Comments on: Flailing About, Blindly

By: M Shannon

M Shannon — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 12:36:12 +0000

Stephen Pampinella. NATO troops cannot stop the intimidation of locals by the insurgents. There are thousands of villages spread across the south and east. Unlike Iraq most Afghans live in rural areas and most of the roads to them are pitiful. To put a platoon in every village would take roughly 10 infantry divisions or approximately the entire US regular army. It would take 50 infantry battalions to put a platoon in every district with one in reserve for each battalion and no other reserves or maneuver forces allotted. Perhaps a platoon per village is overkill but a platoon for every three or four still takes up a full corps and we still haven’t answered how this platoon guards it’s fort, patrols and stops night letters and assassinations, looks for IEDs, and gets re-supplied.

Of course we should put ANSF in every village. If we had enough and if they wouldn’t abuse the villagers and if they didn’t simply sell their weapons and ammo and if they’d actually try to protect the village.

The only way to stop intimidation of the locals is for the insurgents to be more afraid of the local tribes than the tribesmen are of the insurgents. This is what happened in Iraq. I don’t buy the “surge platoon house” version of events there.

By: Stephen Pampinella

Stephen Pampinella — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 04:56:18 +0000

Good article. For a moment, I’m going to risk thinking that some solutions in Iraq can (tentatively) be applied to Afghanistan. Reading Tom Ricks and Bing West both suggest that the only way to prevent insurgent intimidation of the indigenous people is by placing our counterinsurgents directly in the population centers. This reduces the risks to the civilian population, who we need to provide us with intelligence regarding the identity of the insurgents. Persistent presence also prevents insurgent intimidation of local security forces (the Army and Police, who may be simply (and rationally) too afraid to show up to work b/c of night letters). It also gives us more eyes on local security forces, giving us greater normative influence with which we can use to discourage corruption. Both Abizaid and Casey avoided doing this in 2005 because they thought that adding more forces would piss off the locals. Instead, adding more troops creates the secure conditions necessary for security cooperation.

As to the point that the military shouldn’t and can’t be doing politics: this strikes me as Jominian. If we are there, side by side with the ANSF and the locals, we implicitly have political influence by the virtue of our behavior. If we enact their (local) values of security, we create new conditions that may empower others to practice those same values, and also humiliate guys like Wali Karzai whose actions violate those values. In this sense, I would argue that police mentoring is the principle step in an institutional solution. It can create friction for the corrupt officials that undermines their position.

By: dennis

dennis — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 03:19:10 +0000

maybe one day we might get it right.

By: M Shannon

M Shannon — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 02:20:09 +0000

Tina: The Brit public rationale for their latest Helmand operations was the election. Since the UK took over Helmand as “it’s province” it’s stuck. It can’t just leave and it has do something other than defend besieged out posts. The Canadians, who have no intention of putting any more troops into harms way, got a US brigade + to reinforce Kandahar so the Brits got one as well. It now appears that evenly dividing the reinforcements may have been an error on the tactical level. From the US point of view it still may have been the correct strategic option if it keeps the UK in the war for the very long term. The Brits will probably in any event be the last NATO ally to leave but if they left early (before the POTUS said it was ok for them to go) it would start a stampede for the exits.

By: Bernard Finel

Bernard Finel — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 00:54:15 +0000

This is an interesting point: “It’s USAID and the State Department’s job to handle relations with another government and provide development assistance.”

A problem of course is that USAID has been gutted and is now just largely a contracting instrument. A bigger problem is that I don’t know that we actually know how to promote either economic development or anti-corruption initiatives. At the very least, our success at either is pretty spotty, even in countries at peace and with better factor endowments than Afghanistan.

By: Tina

Tina — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 20:24:40 +0000

I thought they went into Helmand to give the impression that a national election was actually taking place.

By: David M

David M — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 14:59:30 +0000

The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 09/14/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.

By: M Shannon

M Shannon — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 12:58:15 +0000

Why would NATO prefer a rural insurgency? They can use their surveillance capacity, air and firepower to better effect. The down side is the threat from IEDs is so far greater in the countryside but the last thing they need are battles in which they have been forbidden to use air or arty hence the preference for a rural insurgency. If the Taliban are smart they will move into the city and create covertly fortified no-go areas with a parallel government and give NATO the choice of abandoning the city or the districts.

Why did the Marines go to Helmand when Kandahar is obviously more important? To keep the Brits in the war. Afghanistan is unpopular enough in the UK without the US appearing to abandon them in Helmand.

The Canadians have pulled nothing off yet. It’s too early to tell if the model village will work. The Taliban have a say and long memories.