AJK: You have to build the frame work so such schools– even if it isn’t at the level of ROTC in the US. And You have to recruit at an early age. Afghanistan established its first military high school over a hundred years ago. Why can’t it do it again?

The problem is that there is very little vision in the Afghan government, and there has been little investment on children their education. But then again, there hasn’t been that much aid from the International community in this area either.

The more you arm the militias, the higher chance you will have for another civil war to happen.

And the funny thing is, the more folks want to do the whole “arm the tribes” and militias bit, which may be gaining ground, the less centrality and the less likelihood of an Afghan ROTC.

I personally don’t see that sort of central state happening in Afghanistan, but a lot of people who know a lot more than me think that I’m wrong. Even them, though, would likely be hard-pressed to forsee ROTC education.

There needs to be an ROTC program within Afghan high schools to attract young, talented students to join. But there has to be clear benefits for them to join the program.

And they need to establish some military high schools as well.

And as more Afghan officers graduate, they should further their training abroad.

And that goes the same for the Afghan National Police.

You have to invest in the youth, which is a failure on the Afghan government. If some of these plans would have been executed 8 years ago, you would have had a young, illiterate and determined Afghan security force.

If any acronym definitions are missing, do say.

“13-13 mln” Don’t understand.

Dafydd, the ANSF are the mortal enemies of the Taliban and their extremist allies. As long as the ANSF gives them a hell of a fight over the next many years, this is a form of victory against the Taliban and extremists. For this to happen, the ANSF needs $120 billion in international grants over the next 20 years (inclusive of the ANAAC.)

However, if the international community merely gives the Afghans military grants, Afghanistan will win this war, and then be a heavily militarized society with an enormous budget deficits as far as the eye can see.

To increase Afghan GDP over the long run so that GIRoA revenue can begin to approach GIRoA expenditure (even GIRoA expenditure minus the ANSF), the Afghans will need another $180 billion in grants and loans. I don’t see how the Afghans can service more than $50 billion in new debt. This means $130 billion in grants is needed.

This isn’t a huge amount compared to the cost of keeping so many international troops in Afghanistan or the cost of WMD attacks against large global population centers.

My understanding of domestic US politics is not extensive, but I am pretty sure the US electorate is unlikely to vote for tax rises and/or spending cuts for this purpose.

On that, only time will tell.

While the groups you mention are all pretty fanatical and prepared to cause death with little or no compunction, none of what you say addresses the substantive issue of whether continued operations in Afghanistan make WMD attacks on the US or Europe more likely, less likely or neither.

Basically, even if the reenlisted rate were 100%, this target can only be met if the ANA only takes 2,000 in casualties. In practice ANA casualties are likely to be more than 2,000.

“I can’t see the public wanting to stump up the cash. I can’t see the Chinese wanting to bankroll the effort. ” I can. The question all of us need to ask is how we would like WMD attacks against our population centers? Do we really want to take the risk of a destabilized Pakistan? Granted the risk to Europe and China is arguably greater than the risk to America. Granted to risk to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Russia and India is arguably greater than the risk to Europe and China. However, if there is a WMD attack on America, can President Obama say with a straight face . . . “I was trying to save money in Afghanistan/Pakistan . . . I made a mistake, sorry”?

Do any of us have any illusions about what Al Qaeda, Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e Mohammed, the Shiite hating trio (Lashkar e Jhanvi/Sipah e Sahaba/Jundullah), Haqqani, TTP, the Uzbek duo (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU], Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union [IJU]), Chechan Takfiris, Brigade 313, Ilyas Kashmiri, Tehrik-i-Taliban [TTP] are?

And foreigners need to pay for it.

I am a bit unclear as to how achieveable you think these numbers are. On the one had your post has “The ANA needs an annual through put of 50,400 to maintain a steady state ANA of 240,000. The ANA will be higher than that by late 2010.”. Then later “Note that CSTC-A/NTM-A projections are implicitly for reenlistment rates above 2/3rds, which is off the charts.”

Anyhow, this is on top of other massive spending commitments which, as you note, the Afghan govt. has no hope of paying for on its own.

The message to the public in ISAF countries is pretty clear. It is “just a little while longer, then Afghanistan will be able to stand on its own feet”. I find this errily reminiscent of the Iraq war “paying for itself”.

I can’t see the public wanting to stump up the cash. I can’t see the Chinese wanting to bankroll the effort. If the Gulf Arabs step in (after having bailed out Dubai), half the education system will consist of Wahabi madrassas.

There doesn’t seem to be great scope for positive outcomes.