I’ll discuss this with you offline.

Or one could drive to Nebraska and visit the Afghanistan library at UN-Omaha and peruse their collection.

You’ll get zero argument from me about the dangers of lumping, and there’s no doubt Giustozzi’s tendency to do that is a major weakness (I especially dislike when he’ll write a paragraph, then endnote it with about a dozen different news stories, almost like he’s trying to overload you with so many sources you won’t bother to cross-check).

As for Schuyler Jones… well, I don’t have access to an academic library at the moment. While I want one, for the past eight months I’ve been unable to find a retailer selling either his tome on Nuristan or his annotated bibliography.

Do you have any hints on where I could find some good sources here? I’ve been hurting for decent sources on Nuristan for a while, and I’m none too happy with relying on hapless western reporters for information.

And, as Schuyler Jones attempted to explain, in Waygal, men have influence, not authority and there simply haven’t been men who were “strong men” as there has been in the Kunar lowlands. So what Giustozzi describes for Nuristan (at least central Nuristan) wasn’t an aberrant period, but simply the enduring reality of political organization in the region.

Thus one should be wary of lumping the situation in the rich, wide lowlands of Kunar where there is a tradition of important men who own and control broad tracts of land and the mountain areas where the challenge of managing the different ecological zones and exploitative strategies in what is called ‘mixed-mountain agriculture’ requires an entirely different form of political organization.

Moreover, within Nuristan the situation for different populations with respect to their relationship with the central government differs markedly going right back to the time that they converted and accepted incorporation into the state. Some agreed peacefully, others resisted for years and were defeated and then forcibly relocated to places like the Kabul basin.

Similarly, in some regions of Nuristan the government presence was more distant and less onerous than in others.

Also there is extensive variation within Nuristan concerning the presence of Islamists. In some areas they were tied to Maulavi Afzal and the Daulat who had ties to the Lashkar, in other places it was the Panj Piris. And while both Maulavi Afzal and Jamil ur-Rahman had ties to the Lashkar, there was animosity between them.

And these days, the region where Maulavi Afzal and the Lashkar had influence had been Tamim’s strongest supporters, while the Panj Piris are seen as a main anti-government force. It’s not clear whether the Lashkar sees this as a tactical or strategic alliance. So there are Salafis and Salafis and bitter anomosities among them are not uncommon.

As for whether there’s a difference in the way that people feel to Afghan governments depending on whether they are foreign-supported or otherwise, Barney Rubin argues quite persuasively that since the advent of modern Afghanistan, all Afghan central governments have had to rely on outsiders to have any effectiveness whatsoever.

Then there’s the entire issue of Sarwar Nuristani, his relationship to the communist regimes and also to Mawlawi Afzal. That’s a complicated and fascinating case that illuminates the ambivalence towards governments even ones that were communist-backed. A thorough examination of this matter would likely lead one to abandon all hope of making any generalization about anything concerning contemporary Nuristan.

In general, I don’t dispute that what Giustozzi is saying may apply in some places, but he’s a lumper, and what I know about the region inclines me to be a splitter. One has to be wary of blanket statements that apply to an area (Kunar/Nuristan including upper Laghman) which encompasses so much variety in terms of history, environment, adaptive strategies and the like.

As a postscript, shortly after the Nuristanis in Waygal accepted Islam, there was a tiny rebellion in that several government mullahs who had been sent to the valley to teach the people about Islam were murdered by locals. The reason according to local sources was that these mullahs were obnoxious, treated the people poorly and were molesting boys. Until 1978 that was the extent of any effective resistance in Waygal to any Afghan government.

Perhaps I should clarify my comment on the Waygal’s history of rebellion. From Edwards’ work, and Strand’s interview with Muhammad Anvar Amin, I was under the impression that resistence to the central government had an established history there. To be more precise: resistence to foreigner-supported governments, or perhaps even more accurately puppet rulers propped by up non-Muslim foreigners.

I think this would also fit your description of how they’ve interacted with the government as well.

About tensions between locals and extremist preachers… this doesn’t really match with the research I’ve seen (which, it is important to note, is not based on personal experience). For example, in 2007 Giustozzi wrote:

Both the intelligentsia and nationalist feelings were very weak if present at all, especially in Kunar and Nuristan. Although tribal structures were strong in Kunar and Nuristan, tribal governance was suffering the absence of big and established strongmen with good self-governance skills and the consequent political fragmentation. In these two provinces, therefore, government presence and influence was extremely weak, even in terms of alliances with local strongmen. By the 1990s these regions had been largely ‘colonized’ by Salafi preachers, who were also often organized politically and hostile to the central government. Due to this extreme weakness of government of the government, in Kunar, in Nuristan and in the northern districts of Laghman, in 2002-3 the insurgents were already able to operate there without much hindrance.

Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, pp.64

In fairness, Giustozzi does explain that insurgents did not for the most part successfully ally with local communities, which he chalks up to an absent government unable to antagonize locals into rebellion (with the obvious exception of the Korengal). Even then, he chalks up rebellion to a desire to protect local interests, in some cases illegal timber smuggling, which I don’t think conclusively and exhaustively argues against what I wrote (or totally invalidate my own research).

So I guess what I’m saying is it doesn’t seem to be as cut and dried as you write. Otherwise, I think we are largely on the same page.

So, in effect, the Afghan security forces and Coalition have ceded the entire Waygal district to the opposition.

Waygal is dramatically different from Korangal.

And contrary to Joshua’s comment, the people of the Waygal valley had been consistent and strong supporters of legitimate Afghan central governments since they accepted Islam and the suzerainty of the Afghan ruler in the late 1890s.

This was reinforced when they teamed with Sardar Daoud to defeat the Safi Pashtuns in the 1946-47 Safi uprising. Zahir Shah also visited the Waygal valley in the 1950s. He traveled all the way up the valley to the twin communities that constitute Waygal village.

The Waygal valley is the home to many Afghan military officers who attained high ranks including the former chief of the air force and commanders of key units in and around Kabul. In addition, the most influential man from the Waygal valley is deputy defense minister, Dr. Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani. He’s also quite close to President Karzai.

The strong tie between the people of Waygal and the central government rested on many factors but the most important one is that they saw the person of the Afghan ruler as insuring their protection from their local opponents, the Safi Pashtun who reside in the lowlands of Pech and who have pushed up into the abundant, well-watered Waygal valley lands that had laid undeveloped during the Kafir times because of the open hostilities among all of the people in the region. The Safis seek to expand into these regions, they also seek the other riches in Nuristan including the timber, gems, water and pastures.

Tensions between the local people and extremist mullahs have characterized the region for decades. It certainly predated the Jihad and the rise of the Mujahidin. What is happening now is only the latest and, sadly, most violent chapter.

All indications are that those who are espousing violence in the Waygal valley represent a tiny minority. They are supported by various outsiders including perhaps elements of Hekmatyar’s group and the Ashatis or Panj Piris, who have been active in the region for decades.

The willingness of many people in Waygal to cooperate with the coalition and to take advantage of the resources and opportunities which are made available is offset by the fundamental inability of the Coalition and the Afghan government to do anything to ensure their security and protection against the extremists who are willing to use violence and intimidation to get their way.

Whether in Waygal district, or more broadly in rural Afghanistan, there is no strategy that can provide security to the people: the ANA isn’t constituted to do so and besides they are too few in number and mainly working in tandem with the Coalition forces. The Afghan police lack the resources, training and mandate to counter the insurgents. As such, Coalition appeals to the locals to support the government and to work against the insurgents are met with indifference because the Coalition and government simply cannot deliver what is most important.

Now with the U.S. withdrawing from Waygal it will again demonstrate that when the going gets tough the good guys get going.

It is possible that this withdrawal is tactical in nature. Elizabeth Rubin’s article on Korangal which appeared in the NYTimes magazine raised the question as to why there’s a presence in that region which results in such high casualties and appears to be ineffective. So a distant observer could question whether Korangal’s days are also numbered.

With a massing of bad guys and their weapons, perhaps the Coalition is consolidating its presence to defend Camp Blessing and the vital LOC extending up the Pech valley. If that’s the case, the departure from Want may make sense, but if this is a broader strategic shift, one has to question how the Waygal district withdrawal will contribute to our broader strategic goals.

As for the prospects to build effective bridges and to find common cause and purpose with the local people, it isn’t that difficult. These are people with concerns and aspirations not unlike our own.

A tremendous amount can be accomplished but it can’t be done on the quick, it can’t be done without having first gained an understanding of the way things operate on different levels and this includes importantly a firm commitment to work at understanding and to continue to do so throughout one’s time in the AO.

12 months is not long enough but it is long enough to gain knowledge and effectiveness that is far greater at the end then at the begining; then it all vanishes with the RIP. Some serious thought should be given (as at least an intermediate step) to staggering rotations so that there is some real, protracted overlap. At present the left seat-right seat period is usually truncated and even if it isn’t, it’s far too short to pass on the nuanced and detailed knowledge that’s necessary to operate effectively in these environments.