Over the past year, the militants in Afghanistan have been aggressively moving to isolate Kandahar. Putting some pieces together, whether the death of Mullah Naqib, then Hakim Jan’s assassination in June, then the big prison break also in June, and most recently the murder of Habibullah Jan, the picture is crystal clear: Kandahar is in their sights. Could this be the epicenter of the conflict?
Absolutely, said Sarah Chayes from Kandahar. “The east,” she said via email, “in my own view, is just a diversion, or at worst an as-yet disorganized second front.”
If true, and by all accounts it probably is given how intently the action has centered on Kandahar over the last year, then the next question is: what is NATO doing to stop it? Ms. Chayes in the past has been adamant in the past at how negligently NATO behaved in not countering the repeated forays into the Arghandab valley, and how this sends a very dark message to Kandahar’s inhabitants (put shortly, “no one will save you”).
During the last few weeks, the intensity of incidents has risen considerably, making it obvious there is a concerted and reinvigorated effort to retake the city. What will be the west’s response? Hopefully not that of Canadian Brigadier-General Dennis Thompson, whose response to the massive prison break was, “meh—not our problem.” Our own apathy will kill us… more accurately, the people we claim to be protecting.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1801 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
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{ 6 comments }
Joshua,
First, I’m not sure that my last post made it through. Basically, I wrote to thank-you for the changes you made in the last post and to thank-you for your reasonable nature during our last exchange.
Second, I feel that I should point out that the fact that the Taliban are eager to regain Kandahar has been evident to the CF since major combat ops. began in summer of ’06 (a realization the struck all the more home with the loss of an acquitance over there). So, they’ve had their sights set on that target for some time.
I would argue that this “new” activity that has occured lately is nothing new: similar occurances occured in Panjwai and Zhari over the past few years. If anything, I think the threat to Kandahar in ’06 was greater at that time then it is now (the Taliban having basically a firm grip over the area until our arrival).
Certainly, the enemy has grown sophisticated in some aspects, but the fact of the matter is is that the Taliban cannot stand up to the CF. As far as I can see (and I admit that I could be wrong on this. . .there could somekind of Tet-like offensive waiting in the wings), the enemy will be reduced to these terrorism tactics for some time.
With regards to Arghandab, its not so much that we are “negligent” as much as there are other strategic and tactical priorities we have to commit to (ie., Kandahar City, Spin Boldak, Pashmul, Zhari, Panjwai, etc.). Unfortunately, we simply can’t be everywhere at once. With the current presence of a brigade of jarheads perhaps we can expand the territory we currently hold.
“What will be the response?” If things get serious again, I suspect that the Taliban will be met with the response they got in ’06: Op. Mountain Thrust and Op. Medusa. I assure you that we can more than hold our own against the enemy: we’ve done so before and we will again.
I’m not denying that there is not any urgency to the overall situation, but I don’t think we’re in all out emergancy just yet as the tone of your post seems to suggest.
Finally, to assauge your fears, Brig. Gen. Thompson’s tour is scheduled to end shortly, so you won’t have to worry about him anymore
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tbird,
No worries, I dig constructive criticism. You pointed out some flaws in my argument, and I’m happy to correct the record.
I guess the point I’m trying to get at is that, while Kandahar has always been under contention, it is only recently that a number of high profile movements against it have taken place. My friends who live there are worried in a way they weren’t last year, or in years past. To me, that is saying something.
Otherwise, it seems that, while you seem to dispute my argument that we are critically short of personnel, one of the problems in the area is that we don’t have enough troops to protect all the major areas. As the gateway to Kandahar City, the Arghandab has enormous symbolic importance, just as the incursion just after Naqib’s death has enormous symbolism. It isn’t a question of winning combat — to the best of my knowledge we haven’t lost a large scale firefight — but rather what those events mean. Not all battles we fight are kinetic; and it is the non-kinetic war we seem to be losing.
I understand the basic reality that it is an environment with incredible scarce resources. However, it is also badly damaging to the mission when people in a previously calm area are not protected in the name of “strategic priorities.” If I was raising a family in Arghandab, I wouldn’t be feeling particularly inclined to assist NATO, no matter how well they spoke of their good intentions.
Joshua,
I actually don’t dispute your argument regarding troop levels. In fact, I’m very much in agreement with you on this matter as well as the matter of general security and the hearts and minds campaign. As always, more could be done. If it was up to me, I would sink billions of dollars and put millions of troops into Kandahar. Unfortunately, I am just a working man who doesn’t make these decisions.
