Violence and Media Perception

For the past several days, Pakistani security forces—also busy being accused of sympathy with militants—have fought a drawn out battle in the recently-Talibanized Swat valley of the North West Frontier Province. Media coverage since Thursday has evolved curiously, focusing only on dead militants claimed by the army and doing little independent investigation of what the fighting was about, what it entailed, who was involved, and who got hurt. Looking at how this changed over the week leads to some potentially unanswerable, but nevertheless vital, questions.

On Wednesday, the AP reported the first round:

Wednesday’s clash in Swat began when militants attacked a security post about 12 miles from Mingora, the valley’s main town, the army spokesman, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, said. He said troops repelled the attack, killing 25 militants and wounding many more, while five soldiers, including two officers, also died.

Another group of about 70 militants tried to seize the market area of the town of Matta, but fled when reinforcements reached the police station, Abbas said.

Riaz Khan, the AP correspondent, notes that journalists were unable to independently confirm casualties because the military would not allow reporters into the area. This helps to inform Essa Khankhel’s report, on Thursday, in The Nation. Apparently overnight, journalists were allowed into Mingora, Swat’s main town. Khankhel was highlighting civilian casualties:

Amidst continuing operation by the security forces against the alleged militants, as many as 26 persons , mostly civilians and 10 Taliban, were killed and 27 others received injuries while some 32 houses were damaged on Thursday in different parts of Kabal and Matta Tehsils of Swat

The security forces used gunship helicopters besides tanks in the operation.

In the locality of Kabal, a mortar shell hit a house of Misalur-Rahman where seven persons of a family were killed. The deceased were identified as Faseehulasan, Mohammad Tahir, Zainul Abideen, Mst Khalida, Abbas Khan and two sons of Abbas Khan. In another locality of Kabal Tehsil some 4 citizens were killed due to gunship helicopter firing. The four deceased were identified as Salih Rahman, his two children and a female of the same house.

This is the largely ignored consequence of vast military undertakings in the tribal areas (Swat can be considered such thanks to the efforts of Maulana Fazlullah)—civilians inevitably get wounded or hurt, and their homes and property destroyed. The danger is that, just as in Afghanistan, this can carry enormous consequences, especially if the government (or, occasionally, U.S.) demonstrates insufficient concern for civilian well being.

The Daily Times put the death toll of Thursday’s fighting at 63. Neither number should be considered reliable, given the limitations of reporting in the area.

By Sunday, militants had bombed a bridge between Mingora and Kabal, killing at least nine “security personnel” (it is unclear whether the dead were soldiers, police, ISI, or all of the above). This was followed by another firefight that allegedly killed another 15 militants and one security agent.

By Monday, Reuters was reporting 94 militants killed. Even taking the highest estimates of the above competing stories, I only counted 85 dead militants. Junaid Ali also noted that approximately 25 civilians or so had been killed—the number is almost certainly higher, if the fighting has continued days past Khankhel’s initial report. RFE/RL reported that now thousands have fled the area.

There are two interesting questions to raise through this survey of coverage:

• The Pakistani Army reports that three ISI agents were killed in the fighting. How they arrived at this number is unclear; are they Army officers who were seconded to ISI service, or long-term agents operating in the area? If ISI agents were cooperating with Fazlullah and killed in the fighting, would they be included in the Army’s tally of dead “security agents,” or would they be counted among the dead militants?
• Bill Roggio has hinted at a collaboration between Tehrik-i Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan and Maulana Fazlullah, the leader of Tehrik-i Nifaz-i Shariat-i Mohammadi, or TNSM, the banned Islamist party from Swat. Supposedly, the U.S. is supporting Maulvi Nazir, a rival tribal leader from South Waziristan, after his violent opposition to Mehsud’s use of Uzbek militants. Do any of these relationships matter, or is this an internal Swat action, with no relation to the Mehsud—Nazir rivalry? If the latter, has the support of Nazir paid off at all in the last nine months?

Neither of these are easily answered. Given the dangers of reporting from these areas, and the relative simplicity of most media narratives emerging from the Army-sponsored junkets, it is unlikely these sorts of questions can be answered in anything approaching a timely manner.

Final Thought: How lame is this Bloomberg dispatch, hastily composed from wire reports and filed from Sidney? Is that how lazy they are?

Previously:
A look at the dangers of trying to export Anbar to Waziristan. Despite repeated decapitation strikes, militancy is more militant than ever in NWFP and FATA. Understanding the history of the tribal relationships with central authorities helps inform current policy choices. It also is necessary to put the current round of fighting and cross-border militancy into context.