Note that Edward’s presented the elements of Pashtunwali as one of several moral authorities that Afghans draw from and are conflicted by.

Perhaps I misstated myself: I don’t discount the role of Pashtunwali in the insurgency, but merely its elevation as a primary motivation for the insurgency, and for converts to the insurgency. Despite the laborious argumentation laid out here and in Johnson’s piece (“typical attack mode?” He is still pushing the ludicrous and unsupportable “ghilzai-durrani rivalry drives the taliban” line), they can’t actually point to how those night letters, or how collateral damage-inspired badal, have fueled the insurgency.

I’m not ignorant of Edwards or Dupree — I’ve referenced both before on this blog, many times (I even reviewed Dupree’s book for crying out loud). Notice how I said in the post I wasn’t even trying to construct a comprehensive list of scholars who have studied Pashtunwali, merely that there is an enormous body of work Hussain was neglecting in a surprisingly proscribed exploration of it as a concept (considering badal is repeated again and again as the heart of the thesis).

Frankly, I would consider Dupree’s concept of the “mud curtain” that reinforces village-level xenophobia to be a far more credible driver of hositlity toward the coalition than Holy Revenge of Holy War.

As for how the insurgency is fueling itself, despite the NPS crowd being very proud of getting their hands on some Night Letters, none have been able to explain how, exactly, they impact rural Afghans’ decision-making on anything other than a theoretical level. Indeed, even if we were to ignore coalition reporting that Night Letters more often result in a plea to send more troops into an area to provide security (which is hardly the same as a nuanced appeal to Pashtun identity), Giustozzi did some sophisticated analysis of how what he calls the Neo-Taliban recruits today, in which he notes that well over half the Taliban were recruited directly from the FATA, where NATO collateral damage is not a significant recruitment factor, but that within the south-east region recruitment was only effective in areas where the tribal leadership was weakest and religious leaders strongest — implying a strong basis in salafism or wahabism, and not Pashtunwali and badal.

To get back to my original critique of Hussain’s work, this sort of nuance, and the research that went into it, is absent from the thesis. And it is deeply at odds with the argument that badal is driving recruitment.

While I agree, Pashtunwali is not a primary motive for Taliban information operations or revenge violence when misplaced bombs destroy families; it is a significant aspect that deserves our attention. Part of our problems in the past has been woeful ignorance of the cultures we operate in. While some people appear to over emphasis cultural factors in analyzing conflicts, this may be a temporary swing in the pendulum until analysts find the correct balance of individual, organizational, and cultural elements affecting the nature of insurgency.

While badal is not necessarily a unique trait of Pashtuns, as you attempt to flesh out in tearing apart Hussain’s thesis, it appears to be a significant organizing factor that has influenced jihad against perceived occupation in the past just as it is today. No it’s not the only factor, and I’m not sure if Hussain claims it as the primary role in his argument, but it is a significant enough cultural factor worth Hussain’s consideration and all of ours. While you allude to the utility of Hussain’s primary argument in the end, it seems you fail to accept badal as a legitimate factor worthy of consideration. I think you should.

Unfortunately, you refer to your typical attack mode on Johnson’s publications without providing any substantive justification. It’s understandable you don’t have the time nor inclination to seriously dissect his Night Letters piece, but I think you fundamentally misunderstand and under appreciate Taliban information operations. Simply put, they are “intimidation and threats” aimed at the local population, and done in a manner reflective of Pashtun history, culture, and narratives. Equally laced with religious diatribe, night letters are much more clever and potent then any message the Afghan government is sending. To our dismay, Taliban understand the rural culture much better than Kabul elites ever will.

-John