. Again, I am not angry about this. I just want to set the record straight. I won’t belabor the point, but just want to be clear about how I think you attributed arguments to me I did not make:

“At first, I was in line with Bill Roggio in thinking it was an Uzbek v. all fighting…”

I never said that in the ‘red-on-red’ posting. The quote I cited above shows this.

“though he has since changed his stance”

My stand on this never changed, since I never made the argument in the first place.

“While Roggio’s analysis is pleasing in that it plays into our deepest hopes of the Taliban collapsing on its own…”

From day one I was clear this is not evidence of the Taliban collapsing on itself. I’ve made the (admittedly imperfect) argument that this is akin to an internal mafia war. When all is said and done, someone comes out on top and the mafia still exists. Often it emerges more powerful as there is a consolidation effect.

The larger implication here, as I’ve stated repeatedly, is the Pakistani government is making the case the Waziristan Accord is a Good Thing. That is dangerous, and American policy makers and the media are influenced by this. The Pakistani government caved in Bajaur, after 7 month of a clearly failed policy. Expect further agencies and districts in the NWFP to get their own “Taliban Accord.”

What I know about private contractors is that they are not hiring for Uzbek. Although they do have at least one clueless recruiter who was asking for resumes for Uzbek linguists (and then sitting on them). And I heard that the CIA has told the kiddies at IU that Uzbek will not get them hired.

Fars tilini o’rganing! That’ll get you a job ASAP.

I think all of you plus some of the sources cited are correct in the sense that the Uzbek presence is being exaggerated. A few years ago the Christian Science Monitor put the number of Uzbeks at around 200 (as opposed to the “thousands” that some unfortunate reporter claimed recently). And there have been reports of the Pakistani army fighting them a few times since then. I imagine their numbers are dwindling.

I know as little as most when it comes to what is actually happening in Waziristan but I do know that Uzbek linguists are not being sought by any part of the US government/military now or in the last 2-3 years. I’m guessing that’s because the US knows that there is no significant Uzbek presence. But also maybe because the Uzbeks are chatting to each other over the radio in Russian (perhaps they are not the simple Ferghana kholhoz/dekhon boys that we are led to believe they are). That radio chatter in turn leads to even sillier reports of Chechens being everywhere. More confusion. Yay.

I still don’t see how I misrepresented your views (unless I dramatically misunderstood all the “red on red” talk). But that’s fine – I still think we’re in agreement that we’re not getting the whole story, that Pakistan has a vested interest in spinning it a particular way, and that there really aren’t any larger implications.

Not even, Nitin, a move against Musharraf. While I am sympathetic to the argument of tribal warfare, the Taliban at least has been fairly a-tribal in composition. Writing off what’s going on as simply the latest round of tribal friction is simplistic, as it involves multiple ethnicities, and multiple groups of foreigners.

No, I’m not angry or insulted in the least. It’s just that I’ve been saying that what is being reported is not what it seems, then you’re saying I’m following the narrative given by the press. That is very frustrating.

I think Mr. Hoffman is not accurate about the Pakistani media’s presentation. The Pakistani press is providing skepticism of what is going on in the FATA. The international media on the other hand is swallowing the Pak gov’t position hook, line & sinker.

The news that Nazir is backing al Qaeda ISN’T something the Pak gov’t wants to promote. And only the Pak press is saying this. And they are not relying solely on gov’t sources. The Pak press has repeatedly reported that their sources in the FATA claim the casualties are far lower. In one post, I devoted 1 or 2 paragraphs on that. It’s a difficult situation when you have to weigh the Pak gov’t vs the Taliban for veracity of statements. And that I take the Taliban/Uzbek’s side on this (that casualties are lower) makes me ill. But there we are.

Here is what I said in my very first post on the subject, where I was very clear this wasn’t just Uzbeks vs locals:

The Pakistani government is more than content with portraying this fight as a battle between pro government forces and the ‘miscreants,’ as the government calls al Qaeda. Since the signing of the Waziristan Accord, the Pakistani military is in no position to get involved even if it wished, as it withdrew troops from the region and promised not to enter the tribal agency. The Pakistani government views this as a win-win situation, a positive step in the development of the Waziristan Accord as locals are fighting foreigners.

But this ignores the very reasons for the fighting – which is the presence of both foreigners and Pakistani and Afghan Taliban in the tribal regions. Siraj Haqqani, the son of the military commander of the Afghan Taliban, and a Taliban leader himself, is coming from Afghanistan to mediate the dispute.

From the beginning I was clear there was far more to this than could be seen, then in follow up posts on the subject, I outlined the Afghan Taliban’s involvement (the distinction is virtually useless at this point but it is useful to make it to refute the Pak gov’t's position), Nazir’s involvement with al Qaeda (it is very real, I’ve been contacted by my own intel sources who confirmed what I have written on the subject), etc.

Again, no hard feelings on this end. I just want the readers here to understand my positions on the subject.

First off, no analysis of the current fighting in Waziristan is complete without considering the history of the region. Intra-tribal wars are part of the culture, the wars being over land, women and wealth. This is the canvas on which we should analyse the current situation.

Second—while we don’t know about the war in Waziristan itself, we do know from several sources—Bill Roggio himself has written about it—that the Taliban are imposing their ‘government’ in places such as Tank, in “settled” NWFP. The objective reality, therefore, is of a Taliban on a political-military ascendent.

Who’s behind this? From what we know about the public position of the Islamist politicians of the MMA, they are sympathetic bystanders. Importantly, the MMA leadership does not even pretend to be in control of events.

That leaves Hamid Gul & Co, former (and perhaps serving) members of the establishment who have commercial and political interests in the region. Not to forget that the Jamia Hafsa business is also controlled by Khalid Khawaja, another member of the Gul & Co club.

So here’s my hypothesis: that this game is being directed by a faction of the Pakistani military establishment that has had enough of Musharraf. The fact that he could crush the Baloch rebellion so easily, but can’t do much about the Taliban one supports the argument.

These folks are not against Musharraf because of his allegedly pro-Western policies. They are against him because he’s monopolised power for too long. My guess on how it will play out? The new Musharraf will ride to power selling Washington his ability to face down the Taliban.

I’m not sure where the anger comes from. I haven’t insulted you, or even said you’re wrong—in fact, in one of your early posts on the subject, you mentioned the murder of a prominent Arab AQ at the hands of an Uzbek, and speculated that it could be an indication of Uzbeks losing their welcome. I thought the same. I also linked that your analysis had deepened to a far more complex picture of what’s going on, and I find that also 100% credible, but that I wasn’t sure it’s a complete picture. The purpose of the post was that we’re still not sure what’s going on, and that it’s obvious we’re not getting the whole story from Islamabad. That’s why I linked to Hoffman’s post—I found its case for deep skepticism of current reporting persuasive.

In fact, I think we’re in agreement that we’re probably being taken for a ride.