This is why there are many similarities between Iran, Afghanistan, Hyderbad, and Kashmir.

Madhu, you probably know that Afghanistan (some say southern Uzbekistan) use to be called Gandhara. This is where Gandhari, mother of the 100 Kauravas came from in the Mahabharata poem. North of Gandhara or Afghanistan was ancient Kaikaya. This was where Kaikeyi, mother of “Bharata” in the Ramayana poem, comes from. “Bharata” was “Rama’s” brother. As you know, India use to call itself “Bharata” for thousands of years. This is why its most famous poem is named Maha (great) Bharata, or great India. If any of the above isn’t politically correct, than substitute “India” with “South Asia.”

Omar, the answers to your questions are very complicated and politically sensitive. How many books do you want to read

Some things you might want to research.

Quetta Shura Taliban = coterie around Mullah Omar. Who created and backed Mullah Omar? Why did Mullah Omar marry Osama Bin Laden’s daughter? Why did Osama Bin Laden marry Mullah Omar’s daughter? Why are they so close to each other? What happened in 1996 in the region? What is the International Islamic Front and why was it formed? Who is its leader? What is its relationship to Mullah Omar and Haqqani? Does it mean anything anymore or has it lost any meaning in recent years? What is Haqqani’s connection to Kashmir? What are the “Punjabi Taliban” and why do so many fight for Haqqani?

You might want to carefully read through Shannon and Bruce’s comments. They were brilliant, nuanced and insightful. Bruce: “I’d agree with M. Shannon on the sense that a lot of the insurgency is largely theatrical.” I agree fully with Bruce and Shannon on this. So Omar, why do you think the Taliban is “winning?”

If you ever figure out the answer to these questions, please drop me a line Omar. :LOL: You would be a much smarter man than I.

Bruce, I agree with your comments completely except for “Whether the Taliban leadership wanted to help Karzai or hurt him probably didn’t translate to much on the ground on election day and I don’t think you can extrapolate intent from the results, either.” I think the Taliban wants Karzai to win. But what affect that had on local Taliban operations if any is unclear.

Shannon, brilliant comments:
“I increasingly get the feeling that the “insurgency” in Nangarhar is some sort of theater where no one really wants it to end and all the Afghans are happy to keep the pot boiling just enough to ensure more billions of US aid and material keep pouring in. For example I see no reason for the enemy to allow road convoys to resupply NATO from Pakistan unless the Taliban make substantial money off the convoys. I hear $2000 per truck is the going rate to get to Jalalabad. The Jalalabad Airfield could be a mini Dien Bien Phu, with a semi competent and determined enemy, but instead it’s a cash cow for everyone.
I can’t think of any organized group (I include mine) here which has an interest in ending the war as long as the level of violence stays at a low level and the borders, airport and main highways stay open. A low level conflict which the US has decided will be “won” by pouring in development dollars, thousands of troops and contractors may be the ultimate jack pot.”
There is a lot to this. This is why it might be a good idea to commit to a $250 billion international grant program to Afghanistan over 20 years and commit to it, regardless of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. This aid has to be conditioned on very difficult, even unpopular, Afghan reforms. Any GIRoA national agency, provincial government or district government that does not perform should be cut off . . . despite the human costs for their residents. Unless aid is a little ruthless and detached you get an NGO welfare dependency industrial complex that hurts almost everyone. Which is where we seem to be headed in many but not all cases.

“Sherzai, the governor is probably the most popular politician here. Karzai should win the election (even a fair one).” Glad that Sherzai is popular. Another reason to be skeptical about claims of a momentum driven collapse of the ANSF and GIRoA if ISAF combat troops (as opposed to embedded advisors, trainers and combat enablers) are pulled out.

