There’s new fighting in Waziristan, with claims that upwards of 150 Taliban have been killed. Al-Jazeera is reporting the heavy use of jet bombing, which, combined with a massive civilian exodus, makes me doubt just how many militants have been killed (though word of 200 Pakistani troops being seized without shots fired stretches my credulity beyond my normal skepticism). In a particularly rich bit of irony, Major-General Waheed Arshad, a spokesman for the Pakistani Army, is complaining that the militants there are getting arms and support from across the border in Afghanistan.
And the militants in Afghanistan, who sneak back into the FATA when they tire of getting slaughtered by better trained NATO soldiers? Well, they get their weapons from… well probably not Iran, I can say that much. Do they appear by magic? Or might Arshad be wary of criticizing the militants’ primary supplier—ISI?
Péter Marton is right that sloppy reporting of this stuff has come to bug me so deeply. But he points to what appears to be excellent analysis from the Hassan Abbas at the Jamestown Foundation. I’ll let his summary of the region’s “Talibanization” stand, as it’s a good one, though I am still left wondering what, exactly, is going on there. We all seem to know things are getting worse; however the best we have are vague portents of some looming disaster. However, recent experience has taught me that neither the local chiefs, nor the Pakistani army, are reliable sources for what conflict is actually happened, neither are fleeing civilians. The severe hostility toward any outsiders, but especially western reporters, makes me unwilling to speculate anything about the fighting beyond recognizing it is probably happening. I can’t say if it would be significant.
All of this bears a depressing similarity to Afghanistan’s snowballing radicalization in the mid-90s. Roger LeMoyne said of Kabul in 1996, “The geography and hardware of conflict seemed less real than the suffering it left behind,” as if these conflicts were only comprehensible in the past tense. I truly hope that isn’t the case; knowing about them in the present, and hopefully future tense, makes it that tiny bit more likely we might be able to either prevent or stop whatever atrocities are on their way. Because if Abbas and Marton are correct, and this fighting is another symptom of the region’s growing radicalism, there is little but atrocity in the future—whether from zealous fundamentalists brutalizing the weak or female, or the Pakistani Army trying to prove its friendship to the West by bombing some villages.
{ 5 comments }
Hello Josh,
Thanks for the link to my summary. What I find remarkable about Abbas’ article is that while I absolutely agree that the supposedly main conflict between the Pakistani government and Islamist militants of all kinds is one that we are not likely to have accurate information on, as this all is constantly spun in one way or another, Abbas notes all those other conflicts that rarely get mentioned, knowing of the existence of which is added value enough in and of itself. In fact, since I don’t trust the sort of news you’re criticising, either, given the chance to choose I’d rather read more on all those other conflicts and the way they are shaping up.
Peter, I agree wholeheartedly: Abbas’ reporting is superior.
Thanks for your encouraging remarks. You might be interested in my other articles on the subject, which are available at: http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/analysts.php?authorid=370
Best,
Hassan
Thank you for the link (including the one to the blog), Hassan. Sure I am interested,
Best,
Péter
Indeed, Hassan, I have to second Péter’s thoughts.