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	<title>Comments on: And by opposing end them?</title>
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		<title>By: Sailani</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/10/27/and-by-opposing-end-them/comment-page-1/#comment-383245</link>
		<dc:creator>Sailani</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 16:45:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>@anan - you&#039;re probably reading him right.  I just found the whole piece written in such ignorance of the real situation that it was a good example of analysis from 30,000 feet (there are many more like this).

Not sure I agree 100% on the objectives on the Talibs, as I think the international forces and international influence really is anathema to them and a major driver of their struggle.  Morever, I hate to lump them all into one as I think the Taliban, and the insurgents in general, are diverse in their aims and not monolithic in their structure. 

As for their international ambitions there is the interesting, but anecdotal, reporting by David Rohde, and also &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.meforum.org/486/the-talibans-international-ambitions&quot; title=&quot;2001 piece on talib&#039;s international ambitions&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; rather old contention.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@anan &#8211; you&#8217;re probably reading him right.  I just found the whole piece written in such ignorance of the real situation that it was a good example of analysis from 30,000 feet (there are many more like this).</p>
<p>Not sure I agree 100% on the objectives on the Talibs, as I think the international forces and international influence really is anathema to them and a major driver of their struggle.  Morever, I hate to lump them all into one as I think the Taliban, and the insurgents in general, are diverse in their aims and not monolithic in their structure. </p>
<p>As for their international ambitions there is the interesting, but anecdotal, reporting by David Rohde, and also <a href="http://www.meforum.org/486/the-talibans-international-ambitions" title="2001 piece on talib's international ambitions" rel="nofollow">this</a> rather old contention.</p>
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		<title>By: David M</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/10/27/and-by-opposing-end-them/comment-page-1/#comment-383244</link>
		<dc:creator>David M</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 16:08:59 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.thunderrun.us/2009/10/from-front-10282009.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;From the Front: 10/28/2009 &lt;/a&gt; News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post <a href="http://www.thunderrun.us/2009/10/from-front-10282009.html" rel="nofollow">From the Front: 10/28/2009 </a> News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.</p>
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		<title>By: anan</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/10/27/and-by-opposing-end-them/comment-page-1/#comment-383226</link>
		<dc:creator>anan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 04:36:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/?p=9808#comment-383226</guid>
		<description>Sailani, I am talking about the son, whose views on global jihad are pretty out there.

Sailani, I thought JOSE RAMOS-HORTA’s conditions in negotiations with the Taliban were very extreme. No way the Taliban would agree to many of his conditions. JOSE RAMOS-HORTA’s strategy seems to be to offer the Taliban a deal, and if the Taliban don&#039;t take it, defeat them militarily. JOSE RAMOS-HORTA supports a surge in ISAF (and probably foreign aid to Afghanistan) to increase leverage during these negotiations. Maybe I misunderstood?

The Taliban&#039;s most important strategic objective is not to drive the US out of Afghanistan. The largest objectives are:
1) Defeat their Afghan and Pakistani enemies (ANSF, GIRoA, former Northern Alliance, nonPashtuns; Pakistani Government and security forces)
2) Retake power in large parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban oppose democracy, believing that the affairs of this world should be guided by His Will rather than the transient impulses of the masses.

America and ISAF are targeted primarily because America is an obstacle to these more important objectives. To top this off, many Taliban groups (especially Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Haqqani) have ambitions in Uzbekistan, Chechnya, other former Soviet republics, Kashmir and Xinjiang China (not sure if Haqqani has ambitions regarding the Uighars, given Haqqani&#039;s close historic links with the ISI, and the ISI&#039;s links with China; but many other Talliban groups do.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sailani, I am talking about the son, whose views on global jihad are pretty out there.</p>
<p>Sailani, I thought JOSE RAMOS-HORTA’s conditions in negotiations with the Taliban were very extreme. No way the Taliban would agree to many of his conditions. JOSE RAMOS-HORTA’s strategy seems to be to offer the Taliban a deal, and if the Taliban don&#8217;t take it, defeat them militarily. JOSE RAMOS-HORTA supports a surge in ISAF (and probably foreign aid to Afghanistan) to increase leverage during these negotiations. Maybe I misunderstood?</p>
<p>The Taliban&#8217;s most important strategic objective is not to drive the US out of Afghanistan. The largest objectives are:<br />
1) Defeat their Afghan and Pakistani enemies (ANSF, GIRoA, former Northern Alliance, nonPashtuns; Pakistani Government and security forces)<br />
2) Retake power in large parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban oppose democracy, believing that the affairs of this world should be guided by His Will rather than the transient impulses of the masses.</p>
<p>America and ISAF are targeted primarily because America is an obstacle to these more important objectives. To top this off, many Taliban groups (especially Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Haqqani) have ambitions in Uzbekistan, Chechnya, other former Soviet republics, Kashmir and Xinjiang China (not sure if Haqqani has ambitions regarding the Uighars, given Haqqani&#8217;s close historic links with the ISI, and the ISI&#8217;s links with China; but many other Talliban groups do.)</p>
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		<title>By: Sailani</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/10/27/and-by-opposing-end-them/comment-page-1/#comment-383221</link>
		<dc:creator>Sailani</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 03:41:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/?p=9808#comment-383221</guid>
		<description>@AJK - keeping in mind the old dictum that &quot;no plan survives contact with the enemy&quot; I think one nevertheless needs to have clear strategic aims in war.  Strangely, beyond ideals about a stable Afghan state, our Western leaders have not yet articulated (at least clearly enough for me to understand) what that would look like, i.e. where the tipping point into stability is.  It would all make Clausewitz very uncomfortable to say the least.