“NDS is the most respected security outfit.” Yeah, they are pretty good. “The ANP aren’t respected but it might be getting better.” Good to know. “The ANA is respected but rarely seen. The ANA may be better trained and lead than the ANP but if they spend a lot of their time on FOBs (one of the effects of mentoring is that the mentored emulate their mentors) the people don’t get a real feel for them.” 2nd Bde, 201st ANA is an old brigade, but one of the worst in the ANA. It operates near Nangarhar. Why it is performing so poorly in something I don’t understand. You are dead right that the FOBs are a disaster. We would be best off converting most of them to ANSF training bases, or joint ANA/ANAAC/ISAF bases.

“The “Taliban” don’t have much support in Nangarhar and battles between them and locals are becoming more frequent but as you go north in Laghman, Nuristan and Kunar and west in Nangarhar the commercial interests lessen and government control weakens and they are more insurgents and presumably the support for Omar and Hekmatyar increases.” Seems right.

In the south there are very few indiscriminate killings by the Taliban. They do target convoy guards (who do seem to be counted in “civilian casualty” tallies) but also anyone who criticizes them or poses a threat to their authority, or is resistant to their attempts to intimidate people, through a steady and determined campaign of assassination. Bystanders in suicide or other IED attacks against higher-value targets round out the civilian fatality stats. What they generally avoid is attacks such as pressure-plate IEDs on travelled roads that kill civilians randomly. There are exceptions to this obviously, but these seem to be the product of Taliban mistakes.

I personally doubt there was any central edict guiding the Taliban response to the election. The insurgency’s much more local and cellular than that. If it helped their local intimidation campaign or security forces were an easy target, they did something. If it didn’t, they didn’t. Whether the Taliban leadership wanted to help Karzai or hurt him probably didn’t translate to much on the ground on election day and I don’t think you can extrapolate intent from the results, either.

I can’t think of any organized group (I include mine) here who has an interest in ending the war as long as the level of violence stays at a low level and the borders, airport and main highways stay open. A low level conflict which the US has decided will be “won” by pouring in development dollars, thousands of troops and contractors may be the ultimate jack pot.

Sherzai, the governor is probably the most popular politician here. Karzai should win the election (even a fair one). NDS is the most respected security outfit. The ANP aren’t respected but it might be getting better. The ANA is respected but rarely seen. The ANA may be better trained and lead than the ANP but if they spend a lot of their time on FOBs (one of the effects of mentoring is that the mentored emulate their mentors) the people don’t get a real feel for them. The “Taliban” don’t have much support in Nangarhar and battles between them and locals are becoming more frequent but as you go north in Laghman, Nuristan and Kunar and west in Nangarhar the commercial interests lessen and government control weakens and they are more insurgents and presumably the support for Omar and Hekmatyar increases.

Another Jalalabad Zone Police HQ was attacked on 21 Aug by at least four attackers with small arms and grenades. They killed two policemen and one of the attackers was killed before the others escaped. I wouldn’t count either of these events as terrorism as the targets were security forces.

I increasingly get the feeling that the “insurgency” in Nangarhar is some sort of theater where no one really wants it to end and all the Afghans are happy to keep the pot boiling just enough to ensure more billions of US aid and material keep pouring in. For example I see no reason for the enemy to allow road convoys to resupply NATO from Pakistan unless the Taliban make substantial money off the convoys. I hear $2000 per truck is the going rate to get to Jalalabad. The Jalalabad Airfield could be a mini Dien Bien Phu, with a semi competent and determined enemy, but instead it’s a cash cow for everyone.

I can’t think of any organized group (I include mine) here wh intereso has an interest in ending the war as long as the level of violence stays at a low level and the borders, airport and main highways stay open. A low level conflict which the US has decided will be “won” by pouring in development dollars, thousands of troops and contractors may be the ultimate jack pot.

I think we generally agree on these topics, although there appears to be disagreement over the general outlook and interest of the State, as well as the problems of economic development and investment.

I fear I am perhaps too cynical-(you see Josh, I guess that lending of cynicism did the trick, now here I am bumming everyone out).

