In my opinion, Uzbekistan has been and remains the most able of the former Soviet Central Asian states to annoy, frustrate, and otherwise make life difficult for Russia. This is not to say that Russia’s government has no power in Tashkent. Allow me to digress -
If one were to follow all of the various changes in Uzbekistan’s approach to foreign policy, they would fine some interesting patterns. It is rather like some crazy variant of tug-of-war, but one in which Uzbekistan stands in the middle, tied up but holding the ropes, working with or against the teams pulling on each side. Unlike Turkmenistan’s proclaimed neutrality, Uzbekistan appears to be open to all comers, particularly if they arrive on Uzbekistan’s terms. While it goes without saying that Russia still has a lot of sway in Tashkent, the fact remains that Uzbekistan is unique among its neighbors when it comes to dealing with Russia.
For example, I would argue that no matter how powerful and successful Kazakhstan’s urban centers become, Nazarbaev knows the hand that he has been dealt. A long, indefensible border, a large, relatively weakly assimilated ethnic Russian population, not to mention the Russian-speaking ethnic Kazakh majority – and this is only a short list of the reasons that Kazakhstan is inexorably entwined with Russian policy. If one generalizes the situations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two very different countries that nonetheless have a lot in common, it seems unlikely that either of them will pull away from Russia, for economic, military, and social reasons.
Turkmenistan plays its neutrality in very strange ways, and while it has been blessed/cursed with an abundance of natural gas, it is still unable to avoid Russian influence. And unlike the other countries, while it might not be seeking Russian attention, it doesn’t seem to be going to anyone else, either. In some ways it appears to be the most independent of Russia, but I would argue that that is all it is – appearance.
Here, then, are a couple of stories of Uzbekistan’s recent maneuverings that have caught my eye:
Uzbekistan openly publishes the congratulations received for its 18th independence day from Saakashvili to Karimov. Like most of the following events, it is difficult to say what direct effect this will have, but political appearances and shows of power also have influence.
Uzbekistan is building a base in Khanabad (no, not that one, the other one). This will naturally help Karimov keep his eye on the Kyrgyz border, which in the past has been porous and within Tashkent’s sphere of influence. There are large ethnic Uzbek populations on both sides of the border in the Ferghana Valley, though it’s unclear what Kyrgyzstan’s response will be. Is this more in response to the events of May 26 or Russia’s buildup in the region? Of course, why can’t it be both?
The CSTO starts wargames, but Uzbekistan isn’t playing. ACORN, or the newly created rapid reaction special forces, is the point of contention. Uzbekistan guesses (probably accurately) that the force has been designed for incursions into other states, and has claimed it will be used to “meddle.” In other words, Karimov wants no part in creating and training a force that could likely one day be directed at himself. Needless to say, this move surprises no one.
The picture above comes from the Afghanis-tan comic that Registan blogged back in 2008.
This post was written by...
Michael Hancock-Parmer – author of 153 posts on Registan.net.
Michael earned an MA in Central Eurasian Studies in 2011 and remains a student at Indiana University pursuing a dual PhD in Russian History and Central Eurasian Studies. He served 6 months in the Peace Corps in Uzbekistan in 2005. After the events in Andijan and the subsequent closure of the program, he served 2 years in southern Kazakhstan, returning to the Midwest in 2007. His general area of interest is on post-Timur Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, centered on the Syr Darya river valley.
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Regarding Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, one is rather reminded of Captain Renault (played by the marvellous Claude Rains) in Casablanca: “I blow with the wind, and the prevailing wind happens to be from Vichy.”
Like a true Realist, Renault looks out for his own interests, but is a careful observer of international relations and adjusts accordingly (then again, like a true Liberal, he (re)discovers his conscience, and at the end of the film marches off into the night – or Brazzaville – with Rick.)
Karimov’s regime – what was it Renault also said? ‘I’m only a poor corrupt official’ – has swung back and forth between Washington and Moscow. It could be considered a sign of strength and independence … it could also be considered a sign of weakness and irrelevance.
And Belarus, widely seen as the most pro-Russia country in the world is now making some anti-Russia comments particularly about joint military exercises.
