Are We, in Fact, At War with Pakistan?

by Joshua Foust on 9/16/2008 · 5 comments

So says Topher Hitchens:

“Don’t mention the war,” as Basil insists with mounting hysteria in Fawlty Towers. And, when discussing the deepening crisis in Afghanistan, most people seem deliberately to avoid such telling phrases as “Pakistani aggression” or—more accurate still—”Pakistani colonialism.” The truth is that the Taliban, and its al-Qaida guests, were originally imposed on Afghanistan from without as a projection of Pakistani state power. (Along with Pakistan, only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ever recognized the Taliban as the legal government in Kabul.) Important circles in Pakistan have never given up the aspiration to run Afghanistan as a client or dependent or proxy state, and this colonial mindset is especially well-entrenched among senior army officers and in the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI.

It’s mostly good stuff about the inattention the U.S. has paid Pakistan over the last six years, even if he kind of flubs some of the details about Pakistan itself (like considering the ISI and the Pakistani government the same thing—you get the point). But is the U.S. actually at war with Pakistan? Myra MacDonald has a somewhat different take:

Just suppose for a minute that his argument were to turn out to be correct. Then is the United States opening up a third front after Iraq and Afghanistan, but this time on the territory of a nuclear-armed country, for the wrong reasons?

She is referring to Juan Cole‘s argument that the original al-Qaeda has been defeated, that the original group that attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon and Embassies and Bali is now dead, and the groups the U.S. is now fighting in Afghanistan are nationalist Taliban militias. In one sense, that is absolutely true.

That, combined with the realization that the majority of Taliban recruits are from local Afghan communities, it would seem foolhardy to extend the war into Pakistan. Especially since Pakistan still enjoys a veto power over supplies to ISAF and OEF.

Of course, it is highly unlikely Pakistan would ever cut that off. It can’t afford to poison the relationship anymore than the U.S. can. The real question here isn’t whether or not the U.S. is waging a very low-intensity war against some militants within the tribal areas, it is why they chose to make it public now. Since at least 2004, it’s been public knowledge that American assets would destroy known militant leaders if they could. Considering the assets that would be required in-country to do so—special forces and clandestine officers namely—it’s not like the U.S. hasn’t already enjoyed a military presence there.

So, why make this public? Why stoke the flames of public opinion—both within Pakistan (this open an admission by the Bush administration makes it harder for the civilian government to either fend off accusations of being a U.S. crony while also demonstrating their inability to govern), and the U.S.—at this very moment? The cynic in me thinks it’s tied to a general impatience with Pakistan’s inability to quell the movement militarily—a lesson every single one of the governments in that area have found out much to their own chagrin. Is this simple exasperation, hoping that publicly shaming the Pakistani government will spur it into action?

I certainly hope not. That will blow up in everyone’s faces in unpleasant, unpredictable ways.


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This post was written by...

– author of 1801 posts on Registan.net.

Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust

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{ 5 comments }

b September 17, 2008 at 5:15 am

So, why make this public?

All U.S. foreign policy is determined by its local policies.

To make the raids on Pakistan public was a gift for the McCain election campaign. After the mess in Georgia there was a need to show that Republicans are “strong”.

Quite simple …

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fnord September 17, 2008 at 7:50 am

Also a way of coopting Obamas leading military issue-point, the need to get tough with Pakistan. “Look, we are already doing that”..

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Sobek September 17, 2008 at 11:06 am

“So, why make this public?”

I first heard this story when the Pakistanis complained about a U.S. airstrike — suggesting it’s not the U.S. that made a calculated move to go public, but the U.S. reacting to Pakistan’s disclosure.

I don’t think this is a reaction to Georgia, because Americans tend to view Republicans as the stronger party anyway. And I don’t think it has anything to do with co-opting Obama, because (a) the authorities were in place since 2004, three years before Obama said he favored military intervention in Pakistan, and (b) the story didn’t break until 2008, a year after Obama’s statement.

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Trilok September 17, 2008 at 3:41 pm

Your cynicism notwithstanding, I still think the reason for going public with the US incursions into Pakistan is to pressure Kayani et al to get serious about cracking down on cross border Taliban and Al Qaeda, which, albeit weakened, is still very much alive.

Al Qaeda does not need the pre-2001 infrastructure to inspire thousands of believers to go out and create mayhem wherever they are [ only believers in the Al Qaeda way and cause, not all Muslims]. And as long as Zawahari and/or Bin Laden retain the ability to send video messages around the globe, they remain deadly.

p.s. great blog.

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kao_hsien_chih September 18, 2008 at 12:12 am

Why the heck would publicly making incursions into Pakistan put pressure on Pakistani leaders to be any cooperative with the West? The only thing that will encourage them is to be even less cooperative than they already are, so that they can be seen as defending Pakistan from foreign enemies, or at least unfriendlies…and as much as people complain about the lack of cooperation, Pakistanis have done a lot more than they get credit for in the West, as the hosts of this website can tell you.

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