Maybe the New New Great Game 3.0 won’t be fought in Central Asia, but in Europe. A series of news stories involving Russia may point the way not only toward its eventual foreign policy toward Central Asia, but also the Caucasus and Europe (and, by extension, the US).
On the domestic front, there is an increasing campaign of repression and retribution murder—from the detention of Gary Kasparov to the campaign of murder against opposition or uppity journalists to the odd ring of death growing around Alexander Litvinenko’s fatal poisoning. Interestingly, the British have fingered a former KGB agent, Andrei Lugovoi, as the primary murder suspect. Unsurprisingly, Russian law prohibits extradition—a highly convenient development when sheltering assassins (Lugovoi protests his innocence).
While Russia’s creeping fascism is a cause for worry among those directly concerned for Russians, it is Russia’s hints at reborn expansionism that has more people worried. The interesting new fold to this expansionism is the appearance of quite legitimate grievances—the gas games, which have been covered to death, could be explained away by shallow (and quite meaningless) appeals to “market prices,” as if there were never political reasons behind the sudden interest in market dynamics. But Russia spoils these potentially legitimate interests by acting like a boorish thug in the Pacific, suddenly nationalizing an incredibly expensive European LNG terminal on Sakhalin Island and murdering the kidnapping Japanese sailors.
It is the role of its former vassal states and regions, though, that face Moscow’s scornful gaze. Georgia, still horn-locked with its northern neighbor, plays that should spark concern. In the last year alone, Russia has continually played with the idea of embargoing Georgian exports; Russia’s new immigration laws seemed designed primarily to target Georgians (though many other ethnicities, most notably Tajiks, were caught in its web); and Russian helicopters have performed violent expeditionary missions into the breakaway Abkhazia area. South Ossetia, too, has seen its share of conflict, and Russia’s other shenanigans have made tensions with the EU so tight, the subject was barely raised at the recent summit in Samara.
Estonia, too, has seen the danger of crossing their former overlords. When the Estonian government made the quite reasonable decision to move a monument to the Soviet “liberators” (a double-edged sword if one ever existed) from a busy bus stop in the middle of town to a World War II memorial park, ethnic Russians took to the streets, looting Armani outlets in Tallinn and assaulting the Estonian ambassador in Moscow. The campaign against Estonia has progressed quite viciously into the information realm, in which freelance Russian hackers are encouraged by Moscow to break down Estonian networks and deny service to local servers. Anne Applebaum, writing in today’s Washington Post, ably explains why this is such a problem:
Estonia — “e-Stonia” to its fans — practices forms of e-government advanced even by Western European standards. Estonians pay taxes online, vote online, bank online. Their national ID cards contain electronic chips. When the country’s cabinet meets, every member carries a laptop. When denial-of-service attacks start taking down Estonian Web sites, it matters…
Some believe the Russian government is experimenting with different tactics, trying to see which forms of harassment work best: whether the verbal attacks on Estonia, the Russian oil pipeline to Lithuania that mysteriously needs repairs, or the embargos on Polish meat products and Georgian wine.
If that is the case, surely the lesson of the past three weeks is that cyber-warfare has a lot going for it: It creates no uproar, results in no tit-for-tat economic sanctions, doesn’t seem like a “real” form of warfare and doesn’t get anyone worried about Europe’s long-term energy needs. NATO did, in the end, quietly send a few specialists to Estonia, as (even more quietly) did the Pentagon. A few Europeans complained a bit at a summit over the weekend, too. But there the affair will end — until whoever forced the Estonian government out of cyberspace comes back online, better armed for the next battle.
That is an appropriate summary of how Russia is altering its relations to the rest of the world. No longer content to be meek and in decline, the Kremlin seems more willing now than any time in the last two decades to aggressively assert itself across its near abroad. While this is not in absolute terms a bad or immoral thing—surely any country has the right to pursue its interests—it has brought about rather severe consequences for aligned or at the least friendly countries.
