My accusation–not implicit, but explicit–is that you refuse to consider where the U.S. and Europe could have less of a presence, not more of one. It’s easy to imagine where we could have more, I agree. Then you list off places we couldn’t *possibly* ever, ever abandon no matter what. This is clinging to a bad situation. But let me respond to your specific preference: fight for Alasay if people are willing to pick up the phone when their neighbor harbors insurgents. This is assuming a modicum of security backing them up. Otherwise move out. Rinse and repeat.

“what happens if we try that tactic writ large: much much much worse violence, with much less freedom of action to respond to it”

Agreed, if we are talking about areas we abandon. And, in addition to that, much much much less violence in the areas we control, because we will actually control them. American troops should not be in another country unless they actually have control (or have a chance, the way they are resourced) to control of the areas they reside in. Otherwise they should move out.

So, if the generals are meant to decide which areas to abandon based on whether or not people are willing to inform on insurgents… how do they determine that? You know as well as I do that they haven’t the first clue who lives in the towns nearby their bases, much less the overall social fabric of a given area. Let’s look at some examples:

Eastern Paktika. Locals there complain about special forces raids, and say they will not cooperate with CF until the raids stop and their men are returned. Those locals are portrayed as “sabotaging” the war effort by being truculent. Do they count as people willing to “inform” on insurgents, or are they too rejectionist to warrant a western security presence?

Alasay district, Kapisa. The people there are generally friendly to Americans (and French!) but very wary of collaborating too closely because of the numerous times their area has been abandoned for better pastures elsewhere. Do we beef up our presence there or do we decide they’re not cooperative enough and move on?

Kandahar City. ISAF is decidedly unpopular there, and according to local sources (like Alex Strick) most of the violence inside the city is between rival gangs, and not necessarily Taliban. Different factions violently compete for the right to distribute unmonitored ISAF development funds. They’re licking their lips are the prospect of “tribal militia” money because of how easy it will be to launder. Do we abandon them because it’s tough despite the symbolism, or do we hang on knowing that at least it’s not majority Taliban yet?

See, Ian, I don’t think even the military can reliably make the right call in these kinds of cases because there is no right call. And I really don’t see any evidence that Rory Stewart (or, to be frank, you) have considered the humanitarian or strategic consequences if we actually adopt that kind of a policy. When TF Currahee pulled out of Sabari District of Khost, saying they’re too unwelcoming and they didn’t want to try, with the plan of spreading development and security stations around the troublesome district, violence spiked and the province’s security posture still hasn’t fully recovered (by all accounts, TF Yukon wisely re-established a government and military presence there).

It’s a microcosm, I think, of what happens if we try that tactic writ large: much much much worse violence, with much less freedom of action to respond to it. Which is why I find the idea wholly unworkable. If you can build a case for why and how that would be better than the status quo—aside from “let the generals do it”—I’d be all ears. But I’m not hearing it.

Is this not a basic question of war? Have we not implicitly said that to every conflict area we haven’t invaded? Obviously Obama and his generals make this kinds of hard necessary decisions.

“What does ceding territory mean”

It means redeploying entire FOBs to areas where the majority of the population is willing to inform on insurgents. I assume you can take a map and consider where we have good information and where we don’t, and put FOBs where we have good information.

“What if containing the Taliban and preventing them from overrunning the safe areas actually requires more troops?”

If so, at least then there is a strategy of protecting safe areas, unlike the current drift. I’m not against more troops if they have a mission.

I’m not for sainting Rory Stewart, but I continue to be perplexed at the all-in-or-fold mentality of this debate, which you could help to raise to a higher level by considering more nuanced positions.

There is nothing tribal about the Karzai regime. He wouldn’t have so many Tajiks and a Hazara VP if it were.

The challenge to the current government is that it had broad legitimacy, but corruption has undermined it. That doesn’t make the fight lost—corrupt governments CAN address the issue, and have—but it does complicate matters. My big concern about the election (which Will is being incredibly hypocritical to dismiss the way he does) is that it won’t fundamentally change the corruption issue, and that is what undermines faith in GIRoA and pushes people toward the “incorruptible” Taliban.

Re: “Johnson argues that the hardcore ideological Taliban (let us make that distinction) will never negotiate an end to their insurgency because they’re religious zealots.”

Since your piece here emphasises a need to remain aware of history, from an old – but I believe reasonably credible – source:

http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn11012004.html

Now the story has some controversial implications about the entire post 9/11 campaign against Afgh. but if anything like the dynamic between Washington and Taliban interlocutors is accurate – which again I suspect is the case – any depiction of them as purely ‘religious zealots’ or ‘medieval tribesmen’ is little better than a poorly drawn cartoon.

There is quite a bit of anecdotal evidence from before we went in that the Taliban and ‘the warlords’ (aka Pashtun tribal leaders) did not always see eye to eye, echoing the rift between the central administration (of whatever ilk) and the more remote regions you mention.

However, once you have a foreign imperial power coming into the equation, the likelihood is that these previously discordant elements will unite to beat back a common enemy. This indeed seems to be have been what has been, and continues to be, transpiring.

