The last chapter of the book is about how he went on to work in Badakhshan, where he still is (or was when I briefly corresponded with him after my review came out in Far East Econ Review). He did say then that he was pretty much confined to his project base, but it sounded like it was against his own wishes (I’m sure gov’t insurance plans are really reluctant to cover people wandering around Afghanistan at this point).

Alanna, I’m certainly comforted you’ve had a better experience with aid workers. And without a doubt many do work out of a genuine interest in the local people and culture. But I’m with Joe in that the vast majority I’ve met—including who have worked in Afghanistan—are literally just adventure tourists. They want to say they’ve been to Afghanistan, but that’s about as far as their committment to the place goes. It’s what happens when you live in the tiny ex-pat bubble in Kabul and never leave the razorwire to meet with normal people. Hafvenstein benefitted tremendously by going places like Helmand before (or perhaps just as) one needed an entourage of security guards; nowadays, I feel, all but the most dedicated are sealed off.

While I do agree 100% with the assessment of the way USAID contractors can churn out proposals at the drop of the hat, I think that “professional development workers” are unfairly treated here. Admittedly, I was one once and am likely to be biased. But the vast majority of development workers I met were idealists, interested in local culture and genuinely committed to trying to do something good for the world. Cynical as all hell, and also committed to the success of the organzations theyed work for, I agree. But trying very hard to run good and useful programs.

Even those who were not idealists were professionals in the best sense of the word – determined to have their projects succeed in tough circumstances.

There’s an awful lot of incomptence among these people, and the effect may well be the same as ill-intent, but saying it’s an industry based on adventure tourism is untrue and unfair.

The book compares, I think, very favorably to Sarah Chayes’ book. That one turnes out to be basically a chronicle of her going around telling, by turns, American officers on the ground, local warlords, President Karzai, and the American military as a whole how much better it would be if she could just run the joint for a while. Hafvenstein’s reluctance to self-aggrandize and carp on policy strikes me as more honest.