What’s worse, however, than publicly assenting to unconventional attacks and harassment of allied countries is what this portends for Central Asia. Russia has deftly shouldered aside American concerns in the region, snatching up oil deals with both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, spoiling European plans for cross-Caspian energy traffic, and placing American diplomats on the defensive as they face an unresponsive Washington. Furthermore, the continued sanctions against Uzbekistan leave open the possibility, however remote, that Tashkent will once again throw its hat in the ring up north, and abandon the idea of engagement with the West.
But it is actually Europe where the latest battle between Russia and its western rivals is taking place, not Central Asia. The steppes of Kazakhstan no longer have Cossacks riding horses or tanks; rather the gas pipes have Russian spigots, and the Internet has Russian hacker storms. The battle remains essentially the same: a fight over who gets to intimidate, influence, and/or befriend the lesser powers in the strategic zones. It is only the battlefield that has modernized itself.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1771 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
{ 24 comments }
You must be either kidding yourself or have no idea what was happening in Estonia. Are you calling brutal beating of people (including women and children) reasonable? I don’t support the rampage but I understand why it happened – when you really hurt somebody they get angry and sometimes hit back. By the way, when you are accusing native Russians of looting the stores do you even know what at least third of the looters were native Estonians? Just imagine for a second what would happen if US government would decide to demolish the grave of Martin Luther King in Atlanta, GA. The memorial in Tallinn had a similar meaning to Russian-speaking community. So please don’t let your hate for Russia to blind you so you can’t even tell right from wrong anymore. If you are interested in finding more details on the subject read some posts on http://www.pomnim.com/frm/viewforum.php?f=11&sid=cf03c300be97e6e3443a1bdaa51aeac2 (you’ll find opinions from both sides in there).
You must be either kidding yourself or have no idea what was happening in Estonia. Are you calling brutal beating of people (including women and children) reasonable? I don’t support the rampage but I understand why it happened – when you really hurt somebody they get angry and sometimes hit back. By the way, when you are accusing native Russians of looting the stores do you even know what at least third of the looters were native Estonians? Just imagine for a second what would happen if US government would decide to demolish the grave of Martin Luther King in Atlanta, GA. The memorial in Tallinn had a similar meaning to Russian-speaking community. So please don’t let your hate for Russia to blind you so you can’t even tell right from wrong anymore. If you are interested in finding more details on the subject read some posts on http://www.pomnim.com/frm/viewforum.php?f=11&sid=cf03c300be97e6e3443a1bdaa51aeac2 (you’ll find opinions from both sides in there).
Really? That’s weird. The two are really quite different, and it’s a bit insulting to equate MLK, Jr. to a blatantly obvious symbol of nationalism with much more subjective meaning.
But it’s really a moot point. Either Estonia is sovereign or it isn’t. It seems there was no acceptable solution to the Russian minority save getting their way. And they’re emboldened by a Russian state that’s feeling its oats and proto-fascist groups (that define doublespeak by claiming their reason for being is to fight fascism) looking to throw their weight around. The silver lining to all of this behavior though is that it is quickly narrowing down Russia’s circle of friends.
This sounds familiar: “you’re critiquing my country, therefore you hate my country.” What is this, FoxNews Moscow?
More seriously, as Nathan said, trying to equate them to MLK is beyond apples and oranges. For starters, MLK was born here (he didn’t invade and occupy the US for a few decades), he was a minority fighting for equal rights (something denied the Estonians by the Soviets), and he was murdered for his dream of racial and ethnic equality.
Now that I think of it, the comparisons – both of them – are right. Only the Estonian MLK would have been one of the hundreds of thousands of Estonians shipped off to Stalin’s death camps.
Oh yeah, and it’s not “demolishing” a monument, it is moving it from a dirty bus stop to a memorial park for war monuments.
Who’s kidding whom, I wonder?
You are being alarmist. Russia has simply, finally, realized that it cannot have friends. No country can, only interests. Their one and only interest is profit and economic growth, which they are ruthlessly pursuing.
