I totally agree that legalization is, for all intents and purposes, off the table. The I’d disagree that the Afghan state’s inability to tax or regulate is a reason not to consider it. It is clear that a) they’d be spending less on eradication, so could spend a little more on tax collection, and, b) even with modest tax compliance on the legal crop, they’d have even more for the same.

It simply isn’t an accident that the Golden Triangle and Colombia, Bolivia, Peru (the White Triangle?) are political basket cases.

Oh, absolutely. But if you think about how young, fragile states have developed throughout history, how many have been able stand up to their biggest industrialists? Not many. In Afghanistan, you’ve got the added pressure of warlords just waiting to call upon their tribe or ethnic group to bring the whole experiment in democracy crashing down.

Karzai will eventually have to tackle the biggest drug traffickers in the government. The fact that he hasn’t isn’t because he doesn’t want to, in my opinion, but rather because the state has neither the institutional capacity or strength to do so.

Afghanistan will take a long time to figure all its interconnected problems out. A long time. The international community seems to want it done on a hurried schedule, something that no one can expect would work.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sher_Mohammed_Akhundzada

Governor of Helmand. Busted with gigantic quantities of opium. Appointed, naturally, to the upper house of parliament. Almost certainly a major player in the opium trade to this day.

Many of the drug lords ended up in the parliament–and Karzai’s ability to stay in power was to a degree dependent on not upsetting them.

I’m not saying Schweich is right on everything, but it’s no secret that the drug lords maintain a big influence over the political affairs of the country.

I love in particular how he talks about how awesome it was to land in a poppy field, when I believe this same incident was described by Joel Hafvenstein in “Opium Season.” He writes about it as emblematic of how shoddy the counternarcotics campaign was, and how clueless U.S. officials were.

Which sounds about right.

Finally, he makes a big point of accusing President Karzai, his family and his government of allowing the drug trade to flourish. He even admits that the intelligence proving it is unclassified and widely available. But then…he doesn’t actually provide any of it. If you’re going to make such grandoise accusations, BACK THEM UP.

Unfortunately, Schweich missed the chance to start a meaningful conversation on a difficult topic. Instead, his comes off as self-serving and his article as typical Washington score-settling.