At least we agree on the shining beacon that is US foreign policy, ha ha ha. I mean, is it their fault they are 30 or so years behind the time? Bunch of old fuddy-duddies running the show, I tell ya.

And…the Columbians…now I’m as big a fan of arm-chair post-conflict reconstruction as the next guy, but in this case, I think we have to agree to disagree on that particular tactic.

I stand by my dumb statement. I think the U.S. government, and in particular the DoD, is dumb to pretend like there will be another great power conflict any time soon. Just as I think their stubbornness (you’re right about that) is dumb, considering it hasn’t worked.

And the Colombians are there to train the local militias… understanding that the Colombian counternarcotics forces are reknown for their corruption.

Regarding drugs, yes, the Turkish method worked very well. I stated that as a solution a few posts ago (not specifcially Turkey, but the subsidization).

The US does not have the best track record in asymmetrical affairs. Dumb? Not so much dumb as stubborn. I don’t think its occured to Washington yet that the Cold War is really over. The US insists on conducting its world affairs as it if was still engaged in a global power struggle and that may be part of the problem.

Are the Columbian’s there to counter the narcotics trade or are they there to assist in dealing with the tactics employed by guerilla’s affiliated with the narcotics trade?

As for Turkey… I have to repeat that their method worked. The Colombian model still has not worked. I realize (and am deeply frustrated by) the political vagarities of the US, but there is success and there is grinding non-success. We are choosing grinding non-success. Which is dumb.

If you want someone to train others to do something, do you seek someone who has had a lot of experience with moderate success or no experience at all?

Regarding drugs, the Turkish dealt with drugs differently. They had a buy back type program where the government agreed to buy X amount of product in exchange for X amount of crop being converted to legitimate use. As the crop became converted, the government decreased its subisidization. That’s a great idea until the American public catches word of the Afghan government subsidizing the opium crops.

The point I made in the post above is that there are analogous situations nearby, in which violent insurgencies were funded by opium, and through partial legitimization they were defeated. After three decades, Colombia doesn’t hold much promise of being stable and peaceful. Yet after only a few years there is barely a trace of the old opium lords of Turkey or India.

You’d think we would want to follow that model, instead of the constant war model.

Well, since Israel did so well against Hezb’Allah …

Would you argue that the IDF counterinsurgency tactics were effective at reducing violence, or is it the “legitmization” HAMAS etc? I will stick with the notion that the Israeli’s are among the best at dealing with militants, but I disagree that a reduction in attacks against Israel can be exclusively credited to IDF tactics. What about the death of Arafat? Various cease fires? HAMAS being a political party now? That sort of thing.

Similarly, I don’t think the analogy with Israel is right. If it were, then either Colombia should have seen a big reduction in drug cultivation, or Israel should not have seen a big reduction in terrorism. Israel can be said to be effective at counterterrorism because they have managed to achieve a significant reduction in terror attacks, during each Intifada and in general over its history. Colombia has seen a reduction in violence in many towns, but vast swaths of its territory is still occupied by FARC. More importantly for this discussion, coca production is higher than ever, supplying all those thirsty American noses.

Hell, if they wouldn’t be reviled because of their status as Jews, I’d say Israel would be a far more effective partner in Afghanistan than Colombia.

The articles I mentioned are

Ramsey, R.W. (1967). The Columbian Battalion in Korea and Suez. Journal of Inter-American Studies, October, In Essays on Latin American Security; The Collected Writing of a Scholar-Implementer.

Ramsey, R.W. (1984). Internal Defense in the 1980s: The Columbian Model. Journal of Comparative Strategy, Winter, 1-13 In Essays on Latin American Security; The Collected Writing of a Scholar-Implementer

Dr. Ramsey talks about the successfull strategies employed by the Columbians, such as legitimization of rebels and the use of joint operations like establishing public welfare programs on the borders of disputed areas.

Okay…let’s take things in turn here…yes, destroying the opium fields will not work. That would be the equivalent to destroying the wheat crop in the United States. Opium is so integrally linked to the economy in Afghanistan, I want to say that as much as 70% of the GNP is based in Opium. It’s because the Afghan’s are not being offered a viable alternative to that revenue base that is at issue, not so much the opium trade itself. It’s tantamount to eliminating oil as a revenue base for the Saudi’s. And, I think to look at anything that occured from 79-01 as some sort of reference is a bit myopic. Of course the CIA used opium to fund the mujahadeen; how else where they (CIA) to get payments for Stingers? Pistachio’s? And, I would still stand up for using the Columbian’s for counternarcotics. I think that’s the equivalent to asking the Israeli’s for help with counterinsurgency tactics. I doubt anyone would say the Israeli’s are failures in dealing with terrorists with the strategies of the IDF. No; the Israeli’s wrote the book on how to deal with terrorism as they live with it everyday. I would argue the same could be said about the Columbian’s and counternarcotics.