Is it really worth highlighting just how ignorant this “what to do about Pakistan” essay really is? Probably. It’s a doozy, though.
It’s my job to come up with ideas about what to do in this kind of situation–especially when no one else is doing so. So I have given the issue more thought, and I have intended for some time to offer a few substantive suggestions about how to deal with Pakistan.
Only someone who has no reading diet beyond a few newspapers would think “no one else” is coming up with “substantive suggestions” for how to “deal” with Pakistan. And I’m not talking about blogs—countless scholars at most major think tanks have been writing on this for years. Who the hell does this guy think he is?
The more subtle goad has been observing the reaction of many Western commentators to Russia’s invasion of Georgia. What has struck me is the ease and complacency with which many pundits, particularly those on the center-left, have declared that there is not much the US can do to stop Russia or support Georgia–and then just left it at that. What this reaction really indicates is that these pundits don’t really regard the issue as important and can’t be bothered to think too hard about the things that we actually can do for Georgia.
Or maybe we don’t see any U.S. interests at stake in Georgia, though it will make a Russia-free Europe harder to come by. But the U.S. not only has no reason to get involved in a spat between Georgia and Russia, most importantly it was a conflict started by Georgia. We are under zero obligation to support unofficial allies who start wars they cannot finish, aside from trying to ensure a quick and not-catastrophic end to the inevitable occupation.
First, let’s state the dilemma clearly. The government of Pakistan has largely given up attempting to fight al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their supporters in the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan.
This is, flatly, untrue. And it disparages the deaths of hundreds of Pakistani troops who have lost their lives trying to do exactly that. Musharraf largely delivered on his promise to detain and hand over al-Qaeda operatives (Pakistani assistance in the arrest of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed is but one example of dozens). Similarly, the problem with the Pakistani government is that it tried to crack down on Taliban militants by sending in the army, rather than politically undermining them—an action that has so far resulted in the deaths of over 800 Pakistani troops (including Pashtuns, which is important to note). To accuse the Pakistani government of “giving up” is ignorant of the real story in the FATA—a more accurate claim is they have abandoned clearly ineffective methods and are seeking alternatives.
As a result, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have formed a new safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal frontier, which they are using to plan attacks on the West, train operatives, and send thousands of foot soldiers to attack NATO troops in Afghanistan. The slight resurgence of the Taliban in the past year is almost entirely attributable to the increased support coming in from Pakistan.
He doesn’t understand what he’s saying. If thousands of highly trained ideological foot soldiers are streaming across the borders can only bring a “slight resurgence” in the Taliban, then it is not really the threat he is making it out to be. In reality, there is a major upswing in Taliban attacks (the “resurgence” started in 2004-5, while guys like Trancinski were blindly obsessing over Iraq), and it had little to do with the peace agreements signed—the resurgence as such (see Giustozzi, for example) began before the first Waziristan accord signed in late 2004.
He then goes on to say that while we are justified in invading Pakistan—because, under the Bush Doctrine (which is of course the equivalent of International Law and accepted norms for state behavior), some Pakistani civilians are launching attacks across a border Pakistan cannot control to attack troops occupying a neighboring country gives us the right to topple the Pakistani government—”an invasion and occupation of Pakistan should be avoided, if possible.” But only if possible, understand.
Part of our casus belli against Pakistan is that it is aiding a relatively small insurgency in the smaller nation of Afghanistan. So it does not necessarily make sense to solve that problem by enlarging it to include an occupation and counter-insurgency war in the whole nation of Pakistan, too.
Not “necessarily”—thanks for letting us know.
The other reason to hesitate in using force directly against the government of Pakistan is because it is no longer ruled by a dictator.
Oh yes, because Musharraf was so worthy of toppling because he was a dictator. Christ. Either a country works for your country or against it; the actual nature of that government should not determine whether or not it is worth going to war. Either a country is hostile, or it is not. The type of government it is under is immaterial.
The new government of Pakistan has been dithering and ineffectual in dealing with terrorism, partly because it is truly representative of the population, which is half-sympathetic to radical Islam and doesn’t want to have to make a choice between Islam and the modern world. But one of the great virtues of representative government is that it is capable of correcting its mistakes, and when it does choose to act, it does so with greater moral legitimacy and hence more effectiveness than a dictatorship. So there is some hope that the government of Pakistan may eventually be convinced to rejoin our war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
And there’s the rub. We did nothing over the past decade as Pakistan was slowly consumed by its own flirtation with Islamism, first from a childish desire not to dirty our hands with a country that went nuclear for defense (Pakistan got the Bomb many years after India), and later from a childish desire not to undermine our pet dictator who was never really all that interested in undermining his own power base—the military and ISI that still at least partially support some Islamist movements. Pakistan’s problem with extremism is not new (it really goes all the way back to Zia ul-Haq), and we’re only now figuring out it’s a problem? Please. (And by the way, the civilian government knows that it can’t just throw troops at the FATA and expect change—they are working through groups like the ANP to undermine them politically, which is what Musharraf should have done in 2001 instead of outlawing secular parties and allowing the MMA coalition to gain a foothold in Parliament.)
Tracinski then goes on to stipulate a Three-Pronged Approach:
The first thing we can do is to win against the Taliban (again) in Afghanistan. This may seem counter-intuitive.
No, it doesn’t. So how will we win against the Taliban?
But the success of the surge in Iraq demonstrates that it is possible to win a counter-insurgency war without necessarily defeating the outside power than supports the insurgency.
