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	<title>Comments on: Maybe The &#8220;Strategic Review&#8221; Could Mention That Afghanistan Is Rural</title>
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	<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/</link>
	<description>All Central Asia, All The Time</description>
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		<title>By: IntelTrooper</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380617</link>
		<dc:creator>IntelTrooper</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 22:02:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/#comment-380617</guid>
		<description>Absolutely, DanO... the problem is that the &quot;oil spot&quot; concept has worked as well as it will in Kabul, J-bad, etc... it&#039;s time to start spreading out, and has been, but more reconstruction resources need to be allocated to the more rural areas (and I&#039;m not talking about PRTs... those idiotic things need to be abolished) along with commanders and troops who aren&#039;t afraid to live outside of the FOB for weeks on end.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Absolutely, DanO&#8230; the problem is that the &#8220;oil spot&#8221; concept has worked as well as it will in Kabul, J-bad, etc&#8230; it&#8217;s time to start spreading out, and has been, but more reconstruction resources need to be allocated to the more rural areas (and I&#8217;m not talking about PRTs&#8230; those idiotic things need to be abolished) along with commanders and troops who aren&#8217;t afraid to live outside of the FOB for weeks on end.</p>
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		<title>By: DanO</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380614</link>
		<dc:creator>DanO</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 20:14:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/#comment-380614</guid>
		<description>As a former PMT in RC-E / Khost, I have to agree with the comments that there were restrictions limiting US Forces to the bases or from operations at night. I experienced both of these situations while working with the coalition forces there at the time.  Contrary to the other s here,  I observed that the ANSF were more than willing to operate at night and importantly in any terrain.  The coalition forces at the time were restricted by risk adverse leadership, war weary soldiers, many on third or fourth combat tours and sick of loosing buddies.  The “Force Protection” (FP) requirements placed on US forces made every patrol that did go out, a Platoon or more often larger operation, usually named after some ridiculous American football metaphor that our Afghan partners who were “In Charge” could not appreciate.  Initially exempt from these FP rules, I was able to support the ANP throughout the extremely austere and remote areas and at all hours -day or night.  Fully knowing the dangers, the ANP leaders mitigated the risk by providing only small footprint, and most importantly maximizing local intelligence.   All this stopped once the PMT mission matured and my team came under ISAF control and their increased FP rules.  After that the PMT could barley leave the FOB unless it was part of a large and cumbersome, often undisciplined parade of US firepower.  Ironically this “Smile Knock” activity in the name of COIN only instilled fear in the locals that no amount of Civil Affairs or Reconstruction Effort could undo.  As far as the urban vs. rural aspect of the fight in Afghanistan went, the same FP Rules at the time required operations have mutual supporting fires of your vehicle mounted crew serve weapons.  This restricted operations to areas in and around the roads and eliminated most of the area that the Taliban actually operated in. This lack of engagement with the enemy provided an illusion of success for the local commander because the resulting drop in enemy contact due to a limited or no patrolling was portrayed as a reduction of enemy activity and increase in the “Security and Stability of Khost” bullet to put on his OER. It reminded me of the saying “if a tree falls in the woods and no one is there to hear it does it still make a noise!”  It does make noise!  The follow on forces found out exactly how loud when they had the balls to impose themselves on the enemy’s freedom of maneuver in the mountains of Spera District!  These risk adverse, bunker mentality tactics cannot defeat an enemy perfectly at home in the mountains, comfortable with the adversity of living under the stars surviving by eating only pine nuts and occasional goat meat.  If the majority of forces are restricted to relatively Taliban free urban areas and the rural areas that can only be accessed by clumsy armored vehicles or worse stuck on the FOB we will lose ground in this enemy oriented fight!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As a former PMT in RC-E / Khost, I have to agree with the comments that there were restrictions limiting US Forces to the bases or from operations at night. I experienced both of these situations while working with the coalition forces there at the time.  Contrary to the other s here,  I observed that the ANSF were more than willing to operate at night and importantly in any terrain.  The coalition forces at the time were restricted by risk adverse leadership, war weary soldiers, many on third or fourth combat tours and sick of loosing buddies.  The “Force Protection” (FP) requirements placed on US forces made every patrol that did go out, a Platoon or more often larger operation, usually named after some ridiculous American football metaphor that our Afghan partners who were “In Charge” could not appreciate.  Initially exempt from these FP rules, I was able to support the ANP throughout the extremely austere and remote areas and at all hours -day or night.  Fully knowing the dangers, the ANP leaders mitigated the risk by providing only small footprint, and most importantly maximizing local intelligence.   