Two quick hits:
- As a follow-up to my running commentary on the problems of reporting civilian casualties in Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad has offered the novel observation, “I believe that there is a bit of a fog of war involved in some of these initial reports. Sometimes initial reports can be wrong. And the best way to deal with it is to have the kind of investigation that we have proposed, which is U.S., coalition, plus the Afghan government, plus the United Nations.” You don’t say.
- Getting lost in translation carries serious risks: “U.S. and NATO military officials in Afghanistan have admitted to RFE/RL privately that inaccurate translations cause problems for their soldiers, whether in a battle situation or simply communicating with members of a rural Afghan community.” They can’t hire qualified speakers who can get clearances, for one. The problems just snowball from there.
Just food for thought tonight. We’ll see if Afghanistan makes it into anyone’s speech during the last night of the Republican convention.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1801 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
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{ 6 comments }
And you know what the Afghans say? They say we never listen. We can’t hear/understand them!
An hour a day of language instruction until all the troops are fluent or none of the troops are there.
For what it’s worth, the language classes offered at Indiana University during the summer have a lot of ROTC students. I think something like 80 or 90% of the Pashto students were ROTC. So, that’s something, right? Officers proficient in the language is a step in the right direction.
But you’re absolutely right – knowing the language is crucial to any “peace keeping” mission. In a war, perhaps it is less important, especially if you want your soldiers to successfully demonize the enemy to the point of shooting them on sight. I do believe that was part of Russia’s problem in Afghanistan – it had too many soldiers that spoke the language [Uzbeks fighting Uzbeks, Tajiks fighting Iranian-speakers, etc.].
Hey, another investigation is coming up! http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?hp
ANd its the dastardly natives who are to blame…
“The United States military, in a series of statements about the operation, has accused the villagers of spreading Taliban propaganda. Speaking on condition that their names not be used, some military officials have suggested that the villagers fabricated such evidence as grave sites — and, by implication, that other investigators had been duped. But many villagers have connections to the Afghan police, NATO or the Americans through reconstruction projects, and they say they oppose the Taliban. “
Oh, and some might find this AEI assessment of the Musa QUala situation interesting: http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/96-donnelly.pdf
Note how they keep on focusing on the problems in Afghanistan being ones of Will, not of failed strategies or structural problems.
Well, FNord, it IS the AEI. According to them, the U.S. only loses wars if it doesn’t try hard enough. It’s like Army guys I talk to, who think we can win Afghanistan if we just bomb them enough. Aside from the whole war crime thing, assuming you can brutalize Pashtuns into following you is a bit daft.
HOWEVER, it is not out of the question that some villagers spread disinformation on the part of the Taliban. We do not know for certain, however. And this is the trick — they can either be doing so voluntarily, under coercion, or in pursuit of financial recompense… assuming it is false to begin with. This is the major challenge of operations over there right now, and partially why I’m opposed to the almost willy-nilly use of air support: it makes it damned hard to clean up afterwards.
Read this different analysis of the civilian deaths.
http://www.hazaristantimes.wordpress.com