As something of a followup to Nathan’s observation about Uzbekistan’s security service (it’s so big!), is this op-ed from Allison Gill, director of the Human Rights Watch in Tashkent from 2003 to 2005. Her criticism is rather pointed:
Umida [Niazova] is in prison today because the Uzbek government refuses to tolerate scrutiny or accountability.
But she is also in prison because governments in the West have failed to push for tangible change. The European Union imposed limited sanctions on Uzbekistan following the Andijan killings, but it has not made the fate of Uzbekistan’s imprisoned human rights defenders a precondition for easing the sanctions. That sent an unmistakable message to the Uzbek government.
Despite Umida’s commitment to Uzbekistan, last fall she said she felt the pressure against her and her colleagues growing and worried about providing a safe home for her two-year-old son Elbek. We began to look for opportunities for her to work or study abroad. But we were too late.
Conspicuously missing from her remarks is criticism of the U.S., perhaps because the American government did make a nuisance over the Andijan massacre and subsequently saw its citizens’ activities—including that of non-political organizations like Peace Corps—curtailed. Nevertheless, Ms. Gill thinks the EU has sway somewhere in Tashkent, and that it should utilize that sway to improve things, if only for Ms. Niazova.
I must share her frustration at merely another round of “dialogue.” Those kinds of discussions seem to travel for years in no direction in particular while those involved get to pat themselves on the back for all the good they’re accomplishing. But more targeted sanctions won’t help Ms. Nizaova, either—as Karimov has ably demonstrated, he can just as easily find eager friends in Moscow or Beijing or New Delhi as he can in Washington or Brussels.
Ms. Gill needs to take a long view. Short of military intervention, there is little anyone can do to coerce Tashkent into loosening its policies on human rights and internal security in the short term. A longer-term view, however, would see the benefits of engagement, of doing business with and opening Uzbekistan to the West (even if one must hold one’s nose while doing so).
As I said before, it is not pretty, it does not massage our moralism, nor our egos, but it has been remarkably effective in many other places. Though we may not be able to do much for Ms. Niazova (and let’s not forget Ms. Turaeva either), we can make sure that matters for their successors are much more favorable. The EU should condition dropping sanctions upon a lowering of trade and business barriers, with the stipulation that Uzbekistan open its economy to outside investment and activity. That has the best chance of preventing more warriors for human rights from being pushed into the desert gulags.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1771 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
{ 7 comments }
Its always been a western fallacy that somehow opening up trade and improving the investment climate was somehow easier for the uzbek govt to stomach than improving the human rights situation. On the contrary, events in 2002-04 proved the opposite, since this goes to the very basis of regime enrichment and control. Its worth noting that the only movement from the North Koreans in the past six years came after the US froze $24m of their money in a bank in Macau. Unfortunately policy questions on Uzbekistan have now descended to a rather simplistic debate about the EU sanctions and the moral bankruptcy of German foreign policy, whereas what is needed is a much more complex and multifaceted approach. But since really nobody in the West cares very much about Uzbekistan, that is unlikely to change very soon.
I think North Korea is an anomaly in the International system. Any other country, including Uzbekistan, would shrug off $24 million. And every other country, including Uzbekistan, is already vastly more connected to the outside world, which would make an equivalent number of sanctions well-nigh impossible.
The problem with Uzbekistan is that, in an international sense, it hasn’t really committed any crimes—at least, crimes against sovereignty. It hasn’t invaded anyone, threatened its neighbors, abducted or massacred citizens of another country. It doesn’t sponsor terrorism. It doesn’t directly fund any major international criminal enterprises. All of its crimes are against its own people, which is very much a grey area when it comes to international intervention. Indeed, there seems to be some kind of continuum, wherein a certain degree of oppression is just fine with the international community, but once a certain line is crossed, well then that is simply going too far.
Has Uzbekistan crossed that line? I certainly thought it had after Andijan. But in many others’ eyes, it did not.
Moreover, engagement has paid very significant dividends across Asia, including Kazakhstan. The more Kazakhstan has opened up to the outside, the better things have become. Ditto China, South Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and so on. The positive role of international exposure can certainly be understated, but it cannot be denied.
But if, as you suggest, harsh sanctions are the way to go, what gets sanctioned? How can sanctions be structured so that they affect only the leadership and don’t push the quite innocent people at the bottom of the ladder ever further into poverty and misery? That’s the dark side of North Korean, Iraqi, even Cuban sanctions—they impact people at the bottom first, and ever so slowly do the negative effects filter upwards.
That is not an equitable, fair, or just solution to oppression. You don’t “solve” tyranny by punishing its victims. Short of military involvement, what course of action would you suggest?
I think what David was alluding to was that the GoU has been as tough or tougher on private enterprise than on human rights, irrespective of Andijan or other events. How exactly do you open up a country that expels foreign investors almost as readily as foreign NGOs?
On trade, Uzbekistan is notoriously the regional spoiler. You can hardly drive a donkey cart across the border, and this has got zero to do with externally imposed measures.
The real test will be if Ms. Karimova is appointed the next president, and how she will avoid extradition to the US on her diplomatic visit to Berlin.
…there is little anyone can do to coerce Tashkent into loosening its policies on human rights and internal security in the short term.
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FYI, Umida NIyazova has just been released. So sanctions may really work.
Well, she confessed, so she must have been guilty in the first place.
Alisher, I’m skeptical that she was released as a result of sanctions. Isn’t it fairly common for female convicts to be released shortly after their convictions? I recall a handful of other cases in which this has happened, and I’d be more convinced that sanctions are efficacious had the charges been dropped.
Anyhow, if the BBC is correct, she was released for other reasons.
I’m not impressed with sanctions, but I’m inclined to agree with David and Dolkun on this. I have my doubts that Uzbekistan wants to engage on anything in a meaningful way, and there’s really little reason to drop the sanctions in hopes that they’ll change. It’s far better, in my opinion, to wait to try engagement again until Karimov is gone.