See, I agree with you that Russia is just pursuing its own interests. That’s fine, and not immoral in and of itself. The danger I see is when Russia’s interests clash with ours, or with Europe’s. That’s where the conflict potential rises. For example, when its interest is served by silencing a prominent critic, and Europe’s interests are served by bringing the murderer Russia is protecting to trial, that’s what I’m talking about. It doesn’t have to be warfare to be troublesome or have far ranging negative consequences.
Litvinenko – prominent? Surely you jest! His death was the cause of his prominence, not the other way around.
I was just reading Russia’s latest foreign policy “concept” paper tonight for some other research that I’m doing. It’s kind of fun reading–when you start feeling like Russia is a big bully and there’s no hope for dialog, etc etc, it’s kind of a comforting, warming little… what’s that word for stories that are morally comforting have endings where everyone lives happily ever after in multilateral dialog, international cooperation and arms control?
On one hand, one might be reassured that–like in the US with the President on one hand and State on the other–there are moderate, liberal voices hiding somewhere behind the gruff rhetoric and actions of the siloviki. On the other hand, I was also reminded of Uzbekistan’s constitution. Probably that point is self-explanatory.
But I think it something else ought to be added to the discussion about the Russia/Estonia bit and Vega’s point–while Nathan, you are right as usual to draw the contrasts between MLK and the Unknown Soldier when comparing the perspectives of Americans and ESTONIANS, I think what Vega actually meant was to compare the perspectives of Americans view of MLK and ethnic RUSSIANS living in Estonia’s view of the Uknown Soldier.
It’s they, after all, and not the ethnic Estonians themselves who were upset, or had any particular reason to be upset, over the statue’s being moved. While I still don’t think MLK is exactly a good example for comparison, it’s very hard to think of one that would parallel the situation very well.
Also, to be fair in any way for to the Russians living in Estonia (I’m not speaking here about NASHI or the Molodaya Gvardia or any other Moscow-based “Putin Youth” groups, which are all really disturbing) you have to take into consideration the fact that at the point that they were protesting–and I’ve seen a lot of the footage, they really did get the shit beat out of them, shot with rubber bullets and everything else–the Estonian government utterly refused to say what it had done with the statue or what it was going to do with the statue. If, in fact, they always planned to move it to a nice park (a cemetery, actually) it may have, um, defused the situation a little bit to announce that beforehand.
Meanwhile, rumors were flying wild everywhere that in fact it had not been “removed,” but cut to pieces on site and chucked into a truck in dismembered form to be thrown away. While it turned out that this was not true, it was an aggravating rumor that made it into all the Russian language media–in Estonia, Moscow, and New York, even–that could have been pretty easily dispelled by the Estonians.
Added to all of this is the open question of WHY the Estonian government felt it was particularly necessary to move the statue at all, and why on earth they decided to do it the week before Victory Day–the single most hallowed day in the in the pan-Russian calendar, more important than Eastern or Christmas (since only maybe half of Russians or anybody else for that matter actually believe in the religious significance of those days, while EVERYBODY (Russians, anyway) believes in May 9).
The whole thing was kind of a pointless provocation that Russians on both sides of the border reacted to, well, predictably. But there are a lot of things the Estonians could have done to make the confrontation less flamboyant.
The American media tends to look at this situation as David vs. Goliath, the little Estonian–whatever they are, a rabbit or something–sticking up for itself against the hulking Russia bear.
While there is truth to that perspective, this conflict is really an internal one in Estonia, between the Estonian majority and its very significant ethnic Russian minority. Estonia, after all, is a new model democracy of the liberal type, and as such is supposed to be bound to respecting the rights of their minorities, even ones that are well-represented in the world community. The Russian minority in Estonia–which is by percentage about three times bigger by proportion than the African-American minority in the US–is embattled and considers itself highly harassed and more or less powerless politically. Last year Estonia was seriously debating outlawing Russian-language instruction schools, something that seriously and understandably upset the Russian-language community.
