This is something that seems far more geared to the re election chances of the UK government and the US mid terms.

Karzai doubtless sees an opportunity to create a little more room for manoeuvre, while the Turkish government sees a chance to boost their international standing.

The Brits have for some time been more divided than the US on talking to the Taliban. Significant sections of opinion having seen this as the way forward from day one. Initially Karzai felt this undermined him (and got a Brit diplomat sacked). Now he, the UN and it seems large sections of US opinion favour that option.

I fail to see how reconciliation with the Taliban can be advanced when the Taliban are not even invited.

Moreover, how to avoid the Musa Qala scenario, where you cut a deal with the Taliban, and they race against each other to renege on the deal quicker and more fully than seems humanly possible?

If I thought we could cut a deal with the Taliban and run (while they stuck to the deal), I would think it is a good idea.

As things stand, it takes me back to another thread. If the locals think the International coalition is looking for an exit route, they will move over to the Taliban en masse.

You’re right that it’s probably unfair to single out the British military for criticism, though I was speaking to a British official so I thought that kind of limitation was kind of implied. I guess not? Anyway, it’s my bad entirely for not being clear about that, and I’ve made some edits above to clear up that everyone has failed Afghanistan, and not Britain in any unique way… militarily.

On the reconciliation thing, I think Britain deserves unique opporobrium for their efforts.

For domestic political reasons the US could not accept that. From there the Brit mission was doomed to failure.

For some reason there is a serious love in between McChrystal and the UK establishment. You saw this in the diplomat you spoke to. If you remember him in London selling his plan, it would appear this is reciprocated. (I would make some comment about the Brit upper class and men in uniform, but it is too soon after my breakfast).

I think we are seeing pretty much the same thing (as the Helmand situation) here. Moving Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in a similar direction should actually be pretty easy. It’s just that the direction they would choose for themselves would be very displeasing to the west.

I am pretty sure Karzai, on his own, could cut a deal with significant numbers of (currently) Taliban commanders. But that would involve a return to warlordism for much of the country. Again, unacceptable to the west.

The Afghans must feel like they are working for a micromanaging boss. This boss keeps telling them they are responsible for this, that or the other, but every time they want to get on with the job, the boss is there saying, “don’t do that, not like that, not with them.”

In fairness you recognise this paradox. In the old days of imperialism you could implement policies disgusting to your home population in far off lands and people would hardly get to hear about it, certainly not in time to make any difference. Ever since the invention of telegraph that has been getting progressively more difficult.

I wonder if someone will do the math in London. Afghanistan might have something like 5 million unemployed young Pashtun males (thin slicing this one, but it’s probably a lowball figure). If a few tens of thousands of them are currently planting IEDs, firing rockets, making ambushes, etc. on behalf of the Taliban as day labourers (or under some longer term employment scheme) then buying them off is not exactly likely to starve the Taliban of potential rank and file insurgents.

Is this really not obvious to everyone?