Great post. Yeah, with the spate of comment comparing the current international occupation to the Soviet failure, I’ve also been surprised by how little attention has been given to the unexpectedly long survival of the Najibullah regime.

The simplistic lesson from 1989-1992 is that foreign subsidy is more important than foreign troops to keep an Afghan leader in power. Najib didn’t fall when the Russian tanks rolled out, but when the Russian government stopped giving him enough money to pay his troops (particularly Dostum’s boys).

I’d love to see a serious analysis of whether this holds lessons for the flagging NATO attempt to stabilize Afghanistan. Let me know if you come across one.

Agreed. I’ve been wondering how to discuss Cordesman devastating presentation on just how poor our self-evaluation has been in Afghanistan. It was, essentially, a top-down critique of the ludicrous notion that “bad news benefits the enemy,” since if we only tell good news stories we have no idea where we need to improve.

Which is why all the reckless cheerleading gets on my nerves so much. But that is a separate issue.

This Economist piece is like when Ann Marlowe was positively quoting two-bit LTCs in Khost saying the one thing the Afghan National Police needs isn’t training by actual police officers from the West, but Army mentorship and retinal scanners. It is a disconnected world view.

Despite the billions that have been poured into security sector reform in Afghanistan, there is not yet any serious plan that explains how the ANSF is ever going to bring security to the country and its people.

Tony Cordesman is dead on in saying that we won’t achieve our goals in Afghanistan unless we stop lying to ourselves.

Haven’t they been on the bandwagon for Blair’s involvement in Iraq and Afgfhanistan all along?

If I remember correctly, that is why they lost me as a reader, years ago.