Personally, I do believe it’s the right of the sovereign government of Estonia to put up or take down memorials to whomever or whatever they want–but you can’t discuss this in a way that pretends that the Citizens of Estonia are all Estonians who feel oppressed and threatened by Russia. Many of them are, but many of them are also Russian speakers who feel increasingly unwelcome in the country they were born in and increasingly asked to choose sides between their civic and ethnic identity–not a recipe for anything good in any of the history I’ve ever read.
Lastly, since I just can’t shut up until I’ve truly offended everyone (yeah, that’s probably my Russian side), while Josh is right to say of course that criticism of a country or person doesn’t ever need to be interpreted as hatred, I would be hard pressed to conclude given what’s written above that Josh likes Russians very much.
I don’t particularly mean to defend anything the Russian government has done in the process, I guess I’m more interested in the situation in Estonia itself, which is, like everything else, a lot more complicated than the way the media on either side report it.
While I’ll agree with you on the timing issue,
is hard to swallow. You, I, and readers of this blog should know that no matter what the Estonians had announced, the Russian nationalists within Estonia and in Russia would have used it as confirming evidence of Estonian “fascism.” It’s just the nature of news and what people give credence to in the former Soviet Union. (For example, it’s best for the US not to answer rumors that it plans to nuke Tehran from Manas. It’s just a dumb rumor that addressing would only make people believe it more.)
Were I to guess, Josh feels about the same way I do about Russians – they’re perfectly OK people. The Russian government’s behavior and the aftershocks of its behavior are troubling. While strategy documents may reassure the reader, and while we can think to ourselves Russia is merely defending its interests, there’s something extremely troubling about Putin’s Russia that is an entirely unintended consequence of his policy. When a government squeezes political space, the last voices left are usually the extreme ones. And I think that we are seeing the beginnings of that in Russia. The ever-growing list of Caucasians and Central Asians murdered by racist thugs and the rise of groups like Nashi that preach there are conspiracies led by fascists (that is, anyone who dares anger the Russian state) to bring Russia low and that Russia is owed the right to be a great power are testament to this. And the government’s response is but a shrug. These trends, and not official policy documents, deserve the lion’s share of the attention.
I try to be level-headed and all. And I think I give Russia the benefit of the doubt more often that I’m initially inclined, but I can’t help but have serious long-term worries about where the country is currently headed.
Then Russia has learned something very stupid, NIF. Interests don’t defend you after you’ve pissed off all your neighbors and they’re ruthlessly pursuing their own profit by sealing you off from everyone else. Russia has a point in saying that the world simply has to accept it for what it is and deal with it, but by acting boorish for short-term gain, it’s ham-stringing itself in the long-term.
Nathan,
I am somewhat surprised by your sentimentality. Countries have no friends. Human history is a litany of allies becoming foes becoming allies, becoming foes, etc.. This is especially true about big countries. Self-interest rules. People are betraying/screwing their own close relations, yet there is supposed to be some sort of brotherhood of man at the national level?
If anything, the so-called Russian bullying is a result of the behaviour of New Europe and aspirants. It seems that their foreign policy (if not identity) is defined by Russophobia. This is especially true of (“we are not Russians!”) Poland, Baltic states. What better way to ingratiate yourself to the West (or Uncle Sam alone?) than declare yourself to be a cordone sanitaire, to keep the unwashed Russian hordes out of Europe? So Russia is obliging them by fulfilling their long-cherished dream of independence from Mordor. Hence the new ports, pipelines, LNG terminals, bypassing capricious transit states. The process is only accelerating. The save-Europe-from-Russia league is coming to realise that soon Gulliver will be unbound. Good bye, leverage. Good bye, transit fees. Good bye, messianic mission. Hence the hysterics.
BTW, Nashysty and their ilk are of no threat. (Pop quiz – do you know their charismatic leader? I don’t.) I’d be more worried about America’s favourite Other Russians, the Nazbols.
