The Chinese people, for their part (or at least the ones in Shanghai) seem to refuse to recognize Central Asians– who are constantly referred to as Xinjian ren (people of Xinjain) regardless of whether they are from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc. Just miscellaneous nations waiting to be assimilated as proper Han. I guess this is somewhat benign, an equivalent of Americans saying “Oh, so you’re from Russia”, but more ominous, since Xinjian is territorially part of China.

Chinese people don’t seem to really like the Uighurs– I find myself constantly having to stick up for them. They’re kind of like boogeymen here. Some things commonly said about them: “You should carry your money in your front pocket, there are a lot of Xinjian ren in Shanghai now [and of course they are all thieves, because a Chinese person would never steal].” Latin-American friends of mine with good Chinese are made to sit in the front of taxicabs, as they are suspected of being Xinjian ren and will, therefore, run off. I also have started to hear “Don’t buy the shashlik that the Xinjian ren make on the streets– one skewer is like smoking 4 packs of cigarettes”, “They’re dirty”, “They’re all in gangs”, foreigners are constantly told to be careful of the Xinjian ren… It goes on, I don’t bring it up myself in conversations but constantly hear it, there is a strong anti-Turkic prejudice among average Chinese people.

And by now we’re all familiar with what the Central Asians think of the Chinese: the purchasing of eshaks and frogs for meat (kind of reminds me of the snakehead fish thing in the DC area a few years back), crowding 20 to an apartment in Karasuu, terrible drivers who don’t think twice before hitting livestock (my organization’s car got hit by a Chinese truck in Kyrgyzstan– the management at the local office then tried to scare our representatives, were aggressive with them, finally paid minor compensation, but that’s because we’re an international organization). The Han Chinese and Chinese Uighurs have different professional organizations at the Karasuu bazaar and didn’t, as of last year at least, permit cross-membership. Chinese vendors tend not to speak a lick of anything except for Chinese. Chinese investors insisting on using mostly Chinese workers at large projects also does not help (although I do recall the cement factory they’re doing around Kyzylkyia as bringing in local workers, so I’m not totally clear as to how common this policy is).

I would say Central Asia’s receptive to soft power from many sources– Russia, America, Europe (mostly through Russia– I don’t think real Europeans take Eurovision seriously, for instance, but Russians do, and so do Central Asians) and, increasingly, the Middle East (music and marriage– both I would say highly influential).

Nothing coming from China. No mutual affinity whatsoever. A small increase in language study (from the Central Asian side of course) that is probably economically motivated, some feel-good exchanges through the SCO. Plenty of economic power, but tons of animosity too.

Agreed, though I can’t say I know enough about Central Asia all-round to be sure. I think Central Asian governments are happy to take China’s money and use them as leverage with the US or Russia (or the EU, I guess). But I don’t think that translates into any sort of affection or desire to be like China – in other words, all the leverage is on the Central Asian side, not the Chinese side. Couple that with the anti-Chinese sentiment that, in my limited experience, is pretty strong across the region, and I don’t see them being any kind of satellite or proxy any time soon.

And it’s a good point you make about the Uighurs. For example, we so completely know how poorly they’re treated we refused to repatriate Uighurs the Army picked up in Afghanistan (though their subsequent treatment, including years of imprisonment despite official innocence, and subsequent neglect in Albania, is deeply shameful); yet, we allowed Chinese interrogators to enter Guantanamo to interrogate them — where, by all accounts, they were threatened and harassed.

My understanding of China’s feeling about “itself” (which I consider loosely defined, given how few on its periphery really wish to be ruled by the Han) is that there are three unnegotiable areas, which John Derbyshire, in a rare moment of clarity, called “The Three T’s”: Taiwan, Tibet, and Turkestan (which is Xinjiang and maybe part of Gansu). All of this is probably tied back to the One China policy, which might even include Outer Mongolia.