I think Obama thinks he has people’s interests at heart, but I think Bush did also. There is unfortunately a great divide between what we think will help and the actual ramifications of our actions.

Also, while I agree with you about the interest of States and global stability, I believe that a given “place” “nation” “State” or what have you needs to offer a stability ROI. I don’t see places such as Afghanistan, much of the Caucuses, or for example Somalia, and many other places offering this, except to the degree their resources can be exploited.

Unfortunately we’ve seen time and again, local democracies don’t necessarily equate with ease of resource exploitation by outside forces. What global instability did Afghanistan really offer under the Taliban? Heroin production? Legalization was an easy solution for that. September 11? I’m not sure at any other point in the history of man did so few deaths herald such an expansion of global instability, other than perhaps a certain nobleman in Sarajevo.

I’m sure someone might come up with various other instances, but my point stands, September 11 heralded a great crime, but it was not evidence of “global instability.”

Any government has its own longevity at its core, democracies believe this longevity comes from citizens’ consent. Totalitarian states, et al have different methods. But in each, the interest is not the will of the citizens or the monarch, but the longevity of the system.

Look forward to speaking soon, and perhaps getting a beer at Local 44 or somewhere else if you’re back in the area. I’ve dropped you a line, if it doesn’t get through, feel free to try me at small world news at gmail dot com .

Unfortunately, Karzai appears to have the strong backing of Khamenei, Russia, Turkey and some other parts of the international community. {Perhaps China as well.} The recent June, 2009 public opinion poll found that he still retained considerable support among Afghans. Therefore, the only way to remove Karzai was through the ballot box. If Karzai has cheated, this would be concerning indeed. Yes I saw the articles on your website . . . I take it that the official numbers might state something similar? I don’t know what is Karzai spin and what is fact.

“this is because the international community, AKA States A. doesn’t really care about democracy in Afghan, they care about the relative benefit to their specific State, this is an ongoing problem for developing democracies who, while dependent on international investment, don’t tend to receive the fair deal they ought to expect.” I’ll have to think about this. I am not sure I agree. Most countries favor more “open” free stable governments, which the large majority of the time means a democratized state customized to local conditions. The reason for this is that “global stability” is correlated with greater global economic growth, lower global risk premiums, and greater security for the home country. In Afghanistan, many countries don’t want Haqqani or the Quetta Shura Taliban to prevail or for Afghanistan to remain massively dependent of foreign grants indefinitely; most of them probably see an open stable free somewhat democratized Afghanistan as the only way to sustainably achieve that.

“it does not appear NATO’s interest is cultivating a progressive, open, and transparent democracy. There is clearly a great deal of orientalism involved in discussion of the people of Afghanistan and the willingness of developed nations to expect that Afghans are capable of understanding the abstract idea of “democracy.”” Do you think this is Obama’s world view? He mentions “mutual respect and mutual interests” rather than “mutual respect, mutual values and mutual interests,” the phraseology I would prefer. Few things irritate me as much as the “orientalism” and “pretentious paternalism” that you describe. It seems worse among Europeans than among Americans . . . but we Americans also have a serious problem.

“We won’t fund Afghanistan properly or in a way that actually works to build its longterm independence, it doesn’t benefit the NGO industrial complex which benefits from government giveaways due to guilt over the involvement of the international community in the collapse of Afghanistan and were giveaways to go directly to local institutions this would harm the International NGOs involved.” This is my biggest fear about Afghanistan. The “Taliban” and its allies can be defeated by the ANSF and NSD with enough international support, smart leadership, and time. What concerns me most is the huge imbalance between GIRoA spending and revenue and how this will be plugged over the next generation. Many do gooder NGOs (Afghan and international) are really amazing idealistic good people. However, many don’t fully understand the concept of long term self sustaining social entrepreneurship.