Nathan is right as usual. I my defense, however, I’d like to point out that, if you’re going to base claims of Russia hatred on what I wrote in the post above, then you should at least note that I was fairly explicit that I think it is the government behaving poorly, and that this is cause for alarm if you care for the Russian people themselves. To repeat myself from a previous comment, disliking the organized behavior of a state—and it’s hard to call what happened anything other than the organized, however loosely, reaction of the Russian government—is vastly different than disliking its people. Normal Russians, i.e. not Nashi, are actually really cool, at least the ones I’ve met here and in Russia.
Anyway, I’m trying to avoid the “I have many black friends” defense. But the parallel between Russian nationalists and American nationalists instinctively defending their governments’ actions by saying all critics seething with hatred remains an interesting one to me. Maybe we should invent a new, Malkin-esque disease? Putin Derangement Syndrome (PDS)? Since the only people who would oppose Putin are clinically insane?
NIF, the prominent critic I was referring to was Anya Politkovskaya. I think also you’re glossing over the very real wariness and anger most of the former Eastern Bloc still feels about being conquered, colonized, and ruled over by people it did not want or need. And it’s a tough sell to pretend Russia’s obvious retribution policies—cutting off Lithuania, cutting off Belarus for not integrating under the 1996 agreement, cutting off Georgia for not allowing Russian soldiers to steal its land, cutting off Ukraine for daring to go pro-Western, and so on—is really about altruistically helping Europe.
Also, if you’re going to make that argument, then what Russian interests, beside domination, are served by being so magnanimous with its gas wealth? You can’t be Hobbesian and a kind neighbor at the same time.
For sure, Politkovskaya was not in the same category as Litvinenko (tin-foil brigade). But hardly anyone knew her in Russia. Nothing in it for Darth Putin.
For much of the Soviet Union’s existence, Russia was bled dry to keep the rest of the socialist camp content. Russia is no longer willing to buy phoney friends. Doesn’t care. It’s just business. The prices are set to what the market can bear.
P.S.
OK, it’s not quiet true. Russia does care on some psychological level about Ukraine and Belarus. Like that famous Ukranian Mikhail Gorbachov said when he was trying to negotiate a new Union treaty in 1990: “As long as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are together, the Union will go on. Fuck the rest.” Yeltsin had different ideas.
Noah Tucker:
[you have to take into consideration the fact that at the point that they were protesting–and I’ve seen a lot of the footage, they really did get the shit beat out of them, shot with rubber bullets and everything else–the Estonian government utterly refused to say what it had done with the statue or what it was going to do with the statue.]
Noah, if You were here in Estonia, You would have seen all of the footage. The protesters were throwing bottles and stones and whatnot towards the police several hours before the police started its first sweeping action. And that was at least an hour after the police advised the protesters to go home and not stay together with those who threw stuff. If anything, Estonian police was too slow and allowed the gathered people to gain enough courage from their vodka bottles and dope injections. The second day rioters were just asking for a good whooping.
As for the fate of the statue – the Estonian government DID say what it has done to the statue. What it didn’t say, was where it held the statue after it was moved from the initial place. The plans for its future place in the military cemetery were known long in advance (at least a week, maybe more), the rioters simply denied that information.
[Meanwhile, rumors were flying wild everywhere that in fact it had not been “removed,” but cut to pieces on site and chucked into a truck in dismembered form to be thrown away. While it turned out that this was not true, it was an aggravating rumor that made it into all the Russian language media–in Estonia, Moscow, and New York, even–that could have been pretty easily dispelled by the Estonians.]
You are unfair. These rumors were STARTED by the Russian Duma delegation who visited Estonia on the 30th of April- 1st of May. And the members of this delegation who spread the rumor knew VERY well that the statue was not cast in one piece in the first place. It was a DELIBERATE DISINFORMATION. I hope that You have spread it indeliberately.
And the Estonian government issued a swift counter-argument to the “cut-to-pieces” lie, You have to blame for yourself if You didn’t read the right media.
