C.J. Chivers presents Georgia’s side of “what went wrong.”
Georgia has released intercepted telephone calls purporting to show that part of a Russian armored regiment crossed into the separatist enclave of South Ossetia nearly a full day before Georgia’s attack on the capital, Tskhinvali, late on Aug. 7.
Georgia is trying to counter accusations that the long-simmering standoff over South Ossetia, which borders Russia, tilted to war only after it attacked Tskhinvali. Georgia regards the enclave as its sovereign territory.
The intercepts circulated last week among intelligence agencies in the United States and Europe, part of a Georgian government effort to persuade the West and opposition voices at home that Georgia was under invasion and attacked defensively. Georgia argues that as a tiny and vulnerable nation allied with the West, it deserves extensive military and political support.
Yes, indeed, but as Chivers notes: the Russians were allowed to have a peacekeeping force in South Ossetia. And by August 7, the Georgians had been exchanging artillery volleys for a couple of weeks. It would have made sense—especially given the recently ended exercises with the U.S. military, and Russia’s own recently ended military exercise, to send peacekeepers to, you know… keep the peace.
It is also worth noting that President Saakashvili did not claim once during his many newspaper op-eds about the fighting that it was in response to a column of Russian tanks. This claim did not emerge into the general discourse until around August 25 or so. That doesn’t make it untrue, but it does mean that skepticism is warranted.
That isn’t to say—again—that Russia is a brave defender of anything. It stepped badly over the line, both by baiting Georgia in the first place, and then by occupying swaths of the country and humiliating the Georgians after. But this attempt by Georgia to spin things, while understandable, is also distasteful. Good thing we’re giving them a billion dollars to bounce back from it.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1801 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
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{ 6 comments }
Snark aside, I don’t see that it is settled that either sides’ narrative is correct on the matter of (a) when Russian combat elements traversed the Roki Tunnel or (b) what actions of either side definitively abrogated the peacekeeping agreement.
The Times article is very useful in putting claims down in black-and-while, at least in English. Notable:
And:
Exactly what Georgian forces were in heavy combat near the [southern exit from the?] Roki Tunnel long before the dawn [of August 8th]? I have read references to “Georgian Special Forces,” but have not seen anything attributed to sources, credible or otherwise. Did these forces travel by road (Gori-Tskhinvali-Didi Gupta-Java-Roki), jumping-off at 11:30pm on Aug. 7 to arrive “long before dawn” at the tunnel on Aug. 8? Or were they heliborne forces, inserted by the tunnel? That seems more plausible… but either method implies, at the least, a hair-trigger readiness to act.
Also, reading the PDF of the intercepted Ossetian cell phone calls (left sidebar of the NYT article), here is the final one that the NYT translated (Aug. 8, 2008, 05:22.36). –
So it appears as if 100 elements of Russian armor (tanks, or perhaps tanks plus APCs) had passed through the town of Java at or before 5:00am on August 8th.
Java is about 35 km south of the Roki Tunnel, and about 5 km northeast of the road junction and bridge at Didi Gupta.
The NYT’s story makes the time-stamping and the content of the intercepted phone calls seem very plausible.
For reference, the bridge at Didi Gupta (2 bridges, actually) is at 42.36 N, 43.90 E. They can be located with Google Maps at this link (zoom in and choose “Satellite”). To have any hope of holding back a Russian/Ossetian counterstroke, the invading Georgians had to control this point, ~15 km north of Tskhinvali. Territory south of this point becomes much more armor-friendly, and the road network branches out.
While the Russians were moving southeast from Java at ~5am on Aug. 8th, the Georgians were busy barraging Tskhinvali and engaging in street battles there…
Erratum: “While the Russians were moving southwest from Java…”
1) S: They say there are 100 units if not more. They’ve already passed through Java…
and
2) So it appears as if 100 elements of Russian armor (tanks, or perhaps tanks plus APCs) had passed through the town of Java at or before 5:00am on August 8th.
the first is not confirming the second. the the second is just wishfull thinking
1) S: They say there are 100 units if not more. They’ve already passed through Java…
and
2) So it appears as if 100 elements of Russian armor (tanks, or perhaps tanks plus APCs) had passed through the town of Java at or before 5:00am on August 8th.
the first is not confirming the second. the the second is just wishful thinking