October, 1947, during the roiling aftermath of the Indian Partition. Such wonderful memories!
Thousands of refugees, mostly Muslims from Jammu, began to pour into Pakistan’s Sialkot District, bringing with them sickening tales of atrocities. As it happened, Sialkot was on the frontier of Pathan tribal territory. In driving out the Muslims on his borders, the maharaja had driven them straight into the arms of the most fearsome Islamic fighting force on earth. “This is a dangerous game for the Maharaja to play,” noted [Lahore's British deputy high commissioner C.B.] Duke, “and is likely to lead to large scale disturbances in Kashmir and incursion by neighbouring Muslim tribesmen.” He was right. The Pathans, who had for months been hearing tales of Sikh and Hindu outrages against their Muslim brothers and sisters in the Punjab, were already gearing up for what they did best: making war. Thousands of Pathan tribesmen were raised by the former railway guard Khurshid Anwar, described by a British diplomat as “a complete adventurer,” who had made a fortune during the war, though no one was clear as to how. The tribesmen, mostly Afridis and Mehsuds from the North-West Frontier Province, tied a bright strip of cloth around their rifles, a sign of their oaths not to return homr until they had avenged the deaths of Muslims in the Punjab. In tribal groups, the warriors swept down from the mountains and massed on the Kashmir border…
[By December, t]he Indian Army’s Sikh troops were becoming restive, and it was rumored that they had demanded a Sikh state, to include Amritsar, Simla and the East Punjab. The Maharaja of Patiala was said to be encouraging the scheme. Against this Sikh objective was the similarly aggressive ambition of the Pathan tribesmen. Sydney Smith, a reporter for the Daily Express who had managed to get himself kidnapped by Pathans near Baramula, confirmed on his release that tribal leaders chanted prayers every night for the success of their jihad against the Sikhs. “They are: to wipe out Sir Hari Singh’s minority rule in Kashmir; to march on and exterminate the chief Sikh State, Patiala; to capture Amritsar and try—one day—to reach New Delhi.”
Kashmir was becoming another chapter in the centuries-long story of conflict between Sikhs and Pathans for control of the North-West Frontier…
The Mountbattens flew back to India on 24 November. Much had happened during their vacation [to attend Elizabeth and Philip's royal wedding in London]. Liaquat Ali Khan stated that Pakistan wanted to refer the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. Jawaharlal Nehru charged high Pakistani officials with inciting the tribesmen in Kashmir. A force of Afghans from Khost crossed the border into Kashmir, reportedly armed with Russian equipment. The president of the Congress Party, J.B. Kripalani, resigned in fear of an iminent war between India and Pakistan. Mountbatten was horrified…
Atlee sent [Nehru] a sternly worded message… Indian hopes for a quick and sharp campaign were “very optimistic… all military history goes to shew [sic] how difficult it is to deal with the tribes of the N.W. Frontier.”
This was shamelessly ripped off from the terrifically entertaining paperback edition of Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire by Alex von Tunzelmann, pages 296-7, 307, and 313. While I cannot speak to how deftly it navigates the extraordinarily contentious politics of India and Pakistan (page 315 notes that Muslim newspapers were angry the United States immediately recognized Israel that year but took its time to recognize Pakistan), I can say that von Tunzelmann’s access, which included access to the Jinnah, Nehru, and Mountbatten letters, was extraordinary. It is as much a personality study on Dickie Mountbatten and Pandit Nehru (and how everyone hated Gandhi) as it is the actual history of Independence and Partition.
Even so, the above quotation, while long and perhaps pushing the boundaries of appropriate quotation for illustrative purposes under our terrible copyright regime, is helpful to keep in mind as Pakistan pushes into Waziristan and stirs up yet more tribal anger (as a waiting game before they can jump back into Afghanistan, remember).
As many argue, Pakistan in the 1990s supported groups like the Taliban (which really means radicalized Pashtuns) as a way to stir up trouble in Kashmir. It is something Pakistan has done since the moment of its inception, and not surprising in any real way. Similarly, this is the—what—fourth incursion into South Waziristan since 2002? The army has chosen to let things get to this point in the Mehsud, Waziri, and Afridi areas. As much as we like seeing progress there, we should keep in mind that the Pakistani Army has seen progress before, and recently… or did you forget when they “won” in Swat in 2008? Now, the entire area is reduced to devastation after two months and 40,000 troops swept through the main populated areas. And now they’re entering the militants’ heartland.
All of this is a long way of saying: it ain’t over yet. And it’s not even close to a certain outcome. Yet.
This post was written by...
Joshua Foust – author of 1771 posts on Registan.net.
Joshua Foust is a Fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. His research focuses primarily on Central and South Asia. Joshua is a correspondent for The Atlantic and a columnist for PBS Need to Know. Joshua appears regularly on the BBC World News, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy’s AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor. Follow him on twitter: @joshuafoust
{ 2 comments }
Definitely not over yet, but it appears that the U.S. might be regaining some of the initiative? I know the stats out of Afghanistan are terrible, but the surge is just getting underway and will be continuing through elections this fall. Meanwhile Pakistan appears to be more serious about taking on the Taliban (if not LeT) and it appears there is an opening (perhaps slight) for renewed progress between India and Pakistan.
Not to deny that the tales of attrocities may have mobilized some tribesmen to fight, but this blanket motive is questionable. The Kashmiris themselves weren’t too pleased once “the most fearsome Islamic fighting force on earth” stopped caring about its Islamic goals and turned its attention to Kashmiri villagers and got to the business of rounding up loot (which is why for a very long time the Pakistani army establishment was weary of using them on the front lines, for e.g. during the 1965 war of Kashmir). A useful counterpoint to this standard drivel would be the few published works on the history of the Pakistan army and the memoirs of Pakistani officials. Exactly why didn’t other Pushtoon tribesmen–or city dwellers–act all “fearsome Islamic” like is somewhat of a question, no?