The debate over the use of drones will likely only intensify over the coming days, months, and years, as they become more and more important to the efforts of…well… every country involved in fighting a war.
First, Alex Mayer and Bill Roggio at LWJ offer compelling evidence on both the lethality (who knew that was a word?) of drone strikes, and the reduction in civilian casualties:
Considering that drone strikes have resulted in 979 total casualties during that same time period, our numbers show that only 9.6% of the casualties reported have been identified as civilians. While our number is undoubtedly a low estimate, this extremely small percentage suggests that the accuracy and precision of these strikes have improved along with the increased pace of these strikes over the past few years.
Next, a rebuttal from Andrew Exum:
I focus on Pakistani press reports because, in a war of perceptions, I am less concerned with how many civilians we are actually killing and more concerned with how many civilians the neutral population thinks we are killing.
And, a counter from Mayer, via the comments section on Exum’s blog:
A TFT poll of Pakistanis in 2007 (i.e. before the sharp increase in drone strikes beginning in mid-2008) found that 74% opposed U.S. military action against the Taliban and AQ inside Pakistan. Just 19% had a favorable opinion of the United States. The Taliban had a 38% approval rating — and 43% for Al-Qaeda.
In August 2009, an IRI poll of Pakistanis found that opposition to U.S. military action against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda inside Pakistan was…almost exactly the same (76%). The U.S. favorability rating among Pakistanis is also virtually the same (16%), according to a recent Pew Research survey. On the other hand, support for Pakistani-US cooperation in fighting terrorism is actually higher than it was before the intensified drone campaign began.
I agree with both (disclaimer: I know Mr. Mayer quite well). I share Exum’s view that war by remote control makes it more likely for wars to be fought as the damage is done on a video screen and not in front of the war fighters’ faces. One of the great aspects of war is how unattractive it perpetually makes itself. And, even if “only” about 10% of the casualties of drone strikes are civilians, that’s about 10% too many. Every time any civilians are killed, maimed, or moved as a result of on the ground fighting or air strikes, the resulting actions are always most certainly an uptick in those willing to fight on the side of the militants – be they Taliban, IMU, Jundallah, etc.
But, as the Pakistani army moves deeper into Waziristan, and amid reports of the IMU making a trans-national resurgence, it seems to me that this whole Global War on Terror business may actually be winnable. The groups are consolidating, which I don’t see as a sign of strength. And, although disparate, the leaders of terrorist groups matter (some more than others). Drone strikes, according to Mayer and Roggio, seem to have a good record of killing those at the top – which leads to infighting and the factioning off of groups, thus making them vulnerable.
My gut reaction is to be against drone warfare, and I think I still am. But, talk to me in a few months.
{ 14 comments }
I think things don’t quite add up here, on the one hand the groups are said to be consolidating.
On the other drone strikes are causing factioning off.
Aren’t these two opposites?
To the extent that drones kill group leaders, there seems likely to be some usefullness. However, militants of all ilks generally start off at their most radical and, as they get older, tend to moderate and seek a negotiated settlement.
Constantly killing the established leaders for them to be replaced by younger colleagues must, in my view, impede this process.
“I think things don’t quite add up here, on the one hand the groups are said to be consolidating.
On the other drone strikes are causing factioning off.
Aren’t these two opposites?”
No, they aren’t. The groups as whole entities seem to be consolidating – their members intersperse. The “factioning off” I am talking about is that if members of the leadership are killed, the amalgamated groups would seemingly be less cohesive.
Perhaps I worded it a bit wrong…better?
Clearer for me at least, thanks.
While I can observe the consolidation process, and can understand things would be simpler when the enemy is one, I’m not so sure it is a real sign of weakening. After all, Al Qaeda is very much a facilitator or Islamist consolidation, and not much else.
I don’t see that there is much mileage in targetted assassination of group leaders.
By next spring I expect these people to have modified their operations to make leader death less likely from drone strike, and to make it less costly when it happens. How many times would a drone strike have to hit a school before the costs outweighed the benefits?
I expect human shielding will be part of their response.
I wonder to what extent the whole “paranoia”v issue is negativly affecting AQ’s standing in the tribal regions. Stories abound so called spies being eliminated by TTP & AQ. It seems to me that quite a lot of the local Waziristan population is less & less favorable to such behavior by AQ & affiliated groups. A survey I recently read (I lost the link unfortunately) mentionned that even within the tribal areas there was susprisingly quite a lot of support for drone strikes against foreign targets.
AbuM–
I think you mean this one….
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=165781
– Do you see drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes 45%, No 55%)
– Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? (Yes 52%, No 48%)
– Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks recently? (Yes 42%, No 58%)
– Should Pakistan military carry out targeted strikes at the militant organisations? (Yes 70%, No 30%)
– Do the militant organisations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No 40%)
Allahi, I didn’t see this particular report, but it may be the article I read referred to this survey ! Thanks for bringing this up.
Perhaps another way to look at the drones, beyond focusing narrowly on their effectiveness in terms of killing high-value targets, is to consider how not using them would afford the insurgents an uninterrupted sanctuary in the FATA.
The fact that we can reach out and touch the insurgents with the drones (that do rely on HUMINT let’s not forget) appears to me, at first thought at least, to be a desirable end in itself. A means of keeping them slightly off-balance if you will.
There are different ways to interrupt sanctuary in FATA, though. I’m not saying anything as facile as “policing and roads!”, but a problem with keeping them “on their toes” is that it keeps them innovating and a step ahead.
The way, I see it, UAVs are just more impressive cruise missiles in their goal: kill enemies while at a safe distance. Anything that involves killing high-value targets from afar can be beaten using the same methods: human shields, underground bunkers, airtight intel, basically. UAVs are a useful tool, but I’m of the mind that it’ll take much more creative thinking to really turn the corner.
On the other hand, though, drones made it into xkcd:
http://xkcd.org/652/
@AJK – I suppose you are right that there are other means, but at the same time the logic that anything that keeps them on their toes helps them innovate and stay ahead of the game could be used to discredit any strategy adopted to combat insurgents (not to nitpick).
While there are similarities with cruise missiles in overall function, there are enormous differences. These include, instantaneous execution (pardon the crude pun) of fire missions, and live video feeds of targets that increase reliability; vastly reducing the chances of missing the target or killing bystanders.
Drones are not a silver bullet I suppose, but at present I see no other way for us to deny the insurgents safe havens (and I think the pakmil offensives can be complementary to that effort, unless they cut deals with ALL the Afghan-focused insurgents).
and it appears to be dovetailing nicely
Today I read the piece in the New Yorker on the topic…very very interesting read. I agree with Exum that drones are a tactic not a strategy, but as the military’s civilian commanders are finding it easier to the pull the virtual trigger, the trend seems to be morphing into a strategy.
The piece is behind the e-paywall, so you’ll need to sack up and throw down the $6 or whatever it costs these days.
My quick takeaway is that the use of drones will only increase, and no one in the U.S. really seems to be asking the tough (and necessary) legal questions.
I am of the mind that the “War on Terror” is, in fact, better prosecuted as a criminal type operation over all out war – although the latter is certainly necessary in some cases.
good piece…read it.
Good article on US military drone pilots. The US will soon purchase more drones than planes and train more UAV pilots than regular pilots.
http://www.esquire.com/features/unmanned-aircraft-1109
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann of the New America Foundation have published a study showing that civilian deaths constituted between 31 and 33 percent of deaths from drone strikes. Their discussion is here: http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge_drones