Noah Tucker wrote:
[Added to all of this is the open question of WHY the Estonian government felt it was particularly necessary to move the statue at all, and why on earth they decided to do it the week before Victory Day–the single most hallowed day in the in the pan-Russian calendar]
Why at all? Because for the past couple of years the place started to attract people who waved the flags of Imperial Russia, Soviet Union, Russian Federation, Soviet Estonia. A couple of times they attacked some estonian nationals who went there with the Estonian flag, or with a small ring of barb-wire to symbolize the grief that soviet soldiers and soviet occupation brought to Estonia. In essence, those pro-russian people actively enforced their symbolism and their interpretation of history, it was not about honouring the fallen any more, it was about honouring those who liberated/conquered Estonia. This was unacceptable to estonians. Estonian nationalists warned that if the government did nothing, they would (blow it up). That would have brought about retaliation towards other statues from the pro-russian side.
Moving the statue to a cemetary was a good compromise.
As for the timing, initially the statue was in the domain of local government of Tallinn, which refused to do anything (due to the ruling central party and his authoritarian leader Edgar Savisaar). A new law was recently passed to deal with wargraves and statues, thus making it a government matter. We had elections in march this year, the new government came to power just few weeks before the events. So it was not possible to move the statue before.
Why not later? For at least 2 years, Russia has manipulated with the local russian speaking people in Estonia. All the signs showed that the provocators (Nashi + NightWatch) has close contacts with the Russian authorities and they planned for the 9th of May. So it was necessary to move the statue as quickly as possible. Even then, the initial plan was to only excavate (by hand) the graves and only 2-3 weeks later move the statue. But the first rioting events at 26th of April left the government no choice but to relocate the statue quickly. The protestors and rioters may have held a belief that if they raise enough noise and clout, that then the statue would be left as it were. That was a mistake in logic – the new place in the cemetary was a good compromise and estonians could not have let the statue left at its former place, especially after the riots. There was an inner logic to the events. It is very difficult to find a better outcome to the present one (regarding the statue).
Noah Tucker wrote:
[The Russian minority in Estonia–which is by percentage about three times bigger by proportion than the African-American minority in the US–is embattled and considers itself highly harassed and more or less powerless politically.]
The real problem is that the russian-speaking population in Estonia is very diverse and that is why no political party or leader has emerged who would defend their interests. Actually there is such a party – the Central Party, or more aptly, the party of Edgar Savisaar. The Central Party is supported by 77% of non-estonian speaking people, while only less than 20% of estonians support it. Savisaar was one of the leaders of the National Front in the late 1980s, but nowadays he is suspected of having been (and still being) an agent for soviet regime to control the nationalist movement – it is believed that such agents were seeded to every national movement in the former Soviet Union. He has had his Watergate scandals and whatnot, but he has done good comebacks.
[Last year Estonia was seriously debating outlawing Russian-language instruction schools, something that seriously and understandably upset the Russian-language community.]
The accurate description would be – Estonia was debating how to increase studies in estonian language in russian schools to 60%.
This would give russian speaking youth better chances at entering Estonian universities and colleges, and labour market.
Russian speaking people in Estonia should more discuss about issues in education, that is to everyone’s best interests. But they should also acknowledge, that estonian language will remain the sole official language in Estonia, at least for some time.
aboriginal:
your points are all good and well taken. i appreciate your adding the perspective from inside Estonia.
for the record, i need to add, if it wasn’t clear, that especially as someone with a significant emotional attachment to Russia I find the disturbing rise of fascist and ultra nationalist rhetoric in the Russian political spectrum to be one of the single most alarming political developments–second only to Uzbekistan’s actions in Andijon and their obsessive cover up–in the CIS today.
And I also think on that count that NIF may be right, that at this point a bunch of kids with too much time on their hands are not the most important thing to worry about in comparison with the Natsbols and anti-Immigration and others— but while what worries me about these parties and their newspaper mouthpieces (like Zavtra) is not so much that they would be a threat to stability or whatever, but how much their rhetoric can begin to appeal to mainstream Russia.
