Comments on: What Really Happened in the Tagab Valley? http://registan.net/index.php/2009/09/25/what-really-happened-in-the-tagab-valley/ All Central Asia, All The Time Fri, 25 May 2012 20:24:26 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: IntelTrooper http://registan.net/index.php/2009/09/25/what-really-happened-in-the-tagab-valley/comment-page-1/#comment-382753 IntelTrooper Fri, 25 Sep 2009 22:39:30 +0000 http://www.registan.net/?p=9587#comment-382753 My comment on SWJ got deleted, but it was half-joking. I was wondering aloud if the PSYOPs guy was running a PSYOP on <i>us</i>. My comment on SWJ got deleted, but it was half-joking. I was wondering aloud if the PSYOPs guy was running a PSYOP on us.

]]> By: David M http://registan.net/index.php/2009/09/25/what-really-happened-in-the-tagab-valley/comment-page-1/#comment-382747 David M Fri, 25 Sep 2009 16:01:34 +0000 http://www.registan.net/?p=9587#comment-382747 The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post <a href="http://www.thunderrun.us/2009/09/from-front-09252009.html" rel="nofollow">From the Front: 09/25/2009 </a> News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front. The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 09/25/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.

]]> By: BruceR http://registan.net/index.php/2009/09/25/what-really-happened-in-the-tagab-valley/comment-page-1/#comment-382746 BruceR Fri, 25 Sep 2009 15:57:01 +0000 http://www.registan.net/?p=9587#comment-382746 Jeez, Josh, what do you really think? :--) Jeez, Josh, what do you really think? :–)

]]> By: anan http://registan.net/index.php/2009/09/25/what-really-happened-in-the-tagab-valley/comment-page-1/#comment-382745 anan Fri, 25 Sep 2009 15:08:54 +0000 http://www.registan.net/?p=9587#comment-382745 Joshua, I read your fine piece. Well written. I would say that the effect of these operations is uncertain rather than they didn't help reduce violence. It is the principle of Ceteris Paribus, all else being equal. Perhaps the operations did help; without them the situation might have been worse. But how much they helped is uncertain. "in early 2009, when I visited the province and met with the Tagab district sub-governor and NDS chief were both trying to get the chief of police fired because he was “too focused on fighting the Taliban.”" Why did they both think that the chief of police was too focused on the Taliban? Was he taking his eye off the ball of ordinary crime, organized crime, Hekmatyur? Was it some other reason? I also heard your radio appearance. You defended the ANSF. In my view the five ANSF success stories are the NDS, ANCOP, 203rd Corps, provincial Khost ANP, and the Kabul ANP. What would your assessment be? You mentioned letting the ANA fight like Afghans. To a large degree this is true; but to a large degree it isn't true. Afghans should fight like Afghans + modern professionalism + modern teamwork/management/organization. Do the professional Pakistani and Indian armies fight like Pakistanis and Indians? The code "letting the Afghans fight as Afghans" cannot be an excuse for the ANA to not delegate initiative and responsibility to platoons and squads (ANA companies fight as companies and do not delegate power to their capable 2nd Lieutenants, Lieutenants and NCOs.) To be successful, an army must encourage initiative and responsibility at the lower ranks and let people beg for forgiveness later. Sometimes modern (notice I don't use the term Western) is better than what was. Forcing soldiers in 10 week warrior training to carry 70 pound packs great distances is a good idea. It builds endurance and strength. However in the field, creative ways should be found to reduce the weight of these packs. Perhaps using donkeys and mules? I wouldn't assume that just because people are tiny means that they can't develop muscle mass, strength and endurance. I don't think this is medically true. To get back to Kapisa, it seems to me that there are sufficient anti Taliban locals to significantly increase the size of the ANP. (The ANP need to be paid more than one third what ANA are paid, but that is a separate issue.) I hope the French work with the provincial police chief to recruit more ANP. Then, importantly to train them (perhaps with 20 week cycles rather than 10 week cycles) and slightly educate them. Some ANP in Kapisa could then be contributed to the ANCOP on a needed basis in emergencies. Joshua, I read your fine piece. Well written. I would say that the effect of these operations is uncertain rather than they didn’t help reduce violence. It is the principle of Ceteris Paribus, all else being equal. Perhaps the operations did help; without them the situation might have been worse. But how much they helped is uncertain.

“in early 2009, when I visited the province and met with the Tagab district sub-governor and NDS chief were both trying to get the chief of police fired because he was “too focused on fighting the Taliban.”” Why did they both think that the chief of police was too focused on the Taliban? Was he taking his eye off the ball of ordinary crime, organized crime, Hekmatyur? Was it some other reason?

I also heard your radio appearance. You defended the ANSF. In my view the five ANSF success stories are the NDS, ANCOP, 203rd Corps, provincial Khost ANP, and the Kabul ANP. What would your assessment be?

You mentioned letting the ANA fight like Afghans. To a large degree this is true; but to a large degree it isn’t true. Afghans should fight like Afghans + modern professionalism + modern teamwork/management/organization.

Do the professional Pakistani and Indian armies fight like Pakistanis and Indians? The code “letting the Afghans fight as Afghans” cannot be an excuse for the ANA to not delegate initiative and responsibility to platoons and squads (ANA companies fight as companies and do not delegate power to their capable 2nd Lieutenants, Lieutenants and NCOs.) To be successful, an army must encourage initiative and responsibility at the lower ranks and let people beg for forgiveness later. Sometimes modern (notice I don’t use the term Western) is better than what was.

Forcing soldiers in 10 week warrior training to carry 70 pound packs great distances is a good idea. It builds endurance and strength. However in the field, creative ways should be found to reduce the weight of these packs. Perhaps using donkeys and mules? I wouldn’t assume that just because people are tiny means that they can’t develop muscle mass, strength and endurance. I don’t think this is medically true.

To get back to Kapisa, it seems to me that there are sufficient anti Taliban locals to significantly increase the size of the ANP. (The ANP need to be paid more than one third what ANA are paid, but that is a separate issue.) I hope the French work with the provincial police chief to recruit more ANP. Then, importantly to train them (perhaps with 20 week cycles rather than 10 week cycles) and slightly educate them. Some ANP in Kapisa could then be contributed to the ANCOP on a needed basis in emergencies.

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