“I fear that the US and NATO are not enough willing to self-criticize to truly approach this question of who are the Taliban and to what degree are the proxies of Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah, Dostum, or others involved in violence that is blamed on the Taliban.” I think the US military at least is asking these precise questions. So are at least some of the people in Holbrooke’s team. However, “politics” including Afghan politics is “outside my lane” in military speak. The military therefore cannot speak openly about these subjects. How to get around this?

Afghanistan doesn’t just have a Haaqani, Mullah Omar and Hekmatyur problem. It also has a warlord problem. Some of these warlords are “local Taliban,” but others are not. The only long term solution that I can see is a capable professional ANA and ANP that can gradually impose a monopoly on force.

I would love to touch base offline.

with respect to your comment above:
“are we even sure the Taliban issued the statement about massive disruptions?” I think that this is so. Perhaps the real question is which of the twelve Taliban militias made the statement. There are Talibans, rather than a Taliban.

Of course, but I am asking questions and I’m looking for cited answers. And of course there are not “talibans” since “Taliban” is already plural, right? Maybe there are “Talibanaat” ?

“Just in the last 48 hours we’ve seen evidence of enough fraud and illegal tampering/campaigning to declare the elections invalid yet they are being hailed all over the world.” The entire world is acclaiming these results, including the UN, Iran, China, India, Japan . . . basically the entire international community. Why do you think this is? Perhaps it is partly because many elections around the world are less than perfect. People from developing countries are quick to mention Florida 2000 whenever a westerner lectures on “democracy.”

No, I think this is because the international community, AKA States A. doesn’t really care about democracy in Afghan, they care about the relative benefit to their specific State, this is an ongoing problem for developing democracies who, while dependent on international investment, don’t tend to receive the fair deal they ought to expect.

Regarding the Florida results and the 2000 election generally, as an American I can say that we, and the international community, would have benefited by the other members of the UN refusing to recognize the legitimacy of that election. Unfortunately the rules that hold for the developing world are not the same as those expected of the so-called “western world” or “developed world.”

“This is yet another bizarre kafkaesque theatre where the results of the so-called democratic election were clearly a foregone conclusion.” Why would you think this? It seems to me that Abdullah had a real shot at beating Karzai. An Adbullah victory might represent significant change. The Presidency is a highly influential office.

First of all, I am saying that currently the election APPEARS to have been a foregone conclusion. Have you seen our reports that 72% of the votes are for Karzai? Furthermore, have you seen the degree to which Karzai or his proxies violated election rules and engaged in electioneering? This is why it was a “foregone conclusion” Karzai or his proxies clearly engaged in direct fraud as well as electioneering (for example posting campaign posters for Karzai not only just outside polling stations but INSIDE these stations. Despite these very clear incidents, and our hard evidence, the international community sits back and says, no harm no foul.

“The question is, will the US or NATO just accept an ongoing facade of democracy in the vain hope of longterm gain?” Why do you think Afghan democracy won’t improve over time? Democracy evolved and improved in Bangladesh (which like Afghanistan was a former Mongol Moghul empire province until the early 1700s AD), and Indonesia? Why wouldn’t the same gradually happen in Afghanistan?

OF COURSE “Afghan democracy” will change over time, whether improving or not. My point is simply that it does not appear NATO’s interest is cultivating a progressive, open, and transparent democracy. There is clearly a great deal of orientalism involved in discussion of the people of Afghanistan and the willingness of developed nations to expect that Afghans are capable of understanding the abstract idea of “democracy.”

“Unfortunately as we saw during the cold war and the post cold war realignment (in particular in Africa) the answer is almost certainly yes.” I don’t agree. Afghanistan probably needs at least $10 billion a year in annual grants, and I don’t think that the international community would fund Afghanistan like that unless it was seen as making progress towards democracy, better governance, and some measure of freedom.

I think perhaps you don’t understand my point. What you have stated is my point. We won’t fund Afghanistan properly or in a way that actually works to build its longterm independence, it doesn’t benefit the NGO industrial complex which benefits from government giveaways due to guilt over the involvement of the international community in the collapse of Afghanistan and were giveaways to go directly to local institutions this would harm the International NGOs involved.

