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	<title>Comments on: The Hidden Finances of Insurgency</title>
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		<title>By: Vengeance7</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380399</link>
		<dc:creator>Vengeance7</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2009 10:05:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I don&#039;t follow the money stuff much.

I argued in late 05 to stop the opium eradication, as did every other advisor who was on their second or third tour back then. I don&#039;t know exactly how command viewed us on that one, &quot;crazy&quot; or &quot;lazy&quot; is the only thing I can figure. I guess it never dawned on them if the dudes working on the ground, in the villages, who had to face the Taliban, said &quot;knock off the opium erradication bull shit&quot; it must mean that it is having a negative effect.


something here, just this little area, kinda&#039; points to a disruption of cash flow. A couple of things happened about 6 weeks ago; nobody really looked too hard into it. I don&#039;t know if it was a blip, or if the &quot;traditional&quot; cash flow has been replaced with something else now. That&#039;s all just unimportant stuff; the really important stuff of full blown forced feeding of TRADOC doctrine and paper work down the throats of host nationals continues.

Hell, I&#039;ll tell ya what torture is, taking a host national 2IC, out of the fight and sending him to the bigger FOB for 2 weeks of poperty book school.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t follow the money stuff much.</p>
<p>I argued in late 05 to stop the opium eradication, as did every other advisor who was on their second or third tour back then. I don&#8217;t know exactly how command viewed us on that one, &#8220;crazy&#8221; or &#8220;lazy&#8221; is the only thing I can figure. I guess it never dawned on them if the dudes working on the ground, in the villages, who had to face the Taliban, said &#8220;knock off the opium erradication bull shit&#8221; it must mean that it is having a negative effect.</p>
<p>something here, just this little area, kinda&#8217; points to a disruption of cash flow. A couple of things happened about 6 weeks ago; nobody really looked too hard into it. I don&#8217;t know if it was a blip, or if the &#8220;traditional&#8221; cash flow has been replaced with something else now. That&#8217;s all just unimportant stuff; the really important stuff of full blown forced feeding of TRADOC doctrine and paper work down the throats of host nationals continues.</p>
<p>Hell, I&#8217;ll tell ya what torture is, taking a host national 2IC, out of the fight and sending him to the bigger FOB for 2 weeks of poperty book school.</p>
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		<title>By: Ian</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380394</link>
		<dc:creator>Ian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2009 16:05:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Bones, all good questions that I share with you. As for &quot;how exactly the Taliban use hawala,&quot; it&#039;s not clear to me that they use hawala that much more than briefcases of cash flown on private jets from the Gulf. But little evidence exists publicly about either. What is definitely clear from the excellent research AREU has done is that ordinary Afghans prefer hawala to other forms of banking specifically because it is entirely anonymous, no need to sign one&#039;s name or provide a passpost number to the hawaladar. That is not necessarily nefarious, maybe just a resistance to the heavy documentation that comes with bureaucratic modernity.

Also, rereading Josh F.&#039;s post, I think it&#039;s worth noting that hawala has nothing to do with Islamic finance. Hawala in South Asia was for many years the province of Hindu bankers (who were vilified for their money-handling role in Muslim areas much like Jews were in Europe).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bones, all good questions that I share with you. As for &#8220;how exactly the Taliban use hawala,&#8221; it&#8217;s not clear to me that they use hawala that much more than briefcases of cash flown on private jets from the Gulf. But little evidence exists publicly about either. What is definitely clear from the excellent research AREU has done is that ordinary Afghans prefer hawala to other forms of banking specifically because it is entirely anonymous, no need to sign one&#8217;s name or provide a passpost number to the hawaladar. That is not necessarily nefarious, maybe just a resistance to the heavy documentation that comes with bureaucratic modernity.</p>
<p>Also, rereading Josh F.&#8217;s post, I think it&#8217;s worth noting that hawala has nothing to do with Islamic finance. Hawala in South Asia was for many years the province of Hindu bankers (who were vilified for their money-handling role in Muslim areas much like Jews were in Europe).</p>
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		<title>By: Joel Hafvenstein</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380393</link>
		<dc:creator>Joel Hafvenstein</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2009 14:55:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Josh -- great articulation of the dangers of over-focusing on opium.  I agree with Ian, though, that seeing hawala as the problem is just as dangerous, if not more so.  Economies across Africa and Asia depend on the hawaladars and the massive, sophisticated system they&#039;ve built up for clearing international payments; any solution that depends on quickly formalizing or illegalizing the transfers will likely be ineffective and certainly be damaging.  (Though some formalization is taking place; the hawaladar I&#039;ve used in Britain has know-your-customer rules as required by the UK government).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Josh &#8212; great articulation of the dangers of over-focusing on opium.  I agree with Ian, though, that seeing hawala as the problem is just as dangerous, if not more so.  Economies across Africa and Asia depend on the hawaladars and the massive, sophisticated system they&#8217;ve built up for clearing international payments; any solution that depends on quickly formalizing or illegalizing the transfers will likely be ineffective and certainly be damaging.  (Though some formalization is taking place; the hawaladar I&#8217;ve used in Britain has know-your-customer rules as required by the UK government).</p>
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		<title>By: Bones</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380387</link>
		<dc:creator>Bones</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2009 20:48:44 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Ian, I think my comment didn&#039;t properly convey that I was interested in how CIA interaction and piggy backing affected the pre-existing system of hawala in the region. I&#039;ve attempted to bone up a little bit on hawala, and I think my point was a bit misdirected.

