(1) some form of popular front militia,
(2) firepower on civilian targets,
(3) sweep and destroy missions.

These are disguised under a thousand names, but the essence remains the same. Each time, each war, it requires journalists years to sort thru the chaff to see the underlying truth.

Look, 2 big problems here. The piece overpromises: “pretty much all there is to say?” So when you get into it, all it says is “incentivize,” go native” and “live and let live…” Really? That’s all there is to say? That doesn’t even scratch the surface of the current challenge. No one who is working in a mentoring role doesn’t figure that out on Day One, all without Devenny’s or Trower’s assistance.

But what really poleaxed me was Devenny’s reply to you:

“I think today’s Special Forces are directly analogous to Trower’s group of advisors… Small team of outsiders, living with their native units, charged with managing and commanding them — sounds a lot like SOF to me!”

There isn’t a mentor in Afghanistan today who believes he’s “charged with managing or commanding” anything Afghan. If you do not get that crucial fact, you do not get what we’re doing there. We do not command. We advise. We suggest. We have no control over Afghan operational plans, pay, personnel selection, discipline or (except in the broadest sense) logistics, out of respect for the sovereign national government. We have access to none of the levers over indigenous forces that have been used to keep them in line since the Romans’ day. That makes our job in Afghanistan distinctly and entirely different, except in the area of cultural niceties, from anything that Trower might have been involved with. The reply makes it clearer than anything you could have written: Devenny has no clue about the current mission and yet thinks he can advise on how it should be done, based on a dated and largely irrelevant reference.

I would actually say Trower, and all the other memoirs by British soldier-adventurers from Clive through to Lawrence should probably be on the list of “to be avoided” by anyone who knows they’ll be working with Afghans in a military mentoring role… because it’ll sure F*** you up if you think your real thing is going to be anything like it was for them.

More here: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_07_02.html

But okay, so I think now we probably just quibble at the margins. I blame FP for making everyone conform to some weird cutesy style. Nick Schmidle did it too, and I really like his work and don’t think he’s wrong either. There are others—smart people, well informed—who try to write something short for FP and it just doesn’t work. Anyway…

Much of my complaints come down to phrasing, which you acknowledge, but it’s kind of important when you’re writing. One of the reasons I try to avoid 900-word thought pieces when I can is you simply cannot reliably communicate complex ideas in that much space—nor are you meant to. I’ve been caught out before, too, trying to explain something and skipping over details and it has resulted in me getting slammed for writing a confusing mess.

That being said, there are probably some definitions to take into consideration. “Militia” in a general sense is any military force composed of non-soldiers meant to provide defense, law-enforcement, or paramilitary activity. What Trower calls “Irregulars” we would call “militias,” or perhaps more appropriately “Irregular militias.” But we are actually talking about the same thing—he raised his Khandahar Horses for the same reason the British Empire tried to repeat his experiment for the next hundred years: it seemed like a good idea (and his lessons were repeated and often cited by later British Army officers assigned the task of managing these militias).

By a pretty basic definition of a militia—right down to the previous commander in Afghanistan using that exact word—we are indeed running a small militia in Wardak. Which we’ve also done elsewhere, it’s not a new thing in that sense.

About referring only to Pathans: I didn’t get that from your piece, I’m sorry.

About applying the lessons of the 19th century: that is at least the explicitly stated purpose of the essay according to the title and subtitle. Again, I feel comfortable blaming FP for making the URL title say, “How an 1845 British Calvary Memoir Explains Afghanistan” and the subtitle saying “A historical look at how Afghanistan can be won — and lost.” But even so: it’s there, and if you disagree with those titles (as it seems you do), then you need to take it up with the FP editorial staff.

It’s probably worth noting that the vast majority of the Security Force Assistance (as they now call FID) in Afghanistan is being done by regular Army and Marine units, and not SOF. SOF is training the AP3, but they don’t want to and they’re trying to push it off onto a regular unit.

I think the DOD openly taking ideas from colonial texts to frame and discuss its activities is more of a problem than it is willing to admit.

“I never write that the units played a key role in the history of the subcontinent.”

This marginalizes your entire point. If you’re going to write an essay about how this Captain Trower has all these lessons that inform what we’re doing right now, then say that you never meant that he was important, and that it was insigificant… well, I’m wondering why write it? Did other Brits ignore his advice? Implement it? On a scale beyond the one Afghan unit he had for (at most) a year or two, were his principles workable? That’s what I’m getting at with my response—one case does not a phenomenon make. Especially a case a century and a half old.

“Trower DID enjoy some success in commanding his unit for a certain amount of time using a specific range of tactics. He couldn’t stay forever…”

This applies to everyone and is exactly my point. I’m saying let’s limit our expectations when looking at this stuff. Your essay seemed to imply the opposite; I’m glad you don’t think so. But again: the essay itself is about using history to inform policy—a very good thing, but it ignores all of the context that makes history relevant.

Which is really the point I’m trying to make. An explicit, “hey, here is an interesting case” would have been actually quite enjoyable to read; all of the other stuff—that again, comes down I guess to language and phrasing about it being “everything you need to know” and “how it will teach us to win”—that’s what irked me.

“Well, okay, so that’s really only one of the three..”

I never state that Trower’s book is “authoritative” on the subject of Pashtun irregulars — the phrase “says pretty much all there is” may, in retrospect, be a little confusing but I still don’t think you can charge me with saying he’s authoritative, i.e don’t bother reading anything else.