Karimov can fool no one in his own country. He would probably look independent if his people were not so dependent on jobs in Russia and Kazakhstan. Regardless how strong ties he may have with the USA, his people will still be looking up to the north.
Michael,
By the way: “the Russian-speaking ethnic Kazakh majority” – how is this one of “the reasons that Kazakhstan is inexorably entwined with Russian policy”?
No doubt, these are plenty of reasons why Kazakhstan is “entwined” with Russia, one of the main of them that it is in Kazakhstan’s own interests as having the huge common market, common history for decades if not for centuries, and cultural commonality, and of course military and political support. But the notion that “Russian-speaking ethnic majority” would somehow hinder Kazakhstan’s propulsion to have its own independent policy from Russia is very faulty reasoning. It is almost like if one made conclusions about Jawaharlal Nehru’s political creed based on his knowledge of English language or his English education.
Sorry, I think I posted my last comment twice.
“has swung back and forth between Washington and Moscow”
And lately, since things with Moscow seems to cool down as it does with everyone at some point, with Europe too. The move of Karimova junior from her post at the embassy in Moscow to a posh UN post in Geneva (i.e. a foot in Europe and of course close to the bank accounts too) was quite symptomatic imo.
“it could also be considered a sign of weakness and irrelevance.”
Well, it’s a basically the same game that has been played by several African dictators during the Cold War and is being played again now that some of them can play off the West and the Chinese against each other. It basically capitalizes on competing interests of the metropolises as well as on smokescreens, naivity and incompetence. And it works, at least for some time. For the end result is unavoidably disaster.
@ Mike: I actually couldn’t agree with you more! Yes, as OldSchoolBoy points out, it’s true that Uzbekistan is tied to Russia for jobs and repatriated rubles. Nevertheless, it certain projects a confident self-image and its population seems impressively geared toward self-sufficiency, making Uzbekistan, of the southern crescent of post-Soviet states, the most seemingly self-reliant.
@Oldschool Boy – I think having a Russian-language dominated population helps keep Kazakhstan firmly in the Russian media circuit. Russia does not produce very much media in the other languages of the former Soyuza. That being said, I will grant that Uzbek/Kazakh/etc. media is often translated from Russian media, but the point is that sometimes it isn’t, and other times they actually comment on the translations.
Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan, at least in my experience, are far more likely to pay attention to the “source,” whether it is RIA Novosti, Channel 1, or what have you. This is not to say that Kazakhstan doesn’t create its own Russian-language media.
Allow me to use an analogy [which is always bad, but might point towards my point]:
Canadian media is to American media what Kazakhstan media is to Russian media.
@Turgai Sangar: I totally agree – this kind of political shifting is international, and generally shows how well smaller powers are able to play their “superiors.”
I can’t disagree with you on how much Russian media, especially TV, is being watched in Kazakhstan. It has great cultural influence, but I would not overestimate its influence on political choices of Kazakhs. Besides, it can be a double-edged sword, because in addition to seeing Russian KVN and cheering for Russian hockey team, the Kazakh audience also see that Russia is not better than any other neighboring country; that there are alcoholism, crime, corruption, skin-heads, and etc. During wars in Chechnya and Georgia, many “Russian speaking Kazakhs” were stigmatizing to Chechens and Georgians, despite all the Russian propaganda. Here is another example: despite the hostility between Russian and Georgia, Kazakh companies are still the largest investors in Georgian economy (although many projects have been suspended lately due to the recession).
Also, TV that Canadians watch consists about of 80 to 90% of the USA programs, but it does not mean that Canadians dependent on Americans on their political choices.
I guess, for countries like Kazakhstan and Canada, the Newtons Law of Gravitation is true: they both attracted economically to their greater neighbors. And these both countries will go along with their neighbors as long as it is not against their own interests.
As for Uzbekistan’s “independent” foreign policy, I would say that the good foreign policy for anybody would be to live in peace with neighbors. There is an interesting interview with Dosym Satpaev on Fergana.ru on the Karimov’s role in the integration processes in Central Asia, and here its translation: http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2561
Sorry for the typo: not “stigmatizing” but “…sympathizing to Chechens and Georgians”.