I have to confess to feeling confusion after reading this:
Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov has won a power struggle with officials of Turkmenistan’s government who played key roles in building and maintaining the oppressive regime of his predecessor, and who helped bring the new president to power. It remains unclear, however, whether Berdymukhammedov intends to use his consolidated power to continue down the dictatorial path of former leader Saparmurat Niyazov, or to institute promised reforms.
She goes on to detail how Stomatologbashi won several rounds of power struggles within the government, purged out the people who posed a threat, and instituted superficial reforms that drew wary murmurs of praise from exile opposition groups.
So far so good. But just two days ago, I was noting that he was extending the trend of slowly dismantling all of Niyazov’s subtle means of control: the lavish parties, the unaccountable slush fiend Niyazov kept abroad, and so on. Even some opposition groups were optimistic about what was taking place.
So, which is it? Is Berdymukhammedov consolidating power, or ever-so-slowly dismantling it?
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1771 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
{ 4 comments }
You seem to be implying that the consolidation of power and the dismantling of Niyazov’s gross excesses are mutually exclusive options. Berdymuhhamedov has to consolidate his power otherwise he would be either unable to institute any reforms or he’d be removed from his position. Indeed, I’d argue that Berdymuhhamedov’s consolidation of power is a necessary prerequisite for the dismantling of Niyazov’s totalitarian institutions since without such consolidation, those who aided in the building of Niyazov’s Turkmenistan would likely resist Berdymuhhamedov’s reforms.
Corey, you make a good point, but that’s not what Kozlova seems to be saying. She’s marketing the changes as a simple power grab with reform dressings, not reform through power grab or something similar. I don’t know that kind of distinction is meaningless, but the way you described it (and the way I see it too) at the very least sounds more benevolent that how Kozlova describes.
I think Berdym. is trying to chart a treacherous course between the micro internal power struggle with the holdover Niyazov junta, the forces of corruption, etc. and the greater struggle of trying to stay afloat as an independent operator in the world wide insurge of competiting interests focussed on the gas reserves.
The barometer for an accurate assessment of the reform/change is: how well are the people of the country doing.? Has the unemployment rate decreased? Are the schools full? the hospitals reopened, etc.? Check those statistics and you will have a more accurate assessment.
I think Corey nailed it – even a reformer has to play the Soviet political intra-party power struggle game to get what he wants. Niazov’s remnants are doubtlessly familiar with the rules, but with any luck, they’re the last gasp of this sort of venal jockeying for power that typified Soviet style politics.
Now that Berdymuhammedov has cleared the way of Turkmenbashi’s toadies and hangers on, he’s free to put in his own people to either institute reforms, or hang onto power forever. The smart money is on authoritarian, but not totalitarian, rule coupled with incremental political reforms. Just like Nazarbayev!