Regardless of the semantics, I agree with you on that point, but I honestly didn’t mean to suggest it was authoritative, for what it’s worth. Additionally, no where do I deny that there is a rich literature on the subject, stating only that the US military should “learn the lessons of the conflict” and “specifically” take a look at the Trower book. You agree with that, don’t you?

Another point, you state that I ignore failed attempts to create Pashtun militias. Note in my original article I never use the word “militia” — Trower does not write about “militias,” he writes about a cavalry unit that was recruited/maintained outside of regular channels, but was “full-time” so to speak. I think I discuss what the difference is in the “incentive” paragraph, and it’s a difference that the US should be mindful of. Trower never uses the word militia, and even criticized massive payments to tribes for that purpose, as I point out.

Trower didn’t run a militia, and neither should we — that’s the point I’m trying to get across.

“Well, okay, so Wardak is in the East.”

Thanks for the reminder.

“And let’s forget that Trower was mostly describing Indian groups, and not Pathans, in his diary”

I was careful to pull directly from Trower’s commentary on Pathans — I never took a comment he made specifically concerning Indian troops and rendered it as if he was speaking of Pashtuns. I think I’m pretty up front about that in the article.

“No, not even close and Devenny should know better. Let’s just say there probably aren’t many Sikhs or “Rajpoots” working for the local tribes in Wardak”

Come on Josh, I’m writing for FP here, not USA Today. I guess I just assumed that the readership would know that the Rajpoots aren’t in Wardak. The “direct descendant” line ties right into the next paragraph where I talk about the Khandahar Horse. I feel that you’re nitpicking there, and you should have alluded to the fact that maybe, just maybe, the “descendants” the author meant to refer to are in the next sentence. That’s a cheap shot.

“Okay. So the AP3 in Wardak are designed specifically to be beholden to the government of Afghanistan.”

I actually disagree with this paragraph — I think today’s Special Forces are directly analogous to Trower’s group of advisors. Maybe you misunderstood (or perhaps the article isn’t clear enough), as I was comparing SOF to Trower and his British officers, not to the irregular unit as a whole. Small team of outsiders, living with their native units, charged with managing and commanding them — sounds a lot like SOF to me!

On your other point, I disagree that Trower is discussing how to build your own “private army” — again, I’ll refer to the incentive paragraph. Is he specifically talking about how to build a “local defense force?” Of course not, but the lessons he espouses are useful in building such units regardless of what name we give them.

“Devenny doesn’t actually discuss why the lessons of an early 19th century ”

Did I state somewhere in the article that I would attempt to do this? What’s the topic, last sentence in the first paragraph: “the training and oversight of local defense forces.”

“Having an employee of the Department of Defense advocate importing lessons from the British Empire to “train” the Afghans”

Pretty sure DOD’s use of colonial-era material for lessons on indigenous force interaction is out of the bag by now, what with the ~156,000 articles on US officers reading Bell, Galula, Kitsen…even tragic history has some lessons to offer.

“In reality, using history to inform our current understanding of Afghanistan is a wonderful idea but only if it is done properly.”

Couldn’t agree more. Again, I’m not going to hold the reader’s hand so all “misinterpretation” can be avoided.

“The “horses,” which were not really relevant to Afghanistan except for a brief”

This is irrelevant, I never stated that they were. I feel that Trower’s interaction with them is interesting, but I never write that the units played a key role in the history of the subcontinent.

“Right, so that’s a quick history-for-dummies of the big irregular forces that have operated in Afghanistan since Britain tried “civilising” the place under Trower. However, it is not just the successes to watch out for, but the failures..”

I don’t know, I think I did a pretty good job — using Trower’s own words — of warning of the dangers of trying to “civilize” such units. Again, what is the point of the article — Trower DID enjoy some success in commanding his unit for a certain amount of time using a specific range of tactics. He couldn’t stay forever and, as he himself admits, his was a minority opinion on how to deal with the irregular troop.

“Indeed, in the end of things, Devenny’s essay is quippy, lazy, and pretty ahistorical… despite being billed as a clever exploration of Afghanistan’s history. It is nothing of the sort, just more thinly-veiled Imperialism masquerading as informed analysis. I know for a fact the DOD has reports that explore this topic with more detail and honesty—I’ve read them. Why couldn’t Devenny, or Foreign Policy, go with one of those? Why this terrible excuse for scholarship in what used to be a respectable magazine?”

Josh — another strawman. “Exploration of Afghanistan’s history” — when did I aspire to this task? Be specific — where in the article do I make common cause with imperialism and suggest it — as in the political domination of a foreign country — has something to teach us? Just because I’m a fan of Galula doesn’t mean I’m a fan of the French colonization of Algeria, etc.

In summation, the article analyzes the words of a British officer who used “live and let live” and “Go native” to organize a small troop of irregulars and bind them successfully to a cause bigger than their own individual tribal interest for a finite period of time. The failure of this arrangement was, as you state, the result of forces far beyond a British captain’s control.

“I know for a fact the DOD has reports that explore this topic with more detail and honesty—I’ve read them. Why couldn’t Devenny, or Foreign Policy, go with one of those?”

What are you suggesting, that FP just provide links to these articles? I’m going to wager none of them mention Trower though, do they? That’s the point of the piece, bring something new to the argument.

You make a lot of good points on your discussion of area history but I felt like you were fighting another article/author and using my narrow piece as a convenient prop. Just my read.

-Pat