“An then there’s the other question who are the Taliban now and how much is being caused by them and how much is te result of militias and warlordism? But I’m not supposed to ask that question right?” This is a very important question to ask. Many are asking it. Why do you think some don’t want this question asked?

I fear that the US and NATO are not enough willing to self-criticize to truly approach this question of who are the Taliban and to what degree are the proxies of Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah, Dostum, or others involved in violence that is blamed on the Taliban.

with respect to your comment above:
“are we even sure the Taliban issued the statement about massive disruptions?” I think that this is so. Perhaps the real question is which of the twelve Taliban militias made the statement. There are Talibans, rather than a Taliban.

“Just in the last 48 hours we’ve seen evidence of enough fraud and illegal tampering/campaigning to declare the elections invalid yet they are being hailed all over the world.” The entire world is acclaiming these results, including the UN, Iran, China, India, Japan . . . basically the entire international community. Why do you think this is? Perhaps it is partly because many elections around the world are less than perfect. People from developing countries are quick to mention Florida 2000 whenever a westerner lectures on “democracy.”

“This is yet another bizarre kafkaesque theatre where the results of the so-called democratic election were clearly a foregone conclusion.” Why would you think this? It seems to me that Abdullah had a real shot at beating Karzai. An Adbullah victory might represent significant change. The Presidency is a highly influential office.

“The question is, will the US or NATO just accept an ongoing facade of democracy in the vain hope of longterm gain?” Why do you think Afghan democracy won’t improve over time? Democracy evolved and improved in Bangladesh (which like Afghanistan was a former Mongol Moghul empire province until the early 1700s AD), and Indonesia? Why wouldn’t the same gradually happen in Afghanistan?

“Unfortunately as we saw during the cold war and the post cold war realignment (in particular in Africa) the answer is almost certainly yes.” I don’t agree. Afghanistan probably needs at least $10 billion a year in annual grants, and I don’t think that the international community would fund Afghanistan like that unless it was seen as making progress towards democracy, better governance, and some measure of freedom.

“An then there’s the other question who are the Taliban now and how much is being caused by them and how much is te result of militias and warlordism? But I’m not supposed to ask that question right?” This is a very important question to ask. Many are asking it. Why do you think some don’t want this question asked?

Does an attack on the red crescent count as a terrorist attack? “A Taliban spokesman, meanwhile, said the police headquarters and the local office of Red Crescent were stormed simultaneously.”
http://www.aliveinafghanistan.org/aiablog/?p=708

It strikes me that some “Taliban” militias are conducting terrorist attacks while others are restricting themselves to attacking ANSF and ISAF/OEF. I think it is very positive that some “Taliban” militias are not attacking Afghan civilians. Strategically, economic development and stronger civilian Afghan institutions represent an important victory in their own right. My hope would be that these “local Taliban” could be persuaded to join the political process much as the Iraqi Sahwa were. Is this realistic? If they don’t have ties with Al Qaeda linked or the international islamic front linked groups as I think you implied, why wouldn’t they want to participate in government or with NGOs and have access to the billions of dollars in grants pouring in from PRTs and international agencies?

2nd Brigade, 201st ANA operates near Jalalabad. This brigade appears to be lower quality than 3rd Mechanized brigade, 201st ANA and the 203rd ANA Corps. Any thoughts about what 2-201 ANA’s challenges are, and why it has been slow to improve? Any thoughts on what could be done to improve the quality of ANA 2-201? The Jalalabad ANP also appear to be a step below their ANP colleagues in Khost, Gardez and Kabul. Any thoughts on why this might be the case and what can be done about it?

What are your perceptions about how popular the ANA, ANP, NSD, Mullah Omar/Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani, Hekmatyur/HiG, Abdullah Abdullah and Karzai are in Jalalabad? Were there provincial council elections in Jalalabad, and if so how were they?