Which is where I’m going with that. I only mention the 1990s to note that the figures and issue we’re facing isn’t new or sudden (in fact, that is the point of Hussein’s book, which is quite good).

Lastly, I did not say Benazir created the Taliban. I said the ISI was spurring them on to power in Afghanistan—which is a reasonable thing to say given their role in opening up the arms cache at Spin Boldak that enabled them to retake Kandahar, as well as the subsequent support ISI gave them.

But getting back to whether the Taliban pose an existential threat to the state or not… well, I bet you that you’ll see a much more vigorous response to them now that they’re advancing toward the capital. When it was just crazies in the boondocks, I can see how some particularly cut off elites in Islamabad might have written them off (and in fact, many Pakistanis I’ve spoken to have expressed frustration that the leftists in their cities haven’t seem alarmed by the Taliban’s advance until now).

But really, is this any greater threat than the post-Partition riots, the 1971 war, or any number of vastly more tragic and deadly events in Pakistan’s short history? I don’t see the existential threat yet, which is why I’m saying, yes, let us do what we need to to blunt the Taliban’s advance and roll them back; but all the talk about losing nuclear weapons is just way too premature right now.

Also, Benazir did not create the Taliban, nor set them on the road to power.

Otherwise, nice history.