Regarding individuals and institutions, I basically agree with you, but with one caveat. That the death of one individual, Mullah Naqib, will have such repercussions for the entire region is in fact a reflection of local democratic practices. He was the recognized and universally respected “elder” of one of the most important tribes in the Afghan south. His moral authority was accorded him by his tribesmen, based on his human and leadership qualities. Sometimes we westerners, in our focus on institutions, are blinded to the reality of indigenous institutions in our eagerness to construct others that are more recognizable to us. I am not trying to second Rory Stewart’s views here. I emphatically believe Afghans know exactly what participatory government is all about and are desperate for it. I just think it might not necessarily take precisely the forms that we are used to seeing, and we should be looking for substance rather than form. Over the next few weeks, Mullah Naqib’s tribe will put forth a new leader, and he is someone whom, along with government officials, it would make sense for international officials to have contact with, since he will be the democratically selected representative of a large and crucial segment of the population of this region.

The murder of President Lincoln also had a significant impact on the security and history of the United States. Individuals count everywhere.

My phrasing was meant to be colloquial, not insulting. My other coverage of you and your work has been complimentary, so if I lent that impression I apologize and withdraw it. Similarly, my apologies on confusing the exact location of your cooperative—aside from my own ignorance of Pashto (I assumed there was a correlation between Arghand and Arghandab), it was mentioned in mourning, as I am a strong advocate of programs such as yours, and am continually frustrated by a seeming lack of funding and focus on the part of the international community.

I think you might be confusing my point here, which is probably due to sloppy phrasing on my part. I don’t deny the role of personality in Afghan politics. I do, however, deplore it, as Mullah Naqib’s death may show—if the death of a single man can put an entire city at risk, that is. My remark about institutional development is made with an eye toward the long view, one which would require—as you state—more than throwing a few computers at a government office.

Similarly, my other writing on this topic has included calls for more specific cultural training for personnel deployed to Afghanistan, a changed strategy for addressing development and security, a retasking of PRTs to make them less obviously military in focus and origin, an expansion of the new Human Terrain System to make overall efforts in the country more culturally aware, and a more rational approach to economic development focused on institution- and capacity-building rather than sprinkling dollars over villages and wishing them success.

I believe you and I are in favor of the same things, in other words. This was meant more as an update to several strings of analysis I’ve maintained here for the past year, which I think might explain some of the confusion.

And were this death to mean, among other things, that our cooperative had to shut down, that would have significance not just for me and the 12 members and their families whose livelihoods it guarantees, but also as a signal regarding the possibility of doing any kind of development work at all in this region. Please don’t go overboard in seeking self-serving motivations for every comment anyone makes.

Regarding VIP politics. The fact is that Afghanistan is still a society in which personalities have tremendous importance. To ignore that and focus blindly on “institutions” that are meaningless to the Afghan people is not an intelligent way to proceed. By all means, institutions with proper, accountable, responsive procedures need to be developed — and that does not mean just providing provincial directorates with a few computers. It means detailed and consistent mentoring of the personnel who staff those institutions, at every level, and over a long period of time.

I could not agree more, therefore, with the plea for more Canadian manpower and resources, for a period extending well beyond February, 2009. The issue is not just one of quantity. Also quality. HOW these resources are deployed — what pressure is brought to bear, via these resources, to require the Afghan government to be more responsive to the needs of its citizens, including but not exclusively their need for security — will determine whether or not a large chunk of Afghanistan reverts to some form or another of Taliban control.