The thing that truly bothers me about Nashi and Mol. Gv. and their ilk is the same as others have voiced in this thread–the fact that Putin’s government does nothing to discourage them in their more extreme moments, and the real threat of the possibility that it in fact supports them. This, and the lack of adequate prosecution and investigation against hate crimes is, as has been well said already here, deeply disturbing.
In discussing Estonia, I wanted mostly just to add the perspective from Russia and what their population actually sees in this conflict–a distorted picture, as always, and deeply biased, but they do have a perspective the thoughts and feelings of ordinary Russians in both Russia and Estonia ought to figure into the discussion.
Thanks to everyone for their thoughtful posts, and especially to Aboriginal for adding more information about the situation, and of course to Nathan for patiently hosting as always.
When I compared Unknown Soldier (which was modeled after native Estonian btw) to MLK I meant very strong emotional feelings for both from a huge part of the community residing within a country (Estonia and USA respectively) to the extend that there is even a holiday associated with each. Before moving the monument, Estonian premier-minister gave several public speeches calling people buried under the monument drunks and marauders (if he really wanted to do it peacefully, shouldn’t he have chosen a more respectful tone?). Most of Tallinn population (including the major) was against the movement which was shown during the polls (shouldn’t government listen to its people?). The cemetery it was moved to (and right before the holiday) has no public transportation (surprise). The closest bus stop is over a mile away (2 kilometers) which creates a real problem for the elderly veterans to whom the memorial has the most meaning (it is simply very hard for them to walk that far). Also, most of the people captured and beaten were not the looters (those knew there was a reason for them to be arrested and run away), but the people who happened to be nearby – peaceful protesters, stand-byers, and walk-byers who didn’t know they had to run since they’ve done nothing wrong (and the conditions they were kept in after arrest were absolutely despicable).
Now, here are some questions I would like you to think about (the ones I can’t get out of my head). If, as Estonian government said, they had not foreseen the outrage of such size, how come they brought police force from all across Estonia into Tallinn (and into one particular spot)? Also, if as they said they did not plan to move the monument right away, how come they had all of the equipment ready (and in the middle of the night)? Anyone who ever was involved in a project of similar size (or even much smaller) will tell you that those things do take planning and require a lot of time to collect all necessary pieces. At the same time, if they planned to move it to the war cemetery from the start, how come they haven’t even informed the cemetery director (in some of the posts, I saw links to articles where he gave a short interview)? Also, how come the damages to the stores were included in the budget (the compensations were offered even before store owners thought of asking for them)? Please think about these questions, and then think again of what happened in Estonia.
Here is an interesting report by an unbiased source: http://thereport.amnesty.org/page/1094/eng/
(there is a link on the right of a summary to a complete version).
This is a fascinating thread, what I wonder is:
if a country can have no friends, then why do we discuss Belarus and Ukraine as specific components of Russia’s psychological level? If they are totally interest-based, then they would spend more time trying to make arrangements with countries of the most benefit to them. You can talk gas and oil pipelines and regional adjacency, I suppose, but under a strict amorality, new distribution avenues could have been completed long before now. Second of all, if a country has no sentiments, only interests, than feelings of affection for that country seem especially out of place.
Just asking. I realize everyone may be done with this thread already.
Please read this article originally published in Eesti Päevaleht – an Estonian daily newspaper: http://www.pomnim.com/frm/viewtopic.php?t=1590
It has some answers to the questions I asked above.
I find Nathan’s comment interesting when he said:
“It seems there was no acceptable solution to the Russian minority save getting their way.”
The reason it is so interesting is that this is exactly what I have observed over the past ten years in Central Asia. Most Russians seem honestly preplexed when formerly subject peoples don’t act like subjects anymore.
Or to put it the way a Kyrgyz friend said it reciently: “This is our independant country, it has been for more than 15 years, but Russians just cannot understand why we don’t act like they are still in charge.”
I imagine the Russians in Estonia are much the same.
[Before moving the monument, Estonian premier-minister gave several public speeches calling people buried under the monument drunks and marauders (if he really wanted to do it peacefully, shouldn’t he have chosen a more respectful tone?).]