You&#039;re absolutely right that the CIA had no hand in creating hawala. Initially, I was curious if a sudden influx of large amounts of American money changed the hawala landscape. Probably, but only as portion of the significant amount of money being funneled into Afghanistan to support anti-Soviet fighters.  Anyhow, most American money was filtered through Pakistani intelligence; the CIA likely used hawala when they wanted to cut out the middleman and regain some control of where the money ended up. So probably not the right question to ask. 

My understanding of hawala is that it revolves around the individual connections between hawaladar, hardly a revolutionary statement. Apparently, new connections were created to  funnel money to fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I wonder if those new connections were entirely new hawaladar, or were donors directed to complicit hawaladar, or were the hawaladar themselves unwitting mediums? As far as the CIA is concerned, their complicity in creating those connections was probably moral support at best. 

It&#039;d be interesting to know how exactly the Taliban use hawala. Is it just a straight money transfer where every party is knowledgeable about the source and destination? Or do they use fronts and false identities to deceive hawaladar?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ian, I think my comment didn&#8217;t properly convey that I was interested in how CIA interaction and piggy backing affected the pre-existing system of hawala in the region. I&#8217;ve attempted to bone up a little bit on hawala, and I think my point was a bit misdirected.</p>
<p>You&#8217;re absolutely right that the CIA had no hand in creating hawala. Initially, I was curious if a sudden influx of large amounts of American money changed the hawala landscape. Probably, but only as portion of the significant amount of money being funneled into Afghanistan to support anti-Soviet fighters.  Anyhow, most American money was filtered through Pakistani intelligence; the CIA likely used hawala when they wanted to cut out the middleman and regain some control of where the money ended up. So probably not the right question to ask. </p>
<p>My understanding of hawala is that it revolves around the individual connections between hawaladar, hardly a revolutionary statement. Apparently, new connections were created to  funnel money to fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I wonder if those new connections were entirely new hawaladar, or were donors directed to complicit hawaladar, or were the hawaladar themselves unwitting mediums? As far as the CIA is concerned, their complicity in creating those connections was probably moral support at best. </p>
<p>It&#8217;d be interesting to know how exactly the Taliban use hawala. Is it just a straight money transfer where every party is knowledgeable about the source and destination? Or do they use fronts and false identities to deceive hawaladar?</p>
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		<title>By: Ian</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380382</link>
		<dc:creator>Ian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2009 17:12:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;If you help people grow other crops&lt;/blockquote&gt;

...farmers will make far less profit than if they grew poppies. The attachment is to what good, easy money it is, even with the risk built in of going into debt if the yield is bad.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>If you help people grow other crops</p></blockquote>
<p>&#8230;farmers will make far less profit than if they grew poppies. The attachment is to what good, easy money it is, even with the risk built in of going into debt if the yield is bad.</p>
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		<title>By: UNRR</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380379</link>
		<dc:creator>UNRR</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2009 11:53:29 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>This post has been linked for the HOT5 Daily 5/30/2009, at &lt;a href=&quot;http://unreligiousright.blogspot.com/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;The Unreligious Right&lt;/a&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post has been linked for the HOT5 Daily 5/30/2009, at <a href="http://unreligiousright.blogspot.com/" rel="nofollow">The Unreligious Right</a></p>
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		<title>By: Joshua Foust</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380375</link>
		<dc:creator>Joshua Foust</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2009 03:29:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Myra, I think I&#039;ve written about most of that before. We are in agreement.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Myra, I think I&#8217;ve written about most of that before. We are in agreement.</p>
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		<title>By: myra macdonald</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380374</link>
		<dc:creator>myra macdonald</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 23:56:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Joshua, how about flipping around the whole opium thing and looking at it not in terms of funding,  but rather from the point of view of the people who actually grow the opium?

There&#039;s very little attachment in growing opium - you buy the seeds, sell the product, and usually get into enough debt to have to keep growing opium. As far as I know, there is also a three-four month down period when you can go off and make a bit of extra money fighting for the Taliban, or whoever in the neighbourhood is willing to pay.

If you help people grow other crops (including the much-mocked pomegranate) and create small farms where they will also be able to keep goats etc, they&#039;ll be much more attached to the land and have a sense of security that is worth defending.

This argument was made to me recently and I found it rather convincing. I&#039;d be interested in your take on it.