Rather, what I am trying to do is attack a certain undertone that I detect in your posts. Unless I am wrong (always a good possibility), I sense that you are making your arguments under belief that there is general sense of apathy with regards to the conduct of the mission (as represented by Thompson). Provided that this interpretation is correct, we could call it “the lone voice in the wilderness.”
Everyone on the ground (both Afghan and CF) is painfully aware of the current circumstances and their grave nature. Yet, (as we both agree) resources are limited and because of this things must be prioritized according to their strategic importance. I can’t go any further into this matter because of OPSEC. Needless to say, I am not arguing that Arghandab and the Kandahar prison are not important, but that responses to these sort of incidents will be restrained.
I guess where you and I part ways is in our takes on these things. Because of my experience, I will have a view that says: man, this is really shitty but I can understand why its like this given the context. Hence, my charitable interpretation of Gen. Thompson: he could well be under a great deal of stress, may care greatly about all the bad things that occur under his command, and may have simply got mad and misspoke during the press conference (haven’t we all done that?). Unfortunately, I don’t know him personally so I can’t be so quick to judge him.
In a personal aside, I think that is why I was so testy in my first post: no one likes having their work and actions judged by people unfamiliar with the internal matters that produce such things. Since you have never been in the CF, my automatic response to judgements regarding criticisms of it will be: how do you know such things?
Anyhow, good talking with you,
Cheers
tbird,
That’s not unfair. Aside from my solemn assurances I know more than you perhaps give me credit for, your criticism is not wrong.
However, I don’t approach this from a military-centric perspective. I realize you do, which is why I appreciate the check you have on my sense of outrage. But I take this from the perspective of people on the ground, about whom I care very deeply; from their perspective, the first question is: why?
I don’t think you’d argue that such sentiment is perfectly valid. Nor do I even think you’d necessarily argue with some people wondering at why certain areas are strategized over others… say, last month, Pashmul over Arghandab. When resources are scare, the “hold” becomes even more important.
And, rightly or wrongly, people like General Thompson, or even the Canadian parliament’s machinations over whether or not to stay, lend the impression that it isn’t of much importance to Canada.
But it is also unfair to single out Canada. My criticism of Canadian policy has been mild compared to my criticism of U.S. policy, which in turn has been mild compared to my criticism of German policy. Every one suffers from this failure in Afghanistan — that is why I describe the under-resourcing issue as a national and international crisis, and not limited to any single country.
I hope that makes some sense. And let’s keep this discussion going! I think it’s incredibly constructive, and you’ve helped me temper my attitude (which is rare, and something I really appreciate).
Joshua,
“Why?” I could give my reasons, but I know that they mean nothing when you’ve lost your livelyhood and loved ones like those poor people have. Unfortunately, its the policeman’s eternal problem: “where are you when we need you?” Its absolutely lamentable. And given my simple position, I don’t ultimately know the real reasons. Much as the ordinary Afghan must trust in ultimate goodness of Allah to deliver them from grief, I must trust in the wisdom of the chain of command (for all the pitfalls that involves).
What I do know though, is that given the situation, we can’t afford to get too upset and irrational or we’ll end up doing loosing the whole affair. Much as Agamemnon counselled Achilles to save his rage for the moment of kill, so we must soldier on in a similar fashion.
And forgive me for seeming to discount your defence-related experiences. I think its Weberian dilemma that I’m invoking when I say that to truly understand the group you have to literally be a member of the group. An astute observer such as yourself, or an outsider with some acquitance (again, I’m assuming you haven’t served in the CF, please correct me if I’m wrong on this account) can gain insight and understand, but ultimately doesn’t truly know. Parochial and mystical, I know, but that’s how I feel about it.
Anyhow, this all diverts from the real issue at hand. We know and agree on what the problem is. How do we solve it? Asides from just being another lobbyist, how do we convince the world that Afghanistan is worth saving? I think it would be profitable to identify and debate the roadblocks and go about demolishing them in such a fashion that convinces and motivates the public to act.
tbird,
You’re right that I have never worn the uniform, though I have spent the vast majority of my adult life working for the military. But I must say… I do somewhat relish the outsider perspective I bring. Especially in an organization like the military, I find it can be quite healthy.
And I can assure you much of this blog’s content is about correcting the many problems in our policy-making apparatus. In fact, simply understanding the problem must happen first; for Afghanistan, that has taken up the majority of my time lately (simply describing the place, in all of its complexities, is an enormous task). But if you search for “solutions” or “policy” you’ll find me trying, ever-so-slowly, to establish a good policy foundation for the analysis we do here.
But honestly? Just correcting misconceptions and errors of fact is already a near-full time job. It’s a daunting task to take on for a blog you maintain in your off hours. So I do the best I can.