I said to someone last night that Karzai is holding the whole international community hostage.  As I watch a new electoral disaster unfold (and it looks like it&#039;ll be even worse) I can&#039;t help being convinced that the West is failing to influence Karzai&#039;s behaviour despite all the blood and treasure spent.

@anan - I think it&#039;s more fantasy than hawkish, unless by hawkish you mean being willing to accommodate the Taliban&#039;s objectives.  I will admit that I don&#039;t know nearly enough about Sirajuddin Haqqani&#039;s views and strategies to be able to estimate the chances of peeling him away from the Quetta shura, but his father, by all accounts, is less of a fanatic than the Taliban and much more focused on Afghanistan and even Loya Paktia than on a global mission to restore the Caliphate.

Or possibly his views have also hardened since 2002 and you are right that he cannot be reconciled.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@AJK &#8211; keeping in mind the old dictum that &#8220;no plan survives contact with the enemy&#8221; I think one nevertheless needs to have clear strategic aims in war.  Strangely, beyond ideals about a stable Afghan state, our Western leaders have not yet articulated (at least clearly enough for me to understand) what that would look like, i.e. where the tipping point into stability is.  It would all make Clausewitz very uncomfortable to say the least.</p>
<p>I said to someone last night that Karzai is holding the whole international community hostage.  As I watch a new electoral disaster unfold (and it looks like it&#8217;ll be even worse) I can&#8217;t help being convinced that the West is failing to influence Karzai&#8217;s behaviour despite all the blood and treasure spent.</p>
<p>@anan &#8211; I think it&#8217;s more fantasy than hawkish, unless by hawkish you mean being willing to accommodate the Taliban&#8217;s objectives.  I will admit that I don&#8217;t know nearly enough about Sirajuddin Haqqani&#8217;s views and strategies to be able to estimate the chances of peeling him away from the Quetta shura, but his father, by all accounts, is less of a fanatic than the Taliban and much more focused on Afghanistan and even Loya Paktia than on a global mission to restore the Caliphate.</p>
<p>Or possibly his views have also hardened since 2002 and you are right that he cannot be reconciled.</p>
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		<title>By: anan</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/10/27/and-by-opposing-end-them/comment-page-1/#comment-383219</link>
		<dc:creator>anan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 02:34:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Sailani (not sure who you are yet),  but JOSE RAMOS-HORTA&#039;s piece you cited strikes me as more hawkish than most hawks:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704335904574496104102259672.html

I don&#039;t understand how someone could successfully negotiate with Haqqani, given his global ambitions. What exactly is the case for that?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sailani (not sure who you are yet),  but JOSE RAMOS-HORTA&#8217;s piece you cited strikes me as more hawkish than most hawks:<br />
<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704335904574496104102259672.html" rel="nofollow">http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704335904574496104102259672.html</a></p>
<p>I don&#8217;t understand how someone could successfully negotiate with Haqqani, given his global ambitions. What exactly is the case for that?</p>
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		<title>By: AJK</title>
		<link>http://registan.net/index.php/2009/10/27/and-by-opposing-end-them/comment-page-1/#comment-383216</link>
		<dc:creator>AJK</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 01:19:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.registan.net/?p=9808#comment-383216</guid>
		<description>This whole post reminds me of something Joshua harps on a bit: what is the precise mission, and what are the precise goals, in Afghanistan? Any purely political agreement is going to be way more of a wink at a solution than a true solution. Surely the US gov&#039;t, Afghan gov&#039;t, and every other player in the country knows that. So what is the preferred, realistic, endgame for the United States that Obama is trying to reach? I still haven&#039;t heard anything concrete (though I&#039;m not nearly as much of a Afghanistanologist than many folks here).

There&#039;s a lot of fuzzy words in the Timorese promise. Who gets to define &quot;insurgents&quot;? Who gets to define &quot;persecution&quot;? And what are the punishments if the Afghan government fails to live up to their promises? 

Lots of questions and no answers, I know, but I&#039;m personally grasping at straws here.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This whole post reminds me of something Joshua harps on a bit: what is the precise mission, and what are the precise goals, in Afghanistan? Any purely political agreement is going to be way more of a wink at a solution than a true solution. Surely the US gov&#8217;t, Afghan gov&#8217;t, and every other player in the country knows that. So what is the preferred, realistic, endgame for the United States that Obama is trying to reach? I still haven&#8217;t heard anything concrete (though I&#8217;m not nearly as much of a Afghanistanologist than many folks here).</p>
<p>There&#8217;s a lot of fuzzy words in the Timorese promise. Who gets to define &#8220;insurgents&#8221;? Who gets to define &#8220;persecution&#8221;? And what are the punishments if the Afghan government fails to live up to their promises? </p>
<p>Lots of questions and no answers, I know, but I&#8217;m personally grasping at straws here.</p>
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