I agree, such kind of speech is not suitable for a PM on a press conference, even if he is just repeating an urban legend and even if he serves it as a joke.
[Most of Tallinn population (including the major) was against the movement which was shown during the polls (shouldn’t government listen to its people?).]
First, the polls went both ways. Second, due to the instability of the situation, people’s opinions changed very quickly. Third, this is not only an issue for the citizens of Tallinn, it is an issue for Estonian state. Nor is it an issue for all people living in Estonia, only those who are citizens. The outcome at the moment is that more than 3/4 of estonians support government action and about the same ratio of non-estonians condemn it (these percentages are over all people in Estonia).
[The cemetery it was moved to (and right before the holiday) has no public transportation (surprise). The closest bus stop is over a mile away (2 kilometers) which creates a real problem for the elderly veterans to whom the memorial has the most meaning (it is simply very hard for them to walk that far).]
I disagree. The central bus station of Tallinn is 700-800 meters away. See for yourself:
http://maps.google.co.uk/?ie=UTF8&ll=59.424016,24.770501&spn=0.007455,0.019934&z=16&om=1
The cemetery is at the end of Filtri tee, the bus station is in the cross of Filtri tee and Juhkentali. There might be even closer bus stops on Järvevana tee, but it is probably difficult to cross the railway.
[Also, most of the people captured and beaten were not the looters (those knew there was a reason for them to be arrested and run away), but the people who happened to be nearby - peaceful protesters, ]
Since the police gave ample warning (60 min or so), those peaceful protesters who stayed along those who threw stuff at the police, were not innocent bystanders but they were accomplices.
[...stand-byers, and walk-byers who didn’t know they had to run since they’ve done nothing wrong]
Yes, that probably happened when the looters dispersed in the city. There is a saying – when logging the woods, chips of timber are flying through the air – meaning that in a war (or a riot) there are unwanted casualties.
[If, as Estonian government said, they had not foreseen the outrage of such size, how come they brought police force from all across Estonia into Tallinn (and into one particular spot)?]
Yes there were reinforcements, but there were not enough special equipment (shields, helmets, etc.). Due to that there were a limited number of police force who could stand against flying stones and bottles. This dictated the policy of first dispersing the crowd and then dealing with them one bunch at a time. Estonia has got additional special equipment by now.
[Also, if as they said they did not plan to move the monument right away, how come they had all of the equipment ready (and in the middle of the night)? Anyone who ever was involved in a project of similar size (or even much smaller) will tell you that those things do take planning and require a lot of time to collect all necessary pieces.]
The necessary equipment was 600 m away due to the (legally suspicious) dismantling of one soviet era building called Sakala Keskus. The driver was generally warned of the request of help, but no date had been given, so he was called in during the first night and in an hour or so he was available. The statue was transported in one piece, the other pieces came from the dismantled limestone wall.
[At the same time, if they planned to move it to the war cemetery from the start, how come they haven’t even informed the cemetery director (in some of the posts, I saw links to articles where he gave a short interview)?]
I have no information for that, can’t comment.
[Also, how come the damages to the stores were included in the budget (the compensations were offered even before store owners thought of asking for them)?]
Every government has an emergency fund for such kind of situations. Estonian state budget has been in surplus for several years.
I might add, that for whatever one might accuse the Estonian government for, there were more players than the state government, city government, protestors and rioters. One must not forget the manipulating hand of Russian authorities. This was a high stakes political game and we as ordinary people do not know all the facts and risks, so we can only guess about the content of risk analysis models.
One more comment,
one reason for the uncontrolled looting along the Pärnu road was that at the same time the riot police was engaging another group of rioters at the Endla street. And on that street there are lots of government offices – migration agency, tax agency, statistical agency, etc. All the important databases are mirrored, but even only messing with the office rooms and papers would have been a nightmare. So the police was minimizing the costs.
[ migration agency ]
That is the Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board.
[ tax agency ]
That is the Estonian Tax and Customs Board