Myra</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Joshua, how about flipping around the whole opium thing and looking at it not in terms of funding,  but rather from the point of view of the people who actually grow the opium?</p>
<p>There&#8217;s very little attachment in growing opium &#8211; you buy the seeds, sell the product, and usually get into enough debt to have to keep growing opium. As far as I know, there is also a three-four month down period when you can go off and make a bit of extra money fighting for the Taliban, or whoever in the neighbourhood is willing to pay.</p>
<p>If you help people grow other crops (including the much-mocked pomegranate) and create small farms where they will also be able to keep goats etc, they&#8217;ll be much more attached to the land and have a sense of security that is worth defending.</p>
<p>This argument was made to me recently and I found it rather convincing. I&#8217;d be interested in your take on it.</p>
<p>Myra</p>
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		<title>By: Ian</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380373</link>
		<dc:creator>Ian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 23:50:52 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Hawala goes back at least to the 19th century--like crack cocaine, it wasn&#039;t invented by the CIA. Check out &lt;a href=&quot;http://nzdl.sadl.uleth.ca/cgi-bin/library.cgi?e=d-00000-00---off-0areu--00-0----0-10-0---0---0direct-10---4-------0-1l--11-en-50---20-about---00-0-1-00-0-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&amp;a=d&amp;c=areu&amp;cl=CL5.10&amp;d=HASH013bbf80505d87dbadbf7284&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;this article&lt;/a&gt; by S. M. Hanifi which discusses it in the context of Abd al-Rahman&#039;s disastrous economic policies.

Hawala is the only &quot;bank&quot; in most of rural Afghanistan, no surprise that people would use it for legit purposes 95% of the time and illegit purposes 5% of the time (my b.s.-stimate.) Like opium, if you shut it down without providing alternatives, it will ruin thousands of lives (think of what proportion of Afghanistan&#039;s economy is &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amazon.com/History-Pashtun-Migration-1775-2006/dp/019547600X&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;remittances from Dubai&lt;/a&gt;.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hawala goes back at least to the 19th century&#8211;like crack cocaine, it wasn&#8217;t invented by the CIA. Check out <a href="http://nzdl.sadl.uleth.ca/cgi-bin/library.cgi?e=d-00000-00---off-0areu--00-0----0-10-0---0---0direct-10---4-------0-1l--11-en-50---20-about---00-0-1-00-0-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&amp;a=d&amp;c=areu&amp;cl=CL5.10&amp;d=HASH013bbf80505d87dbadbf7284" rel="nofollow">this article</a> by S. M. Hanifi which discusses it in the context of Abd al-Rahman&#8217;s disastrous economic policies.</p>
<p>Hawala is the only &#8220;bank&#8221; in most of rural Afghanistan, no surprise that people would use it for legit purposes 95% of the time and illegit purposes 5% of the time (my b.s.-stimate.) Like opium, if you shut it down without providing alternatives, it will ruin thousands of lives (think of what proportion of Afghanistan&#8217;s economy is <a href="http://www.amazon.com/History-Pashtun-Migration-1775-2006/dp/019547600X" rel="nofollow">remittances from Dubai</a>.)</p>
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		<title>By: Bones</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/05/29/the-hidden-finances-of-insurgency/comment-page-1/#comment-380371</link>
		<dc:creator>Bones</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 21:43:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Steve Coll briefly mentions in Ghost Wars how the CIA used hawala to get money to Afghan commanders in the field during the 80s. Given the amount of cash they were dumping into Afghanistan, I wondered at the time if it had any effect on the hawala networks. Coll doesn&#039;t give specific numbers, and his source is &quot;interviews with US officials,&#039; so it&#039;s hard to tell if they were flooding the system with American dollars or just routing a small amount through hawala. But here&#039;s the Secretary of Defense directly linking the networks now with the &quot;external funding channels&quot; propped up by the US in the 80s. Perhaps the CIA did lay the groundwork for today&#039;s hawala networks after all.

Aside from policy, Is Gates &quot;acting as if hawala is a new problem&quot; when the former CIA man admits that the &#039;channels&#039; he opened probably never closed? That sounds more like confessing that we&#039;ve been choosing to ignore an old problem, kind of like opium after 2001.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Steve Coll briefly mentions in Ghost Wars how the CIA used hawala to get money to Afghan commanders in the field during the 80s. Given the amount of cash they were dumping into Afghanistan, I wondered at the time if it had any effect on the hawala networks. Coll doesn&#8217;t give specific numbers, and his source is &#8220;interviews with US officials,&#8217; so it&#8217;s hard to tell if they were flooding the system with American dollars or just routing a small amount through hawala. But here&#8217;s the Secretary of Defense directly linking the networks now with the &#8220;external funding channels&#8221; propped up by the US in the 80s. Perhaps the CIA did lay the groundwork for today&#8217;s hawala networks after all.</p>
<p>Aside from policy, Is Gates &#8220;acting as if hawala is a new problem&#8221; when the former CIA man admits that the &#8216;channels&#8217; he opened probably never closed? That sounds more like confessing that we&#8217;ve been choosing to ignore an old problem, kind of like opium after 2001.</p>
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