All this stopped once the PMT mission matured and my team came under ISAF control and their increased FP rules.  After that the PMT could barley leave the FOB unless it was part of a large and cumbersome, often undisciplined parade of US firepower.  Ironically this “Smile Knock” activity in the name of COIN only instilled fear in the locals that no amount of Civil Affairs or Reconstruction Effort could undo.  As far as the urban vs. rural aspect of the fight in Afghanistan went, the same FP Rules at the time required operations have mutual supporting fires of your vehicle mounted crew serve weapons.  This restricted operations to areas in and around the roads and eliminated most of the area that the Taliban actually operated in. This lack of engagement with the enemy provided an illusion of success for the local commander because the resulting drop in enemy contact due to a limited or no patrolling was portrayed as a reduction of enemy activity and increase in the “Security and Stability of Khost” bullet to put on his OER. It reminded me of the saying “if a tree falls in the woods and no one is there to hear it does it still make a noise!”  It does make noise!  The follow on forces found out exactly how loud when they had the balls to impose themselves on the enemy’s freedom of maneuver in the mountains of Spera District!  These risk adverse, bunker mentality tactics cannot defeat an enemy perfectly at home in the mountains, comfortable with the adversity of living under the stars surviving by eating only pine nuts and occasional goat meat.  If the majority of forces are restricted to relatively Taliban free urban areas and the rural areas that can only be accessed by clumsy armored vehicles or worse stuck on the FOB we will lose ground in this enemy oriented fight!</p>
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		<title>By: IntelTrooper</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380612</link>
		<dc:creator>IntelTrooper</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 19:24:48 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>BruceR:
&lt;i&gt;Fritz, it’s not the Coalition that likes to stay in at night… if they could they’d do everything at night when it’s much safer for us, and stay under cover in the day.&lt;/i&gt;
That may be the case where you were at, but I know in good ol&#039; NK2L there was a standing order to do nothing at night.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>BruceR:<br />
<i>Fritz, it’s not the Coalition that likes to stay in at night… if they could they’d do everything at night when it’s much safer for us, and stay under cover in the day.</i><br />
That may be the case where you were at, but I know in good ol&#8217; NK2L there was a standing order to do nothing at night.</p>
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		<title>By: IntelTrooper</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380611</link>
		<dc:creator>IntelTrooper</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 19:22:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/#comment-380611</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;You see it everywhere—right down to the frustrations of ETTs being held on their base because they can’t get permission to go assist their Afghan brethren in a firefight (which also happens with depressing regularity).&lt;/i&gt;
Absolutely spot on. In fact, I know of two embedded trainers who were threatened with disciplinary actions for leaving the FOB to assist in a firefight before the dim-witted American Army Engineers could get their act together and go running to the fight.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>You see it everywhere—right down to the frustrations of ETTs being held on their base because they can’t get permission to go assist their Afghan brethren in a firefight (which also happens with depressing regularity).</i><br />
Absolutely spot on. In fact, I know of two embedded trainers who were threatened with disciplinary actions for leaving the FOB to assist in a firefight before the dim-witted American Army Engineers could get their act together and go running to the fight.</p>
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		<title>By: BruceR</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380604</link>
		<dc:creator>BruceR</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 13:07:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/#comment-380604</guid>
		<description>Oh, JFTR, I never heard of a Cdn OMLT being held on base and out of an ANSF firefight in progress: that&#039;s a new one. I have heard of other units being slow to reinforce/assist, or requests for fire support being turned down or delayed until it was too late, though. That seems to happen a fair bit. YMMV.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh, JFTR, I never heard of a Cdn OMLT being held on base and out of an ANSF firefight in progress: that&#8217;s a new one. I have heard of other units being slow to reinforce/assist, or requests for fire support being turned down or delayed until it was too late, though. That seems to happen a fair bit. YMMV.</p>
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		<title>By: BruceR</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380601</link>
		<dc:creator>BruceR</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 04:53:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/#comment-380601</guid>
		<description>Fritz, it&#039;s not the Coalition that likes to stay in at night... if they could they&#039;d do everything at night when it&#039;s much safer for us, and stay under cover in the day. But it&#039;s IMPOSSIBLE to get the ANSF to work at night. They will. Not. Do. It. Every ETT and OMLT and PMT in the country says the same thing. And without them, a bunch of Westerners wandering around at night can&#039;t ever really accomplish a whole hell of a lot.