Right, because the Anbar Awakening didn’t start six months before the surge or anything, and wasn’t driven by locals choosing to remove foreign fighters from their midst, and it’s not like the Taliban are considered fellow Pashtuns or anything.
That it is possible to win a counter-insurgency war without defeating its outside supporters should not actually be that big of a surprise, because this is precisely the context in which counter-insurgency usually arises. Most of these wars–particularly in the 20th century–have been contests in which great powers used insurgents and counter-insurgents as proxies to fight one another indirectly, because they viewed fighting each other directly as far too costly.
Well, except in Algeria, Malaysia, Columbia, and modern-day Afghanistan and Iraq. Otherwise, good point.
In this case, it is possible that a “surge” in Afghanistan–if it achieves results similar to what we have seen in the past 18 months in Iraq–could be far less costly than war with Pakistan. The idea would be not only to add to the number of troops in Afghanistan but to shift to a fully executed, integrated counter-insurgency strategy, as we did in Iraq.
Could be? Christ. Does this guy not think that in many places a fully-executed counterinsurgency is NOT taking place in Afghanistan? The problem in Afghanistan is that using techniques learned in Iraq are inappropriate, and we’re having to adjust our tactics and strategy for accommodate the uniqueness of Afghanistan. This guy does not understand either conflict.
Pakistan supports the Taliban partly because they sense weakness.
And here I thought they supported the Taliban because they wanted a steady pool of militants to send into Kashmir and a pliant government the lend “strategic depth” against India and Iran. Silly me.
During the 1980s, we supported the Afghan mujahideen with enormous amounts of money and weapons, as well as training and intelligence, while our then-allies in Pakistanis sent large numbers of men to fight. Why can’t we do it all again, but this time in reverse? If a large part of the current problem is that Pakistan is allowing the Taliban to send fighters over the border into Afghanistan, why not return the favor by sending fighters the other way? We should see if it is possible to recruit Afghan proxies (and even Pakistani allies) to send into Waziristan to drive out the Taliban and their supporters, or to force tribal leaders to stop backing the Taliban.
Just like that, let’s train up some angry Pashtuns and send them against Pakistan. It is just that easy, and we’ve never run into trouble doing that before or anything. No, this plan is waterproof.
I have long advocated “playing the India card” by pursuing a commercial, cultural, and military alliance with India, as a strategic counterbalance to China–and to Pakistan, India’s bitter rival.
Yes, let’s play the India card. Because Pakistan isn’t already panicking about India’s major advances inside Afghanistan already, and it’s not sponsoring horrific terrorist attacks on Indian diplomatic assets or anything.
Alas, this is just unbelievable. “The radical Islamists do not make rational calculations about their interests,” Tracinski closes, “because their interests are inherently irrational: as they like to remind us, they love death.” Right on. That must be why they keep attacking our FOBs with RPGs and mortars instead of a steady stream of hundreds of suicide bombers. That must be why their leaders are out in front leading the charge to a glorious martyr’s death instead of mounting a sophisticated psychological campaign designed to ease away chunks of Afghan territory from Coalition control month-by-month. That must be why they’ve adopted a tactically sophisticated, hyper-adaptive insurgency that can identify and adapt tactics faster than we can even observe them.
Yes, they love death. So why bother figuring out how to undermine them?
It is painful to know guys like this get paid for their expertise. But at least they’re not in charge of anything—then, it would REALLY be time to worry.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1771 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
{ 2 comments }
“The radical Islamists do not make rational calculations about their interests, because their interests are inherently irrational” Ouch, that stupid shit’s still propagated at a larger scale?
Not much more to say, except this: You say this guy earns a living by writing such ridiculous stuff? I must be doing something VERY wrong …
Oh well, like you wrote in another post: Live’s essentially unfair. Fortunately those making decisions are still somewhat smarter …
Following is a response I sent to Max Boot on his recent WALL STREET JOURNAL op ed. It constitutes a way tp present a real challenge to Russia, unlike John McCain swaggering around shouting that “We are all Georgians now.”
” Max,
“Your WSJ op-ed clearly describes what must be a major part of our response to the Russian coup de main in Georgia: rebuilding the Eastern European armed forces. Rather than the United States and NATO sticking our collective head under the guillotine and giving Russia the release by committing heavily to Georgia, I suggest we have to contribute to a massive rearmament of Poland, the Baltics and Ukraine in particular, and the rest of the Eastern European countries to the extent they are willing to participate.
“This would plainly be a direct response to Russian military adventurism in Georgia but it is in an area where geography is not against us. Russian must be made to see that it can only lose in a new Cold War. Russia simply is too poor to match a U.S./NATO buildup on its western border. If we handle this skillfully Russia will find itself in the same losing proposition of trying to outspend the West again as the Soviet Union did before 1989 or behave in a more acceptable manner.
“I believe we should emphasize, first, infrastructure to permit rapid U.S./NATO reinforcement of the front line states. Next, aid should stress interoperability. Finally, we should double and redouble our training and advisory efforts, to include training exercises on the ground that bear a close resemblance to actions if Russia attacked one or more of the Eastern European countries.
“The Western Europeans are likely to drag their feet but this should be pretty much of an easy sell to NATO, which has deep pockets that the Russian state can’t possibly equal, even with the inflow of petrodollars. Also, perhaps I am being overly cynical but my guess is that the Western Europeans would much rather provide military aid than soldiers.”