If army civilians have more travel restrictions on them there this year compared to last, then perhaps you are right that it’s even more dangerous now. But on the other hand, there’s been very little change in the accessibility guidelines for NGOs in the last year. NGOs can’t operate in the rural Pashtun areas without the negotiated consent of the Taliban, which was the case by late 2007.

I remember that in the spring of 2008 I visited a number of provinces there and they were all completely under the Taliban’s sway. I had interviewed people from every district in the province and found that every single Pashtun-dominated district had a fully functional Taliban shadow government and the fighters patrolled openly. In some places (such as Khwaja Umari) that are mixed, the Taliban dominated the Pashtun parts only.

So it’s possible that the insurgents have increased their kinetic activity, making it more dangerous, but have maintained a constant footprint since early 2008.

re: Arghandab: I don’t believe it is fully under Taliban control. There’s a strong Alokazay presence there that mitigates the Taliban influence to an extent. The insurgents have now made it up to the river, from what I understand, but they still don’t operate openly in the day in most parts of the district. While there are plenty of insurgents there, I wouldn’t call it a “Taliban stronghold.” But I haven’t been there since May, so I’d be happy to defer to someone with a more up-to-date appraisal.

Thanks for the response. But I’m curious about something: people—civilians, aid workers, and so on—were okay, safe even, traveling to Ghazni in 2007. Maybe not Nawa, but more northerly Pashtun areas were still permissible. Earlier this year, there were no travel warnings against Army civilians traveling to places like Esfandiya.

There is now. Ghazni may have been dangerous, and definitely harbored Taliban, two years ago, but it is unquestionably more dangerous, more under their sway, and more anti-American now.

Also, help me out: Rajiv Chandrasekaran just described Arghanadab as a Taliban stronghold in Kandahar. Are you saying it’s really not, and the area is not controlled by them?

In a formal sense, Ghazni province is not in danger of falling to the Taliban since they won’t be able to overrun Ghazni City. But substantively speaking, Ghazni (and Khost, Paktika, Wardak, Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul) are under de-facto Taliban control–pretty much every Pashtun area is under their control except for the district and provincial capitals. There are some exceptions, such as Arghandab and parts of Khost, but for the most part they operate freely outside of the capitals.

Abdul Ahad’s depiction is also recognizable as Afghanistan, and actual Taliban behavior. Rosen’s view was very narrow and dark, like looking through a toilet paper tube into a dimly lit space. While I did not doubt Rosen’s experience of being trundled about and having his fate determined by a Taliban commander, it was a misadventure rather than a substantive revelation of, “This is how the Taliban works, what it is thinking, and how it attempts to delegitimize the government as it seeks to replace it with its own services. Contrast this with Abdul Ahad’s very accurate description of the Taliban court system and where it fits in their strategy.

Rosen touched on none of this; but it would be interesting to know if he originally wrote about it and an editor later removed it.

On a separate note, it has been pointed out that even the local ANSF equate the Poles with Russians… not because of their behavior so much as their ethnicity, the weapons they carry (Kalashnikovs) and some of the vehicles they use. They look and sound very much like Russians. Perhaps the Poles could be more helpful up north where some of the provinces did not have as deep a hatred for the Russians, such as in Dostum’s old neighborhood.

While it seems to be widely accepted that the 101st was fouling things up here in Afghanistan, it is perhaps more helpful to acknowledge where past behaviors have put us behind the power curve; but time starts now. Never before in Afghanistan has the emphasis been on pop-centric COIN. There will be stumbles, fits and starts… but now the emphasis is moving. This is not a joke, not from what I’m seeing. If a journalist really wants to be on the edge, now is the time to observe the painful rebirth of a mission.

As I say this, over a hundred civilians are receiving COIN and stabilization training early in their deployments only yards away. They are being taught tools that have never been used here, much less by civilians. If Rosen, or anyone else wanted to get a grip on the changing reality, they would be here with them tracking the trials and tribulations of turning this huge ship in a new direction.