I’m not so sure democracy is an off-limits subject, though, at least in the abstract. They certainly react negatively to foreigners lecturing them on how to run their country — as everyone, perhaps especially America, does. But there are so many thousands of protests every year over environmental degradation, economic injustices, and unjust local governors, that I don’t think it’s an impossibility. (Update: Well, just today Hu Jintao ruled out ever allowing a multi-party democracy, so at least in an official sense I guess the one party rule is here to stay… forever.)

Anyway, back to the topic at hand, I still don’t see how China is leveraging its influence in Central Asia, or if it even has any. I don’t think anyone is all that interested.

As for soft power, while I think Nye is right that one ought to think about seducing and attracting a bit more than bombing, I find it a flaky concept. I think the truly interesting thing about China and soft power is not measuring it, a fruitless task, but exploring what “soft power” means to the Chinese. They certainly write about it often enough. As for what is displacing American soft power, I think the answer is: everything else. Not replacing, but the field just continues to get more crowded. In the Cold War, America was pretty alone in the global media and entertainment business. It’s still huge, but everybody has alot more choices these days. Hell, some in China complain of the soft power of Korean soap operas and pop music. But no one says “I wish I lived in South Korea”, as blue jeans purchasers in the USSR did.

I agree that China does care about its perception abroad, but I wonder if the post-9/11 lesson they taken is “just make sure you don’t look like a schmuck” – a lesson they’re still learning, I believe. It’s not quite the same as American “we’re the coolest, most fun country EVAR!” message that the U.S. has often projected, or tried to project at any rate.

As for the Uyghurs, people do try to shame China about it, but China isn’t receptive to it. Why? It’s the whole “internal affairs” thing. The PRC believes that you’re not overstepping your bounds when you enter economic or development relationships with a foreign government, but you are overstepping your bounds when you tell them to re-organize their society or redraw their borders. Democracy and Uyghurs are two issues that they perceive as crossing this line. You can’t shame them on it, because they don’t think you have the right. You could, however, shame them about being hypocrites interfering in another nation.

Chinese individuals, however, could be made to feel shame and then pressure the government themselves, but you’d have to approach so as they don’t feel they’re being lectured or told what conclusions to reach by foreigners. Not an easy thing.

Actually Nye drew the distinction as well. He said there were three kinds of power: physical or military, economic, and “soft,” which he generally defined as influence or attractiveness. The first is obvious in a place like Iraq—the U.S. is trying to force Iraq into a national mold through military force. The second can be seen in the broad U.S. policy toward China, in which the assumption is that economic integration and interdependence will influence China’s behavior.

The third, however, is quite rightly difficult to explain. And if you’ll forgive me venturing outside Central Asia for a moment, it is not at all clear how to measure it—China is both resented and admired in Sudan, where they have a growing presence of their own version of the Peace Corps. So even in a place most in the West define as aligning itself with China, the picture is not at at all clear save one thing: China cares about its perception abroad.

Which then raises the question for us: why doesn’t anyone try to make them feel shame for how poorly they treat the Uighurs?

It’s been a while since I read Joseph Nye’s book, but I seem to remember Soft Power included economic powers. Of course the big problem is the concept is fuzzy (as in “unclear”, not “warm and …”) – Nye said it was anything that attracted or persuaded others, and there was a spectrum from soft to hard (sanctions would be somewhere near the middle). Some ways Kurlantzick is using the term:

1) Free trade zones
2) Public diplomacy (I’ll give him aid money, but I don’t see CCTV pulling a VOA)
3) Confucian Institutes (really, too big a deal is made of these. Does the Goethe Institute revolutionize Germany’s image?)
4) Highways
5) The SCO

The SCO is the biggie, and not exactly soft power. Meanwhile, from what I hear, anti-Chinese sentiments, fears of waves of migration, and the usual cheap goods that suffocate children, are alive and well in Central Asia. You could say the PRC is making deals with sketchy characters, but calling it “soft power” strikes me as lame.