If this is more or less the case, what exactly is the US mission in Afghanistan? Al Q was never a central governing authority. If the linked article above is relatively accurate, the Taliban – i.e. the central Afg. govt – was more than willing to hand him over or take him out in which case the entire basis of our invasion and occupation is undermined and – again in terms of paying attention to the history of the situation – analysis of the campaign should not dwell on tactical pros and cons, or even shallow arguments as to whether ‘strategic’ victory is possible, rather why we are there in the first place.

Why are we there in the first place? What is the mission? There is simply no credible, publicly articulated reason for a single US or NATO soldier to be there in the first place. Even leaving justification aside: what is the goal?

Seems to me the only valid goal is to take over the country’s governance in some way, either overtly or covertly (usually the latter) such that all decisions important to geopolitical issues regarding energy, military and financial flows, can be controlled by the US Empire. Given that is the case, ‘victory’ is persuading the Afghan elites – or creating new elites who have the power to overcome existing/old elites including Pashtun tribal leaders in Afg. and Pakistan areas – which are actually Pashtun but not on our nicely-drawn contemporary nation-state post WW II maps.

Dropping bombs all over the place using drones is one way to enforce authority – though not allegiance. But that is just a way of keeping the little people in local areas in line. Creating a new elite or making an existing elite into a compliant proxy is something that, if being attempted, is neither reported on nor analysed in terms of the overall strategic, let alone tactical, picture.

You are right. History is important. And history tells us that if you don’t take ‘them’ over with massive force and essentially murdering any and all opposition to impose acceptance of defeat along with subsequent overlordship and order, that you still have to put together a credible local proxy than can effect the same. Seemingly, there is little that current US military operations in theatre are doing to effect this. Indeed, the US is demonstrating that it has lost its grip on authentic imperial leadership and is essentially blundering. Rarely do good results come from such sloppily thought out, internally inconsistent, policy.

That said, if the intention is to maintain an overall atmosphere of instability in the ME along with boosting defense sector corporate profits, it’s working just fine.

People discuss the Afghans as indomitable. They view themselves, wishfully, as such. A recent book plays off of it in its title. The meme has become nearly universally accepted, to the point that the spurious argument is constantly raised as a justification for strategy. History indicates, however, that the Afghans are the speedbump of history. They have been regularly conquered… and usually because they are just in the way of someone who is either on their way somewhere (Khan, Alexander) else or in the way of interfering with someone else (Britain, America v. Russia). You can see the genes of many conquerers in Afghanistan today. Simply put, Afghans are the ultimate survivors. Their ability to fence-sit and await the gelling of any situation has demonstrated itself throughout the ages. In the meantime, they have developed a strong ability to maintain the essence of their culture. While Afghanistan has been repeatedly conquered, the Afghan culture itself has not been conquered. Afghans have assimilated anything which they have chosen and left the rest behind to wash away with the tide of retracting empires which the Afghans have had little if anything to do with the deaths of.

With a history that has rewarded fence-sitting as a coping/survival mechanism, is it any surprise that while 90-some-odd percent of Afghans do not wish to the see the return of Taliban rule, it often seems as if there is an ambiguity in their actions? I think it makes perfect sense. Add to that the irritation with their “guests,” who show such arrogance and fear, and the ability to materially commit their own “blood and treasure” in one direction or the other is not exactly encouraged. They view this as possibly sentencing themselves and their families to death.

Could anyone demonstrate the linkage between popular support and the percentage of insurgencies that succeed or fail without greater than 50% of popular support? History has proven that a much smaller but heavily armed, violent and committed group can dominate a larger, more docile group. But what percentage of unpopular insurgencies succeed without external support? What percentage of foreign-assisted governments fail against unpopular insurgencies? I would submit that the answers are likely to be quite different from the contemporary “insurgency math.”

Regarding ceding areas of Afghanistan in favor of concentrating on holding areas where the GIRoA holds seemingly uncontested sway or consolidating against minor insurgent encroachments, try applying a couple of standards. First, what is the level of popular support (desire) for the GIRoA/insurgent to succeed? Second, what is the how does the inkspot theory apply in reverse? I would submit that the answers to these questions leave us with perhaps temporarily ceding only the Korengal for later.

We are learning here in Afghanistan. We are learning that clearing before there is a plan to hold and build (no build; no hold) is a bad idea. What is the purpose? We have perenially done clearing operations that resulted in no long-term change in the situation except reducing the number of humans respirating.

The overarching argument over the “strategic interest” of any nation in Afghanistan would never have been argued on September 12, 2001. It was pretty clear. The world has materially changed. Like any revisionist history, there are many reasons, many explanations, and much “clarity” provided in historical references which may or may not be relevant. Getting lost in the weeds over arguments that dismiss the effect that globalization has had on the propensity for disenfranchised groups from discrete nations to export violence on a (formerly) state-actor scale completely ignores two simple truths that were apparent to all on 9/12/01. First, there are people out here in the world who bear incredibly ill will with the United States and her allies for their particular situations, for whatever reason. Two, failed or failing nations who exchange ideas, capabilities and support with these extra-state actors enhance the abilities for the export of tremendous violence to be performed within our own borders.

