Comments on: Who Really Thinks the Taliban Want to Negotiate? http://registan.net/index.php/2008/10/15/who-really-thinks-the-taliban-want-to-negotiate/ Central Asia News -- All Central Asia, All The Time Mon, 13 Feb 2012 06:17:36 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Mike Camel http://registan.net/index.php/2008/10/15/who-really-thinks-the-taliban-want-to-negotiate/comment-page-1/#comment-378757 Mike Camel Sat, 25 Oct 2008 12:22:32 +0000 http://www.registan.net/index.php/2008/10/15/who-really-thinks-the-taliban-want-to-negotiate/#comment-378757 Thanks very good stuff Thanks very good stuff

]]> By: Old Blue http://registan.net/index.php/2008/10/15/who-really-thinks-the-taliban-want-to-negotiate/comment-page-1/#comment-378674 Old Blue Sat, 18 Oct 2008 02:35:40 +0000 http://www.registan.net/index.php/2008/10/15/who-really-thinks-the-taliban-want-to-negotiate/#comment-378674 The Taliban are feeling emboldened; not necessarily by any real gains in territory as by the attention that they are receiving from the western media and the defeatist tone of much of the analysis. An insurgent force that perceives itself as having strength, especially one that has a perception of winning, will not negotiate on even terms, but will make ridiculous demands to further demoralize and fracture their opponent. There will be those who seize upon the Taliban demands as reasonable or even righteous. It has also been pointed out that history indicates that insurgents will only offer negotiation under ridiculous terms to confuse their opponents while they have no intention of ceasing their true effort of completely toppling the government. There are serious issues that we must face in the government of the IRoA to avoid making the same mistake that we made in Viet Nam; propping up a government that is rife with corruption. The original appeal of the Taliban, and a major part of their IO campaign, relate to ridding Afghanistan of corruption; whether or not that perception is true. It doesn't have to be true... it only has to be believed. The most significant part of this revelation of the demanding terms under which the Taliban would come to the table is the illumination it gives to the status of the Taliban thinking; and that the General himself admits to his involvement with the Taliban. Our task is to see the play for what it is and then apply good, practical counterinsurgency doctrine. We must insist that the government of the IRoA clean up its act, or we must help it to discover and overcome its internal weaknesses. The IRoA cannot just be a blank check for warlords to rule their piece of the pie and enrich themselves at the expense of assisting countries. The Taliban are feeling emboldened; not necessarily by any real gains in territory as by the attention that they are receiving from the western media and the defeatist tone of much of the analysis. An insurgent force that perceives itself as having strength, especially one that has a perception of winning, will not negotiate on even terms, but will make ridiculous demands to further demoralize and fracture their opponent.

There will be those who seize upon the Taliban demands as reasonable or even righteous.

It has also been pointed out that history indicates that insurgents will only offer negotiation under ridiculous terms to confuse their opponents while they have no intention of ceasing their true effort of completely toppling the government.

There are serious issues that we must face in the government of the IRoA to avoid making the same mistake that we made in Viet Nam; propping up a government that is rife with corruption. The original appeal of the Taliban, and a major part of their IO campaign, relate to ridding Afghanistan of corruption; whether or not that perception is true. It doesn’t have to be true… it only has to be believed.

The most significant part of this revelation of the demanding terms under which the Taliban would come to the table is the illumination it gives to the status of the Taliban thinking; and that the General himself admits to his involvement with the Taliban. Our task is to see the play for what it is and then apply good, practical counterinsurgency doctrine.

We must insist that the government of the IRoA clean up its act, or we must help it to discover and overcome its internal weaknesses. The IRoA cannot just be a blank check for warlords to rule their piece of the pie and enrich themselves at the expense of assisting countries.

]]> By: kız arkadaş http://registan.net/index.php/2008/10/15/who-really-thinks-the-taliban-want-to-negotiate/comment-page-1/#comment-378670 kız arkadaş Fri, 17 Oct 2008 14:53:57 +0000 http://www.registan.net/index.php/2008/10/15/who-really-thinks-the-taliban-want-to-negotiate/#comment-378670 what is this? I would wager nothing more than mere bluster. It requires nothing of the Taliban and everything of the West. It is as serious an offer as a stable of unicorns. Besides which, we’d do well to ignore the advice of an enthusiastic supporter of Osama bin Laden—especially since he used to run the IS yes what is this? I would wager nothing more than mere bluster. It requires nothing of the Taliban and everything of the West. It is as serious an offer as a stable of unicorns. Besides which, we’d do well to ignore the advice of an enthusiastic supporter of Osama bin Laden—especially since he used to run the IS yes

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