If anybody puts up the money, they would figure that they own at least a part of the enterprise–and they are probably right, since, without their money, the enterprise is toast anyways. They will try to twist the distribution of aid around, to advance their agenda. Or, in other words, you get stuck further and further into the morass. The fundamental paradox, in other words, seems to be that even if “letting go,” at least of the attempt to control the nitty gritty of the operation, is the only way to wrap up the mess, nobody really wants to give up having some control over the outcome. Or, in other words, I don’t see a good way out.

My two cents: Beefing up the UN on a truly massive, NASAeffort-like scale would be able to distribute serious and “neutral” aid, especially if done by non-western folks. Hire in 600 000 chinese contract workers, and supply them with Pakistani Pashtun interpreters, declare a offensive ceasefire and send out the word to all Afghans that now some serious benefits are coming their way. Follow this up with real money. It is the only way out of this mess I can see.

Nagasaki and Hiroshima did not occur out of a vacuum. The atomic attacks were used against a foe that in the course of a total war, itself used biological and chemical warfare, killed 20 million people, and was actually planning a radiological attack against the West Coast of the US. One can dispute the morality of atomic weapons, but they were, in a sense, part of the logic of the times.

Obviously in Afghanistan, the situation is utterly different.

And I’m beat why he keeps getting published. Though I’ll also note it is interesting he never gets published in Afghan-centric publications.

Tom Johnson and Chris Mason’s latest piece in the October 2008 Atlantic, titled “All Counterinsurgency Is Local,” sets a new standard for ignorance and insipid analysis. That their dreck continues to be taken as serious and informed by the intelligentsia and the Coalition suggests how little has been learned in the last eight years about Afghanistan.

I think US policy is the opposite. We do our evil deeds, in a manner of speaking, at least in Iraq and Afghanistan, in small doses, largely due to neglect, indifference, and personal prejudices of the people on the ground rather than systematic policy by the top leadership. Death toll is comparatively small, day by day, but over time it builds up–to the point perhaps well beyond the Romans. Regardless of the problems with the Lancet study (and people just seemed to have trouble understanding the notion of “access deaths” rather than people actually being shot or blow up), there is no question that lots of people have been dying. Just that they weren’t being killed in large “batches,” so to speak.
That, actually, might be a problem from the “Roman” perspective: 1,000 people being massacred in a single day may shock and dismay the home folks. It will also shock and intimidate potential local enemies for 1,000 days. Killing 20 people a day or 1000 days will not shock, dismay, or intimidate anyone, despite 20 times the death toll–although it will gain plenty of hatred for the conquerors. Unfortunately for the conqueror, it doesn’t shock the opponents into quiescence either.

I hope not.

It’s also worth noting that the Lancet Study had numerous methodological and analytical problems.

Joshua, you are really amusing.

Google lancet study Iraq

What, in your mind did the Romans do, that wasn’t challenged at Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as many other places later on?