As the suicide bombers are proving regularly in Afghanistan, a single man or small group with a powerful weapon and little or no regard for his own life is capable of severe harm and very difficult to stop. We fail to understand this at our own risk. Perhaps we should try (again) the technologically-driven selective firepower approach. Like an alcoholic trying to drink only wine or beer in order to control the amount of alcohol, it is an experiment that might have to be tried… unsuccessfully… again and again before he gets the point that it will not work. We have forgotten the hangover of the World Trade Center. There are two ways that we can provide security for ourselves. One is to micromanage life in our countries, aspects of which are being used in places such as our airports. There is also addressing the root causes and conditions for such events. But, perhaps we should try the Clinton method (standoff, cruise missiles) again, since the first time didn’t teach us anything.

What “geopolitical benefits are you referring to? I don’t see any conceivable ones, except the possibility of collaborating positively with Russia, China, India, Iran and Afghans to achieve shared interests. However, that does not seem to be happening right now nearly as much as it should. Instead all of them are free riding on America. {One example: China is the largest trading and investment partner of Afghanistan. An Al Qaeda video from 3 weeks ago called for attacks against the Chinese homeland. China should be sending tens of thousands of civilian advisors to the GIRoA and billions of dollars in grants rather than the hundreds of millions in grants it is giving now.}

A large strategic objective that you didn’t include is “to make Afghanistan a success”; because:
1) this would encourage the majority of decent muslims who seek a positive future for muslims and nonmuslims alike.
2) this would discredit extremist Takfiri type ideologies within the Ummah.

Another large reason for long term engagement in Afghanistan is that a highly capable ANA (which is anti Takfiri and anti extremist to its core, and which includes many orthodox sunni Pashtuns) would be insurance against disaster in Pakistan, unlikely though that may seem now. In the event of a disaster, the ANA could go east of the Durand line.

Omar, do you (like me) favor temporarily yielding large parts of Afghanistan to the Taliban, and helping the Afghans retake these areas over the long term? (See the discussion above.)

This is a necessary component of my preferred approach, or super embedding advisory ISAF division, brigade and battalions headquarters directly in the ANSF and fighting through them. This means transitioning all battlespace in Afghanistan, all PRTs and all reconstruction to the ANSF. Andrew Exum also favors completing the transition of all battlespace to the ANSF within 12 to 24 months (although he hasn’t given his opinion on transitioning PRTs, reconstruction, and their security to the ANSF,) so elements of the strategy I favor are part of the current strategy.

For this to succeed, I think the Afghans will need many tens of thousands of foreign civilian advisors (hopefully many from China, India, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey etc.) over the long term. In addition Afghanistan will probably need $250 billion in grants and $50 billion in loans over the next 20 years. {As I do the numbers, it will be difficult for the Afghans to win with less.}

I think there is a difference between fighting COIN super embedded in the ANSF and GIRoA versus fighting COIN in “PARTNERSHIP” with the ANSF and GIRoA . . . which McChrystal and Andrew Exum favor.

The embedded approach will require ceding large parts of Afghanistan to the Taliban and her allies in the short term and gradually recapturing these areas over the long term. It will also require fewer ISAF OR1 to OR3 (although more senior officers and NCOs, since the ANSF respect them more than younger officers/NCOs.) The embedded approach will save many tens of billions of dollars in ISAF operational costs, be politically more sustainable to international contributors, the global muslim community (ummah), and be more popular among Afghans (since Afghans love their army . . . and mostly like their police.)

Shouldn’t this more limited but long term commitment to Afghanistan be discussed? A smaller ink stain approach as part of a comprehensive integrated long term strategy is a legitimate option.

BTW, this was the Rumsfeld/Cheney policy until Rumsfeld was fired. America didn’t really start training, equipping and paying for the ANP until Rumsfeld was fired. At the beginning of 2008, Afghanistan–a country of 33 million poeple–only had 3 thousand trained police officers. Rumsfeld/Cheney believed in ceding most of Afghanistan to chaos and insecurity. Rory Stewart is in many ways part of the Dick Cheney school of foreign policy.

Now how do we manage the interface between “safe zones” like Kunduz and “contested zones” like Baghlan? What does ceding territory mean, beyond allowing the Taliban free reigh in some areas we don’t have the resources to control?

What if containing the Taliban and preventing them from overrunning the safe areas actually requires more troops?

To back away from the demagoguery over the “safe haven” rhetoric, these are the kinds of question Rory Stewart doesn’t seem to have considered. There are tremendous consequences, tremendous human and political and social consequences, to doing what he advocates, but he at best glosses over it.

I won’t deny that there could be a convincing case for creating safe zones and giving the Taliban territory. But no one, not even the sainted Rory Stewart, seems to have thought through the consequences—what will THAT take? How much will it cost in money and lives? Will we actually be better off?

Right now, I don’t see encouraging answers to any of those questions. Which is why I rely on the “safe haven” shorthand, and continue to treat Stewart’s ramblings with the disdain they deserve.