Getting the ANSF to leave their fortified locations in the daytime more than once every couple days is hard enough. Yeah, they&#039;ve learned some of that from us: they are increasingly modelling our risk-averse, fobbit ways, especially the ANA. But it&#039;s also a widely-held ANSF mindset that sees the war as something to be survived, rather than won.

This is also why the ANA is so behind this whole &quot;re-occupy the cities&quot; thing. They figure it&#039;s fewer casualties, and more free time for them between patrols. Which, frankly, it will be.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fritz, it&#8217;s not the Coalition that likes to stay in at night&#8230; if they could they&#8217;d do everything at night when it&#8217;s much safer for us, and stay under cover in the day. But it&#8217;s IMPOSSIBLE to get the ANSF to work at night. They will. Not. Do. It. Every ETT and OMLT and PMT in the country says the same thing. And without them, a bunch of Westerners wandering around at night can&#8217;t ever really accomplish a whole hell of a lot.</p>
<p>Getting the ANSF to leave their fortified locations in the daytime more than once every couple days is hard enough. Yeah, they&#8217;ve learned some of that from us: they are increasingly modelling our risk-averse, fobbit ways, especially the ANA. But it&#8217;s also a widely-held ANSF mindset that sees the war as something to be survived, rather than won.</p>
<p>This is also why the ANA is so behind this whole &#8220;re-occupy the cities&#8221; thing. They figure it&#8217;s fewer casualties, and more free time for them between patrols. Which, frankly, it will be.</p>
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		<title>By: Joshua Foust</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380598</link>
		<dc:creator>Joshua Foust</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 01:27:21 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>To (briefly) defend Pakistan, they are facing serious stress on their own food supply right now. So it might not just be a big middle finger for Afghanistan. But the broader point, which is that in many regions in the east &quot;successful&quot; counternarcotics has simply crashed the local economy, is right on, and something I&#039;ve railed against for years.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To (briefly) defend Pakistan, they are facing serious stress on their own food supply right now. So it might not just be a big middle finger for Afghanistan. But the broader point, which is that in many regions in the east &#8220;successful&#8221; counternarcotics has simply crashed the local economy, is right on, and something I&#8217;ve railed against for years.</p>
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		<title>By: JTapp</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380597</link>
		<dc:creator>JTapp</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 01:01:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Another good story on PBS tonight about how Afghan children on the border have to cross over to Pakistan to illegally smuggle flour back. It was in a region where poppies were successfully eliminated through gov&#039;t programs, while other promises of aid weren&#039;t kept.  It was an example of a tired rural area trying not to starve (you can comment on the accuracy of the report) and angry at American promises.  
Pakistan has banned wheat exports to Afghanistan, hence the smuggling.  Can we even hope to win hearts &amp; minds when Pakistan says &quot;screw you&quot; to the Afghans like that?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another good story on PBS tonight about how Afghan children on the border have to cross over to Pakistan to illegally smuggle flour back. It was in a region where poppies were successfully eliminated through gov&#8217;t programs, while other promises of aid weren&#8217;t kept.  It was an example of a tired rural area trying not to starve (you can comment on the accuracy of the report) and angry at American promises.<br />
Pakistan has banned wheat exports to Afghanistan, hence the smuggling.  Can we even hope to win hearts &amp; minds when Pakistan says &#8220;screw you&#8221; to the Afghans like that?</p>
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		<title>By: MILNEWS.ca</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380594</link>
		<dc:creator>MILNEWS.ca</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 00:24:37 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>You&#039;ve said it before, and you&#039;re saying it again, and you continue to be bang on.

Wonder if they&#039;re doing it because it&#039;s easier and won&#039;t need as many troops?  Even if it doesn&#039;t give the best results?  Ya think?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You&#8217;ve said it before, and you&#8217;re saying it again, and you continue to be bang on.</p>
<p>Wonder if they&#8217;re doing it because it&#8217;s easier and won&#8217;t need as many troops?  Even if it doesn&#8217;t give the best results?  Ya think?</p>
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		<title>By: anonymous</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/06/24/maybe-the-strategic-review-could-mention-that-afghanistan-is-rural/comment-page-1/#comment-380589</link>
		<dc:creator>anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2009 20:15:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>That may be your best post ever.
I hope it is widely read.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That may be your best post ever.<br />
I hope it is widely read.</p>
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