Comments on: I’ll Have What He’s Smoking

By: Toryalay Shirzay

Toryalay Shirzay — Sat, 06 Feb 2010 05:10:14 +0000

In the past few days the US and ISAF have openly been talking about new military operations in Helmand.Don’t the US/ISAF know the Taliban are listening to whatever they are saying? I wonder.Here is something that will spare them certain hardship:in Afstan,you never openly talk about where will military operations take place,you do what you have to do and then talk after the fact.This will save them a lot of pain,trust me. I thought the ultra smart big bro knew better,but maybe not, eh.

By: Stephen Pampinella

Stephen Pampinella — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 18:28:05 +0000

Link to MacFarland’s article (apologies for misspelling this in original comment)

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr08/Smith_AnbarEngMarApr08.pdf

By: Stephen Pampinella

Stephen Pampinella — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 18:26:54 +0000

To play Devil’s Advocate, perhaps improvements in the security situation don’t happen in a linear, or cumulative fashion, but occur exponentially once a tipping point has reached. Gen. McFarland’s article introduces this concept as an explanation for the success of his BCT and supporting Marines in Anbar. The Awakening doesn’t really begin to take off until October 2006, and only the month before that, Col. Devlin’s memo argued that Anbar was completely lost. So, it could be that we simply haven’t reached that tipping point in Helmand for various reasons (Marjah still creates instability in the province) or that we never will (which would call into question all our assumptions about whether or not counterinsurgency could be effective) and anywhere we deployed those troops would lead only to stalemate, and not a counterinsurgent success.

By: Joshua Foust

Joshua Foust — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 14:44:25 +0000

Data, please. Recent incidents say otherwise.

By: Dafydd

Dafydd — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 10:40:24 +0000

Problem is, so much has been invested in Helmand that deprioritisation (I would call it retreat) looks like a bad failure.

You would be right, in my opinion, to conclude this is handing the Taliban a massive gift. They can tie down a large section of the international forces with very little of importance (i.e. Helmand) at stake.

Even if they are ultimately defeated there tomorrow, the time it took for it to happen gives a propaganda victory.

But it is a major opium centre.

For the US to ignore that would require a transformation of its political culture. I think drugs are a more salient political issue for the US (and the rest of the West, but less so) than for the Taliban.

By: vb

vb — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 08:57:42 +0000

I am familiar with the North. Have travelled through it many times. The security situation has great improved since July 2009.

The problem is the press waits for something negative to happen and then prints it. However, overall in the North, the people are a lot more secure than they used to be. Even in really bad places like Cha Dahra in Kunduz, a lot of the Taliban have been removed. It’s still dangerous, however, a year ago the Taliban used to drive through the streets and play music. A lot have been irradicated from the area.

When I tell the Kunduz and Baghlan people what I am reading in the press about their areas they just laugh. I think some journalists need to be more responsible.

By: Capt. Monkey

Capt. Monkey — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 07:48:41 +0000

Ah, I see. That makes more sense. Thank you for clarifying.

By: Joshua Foust

Joshua Foust — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 04:04:13 +0000

As far as strategery goes, there is *some* value to Helmand. I just think its value is misplaced when we start thinking of priorities. For example, despite its use as a smuggling route, I also think Nuristan should be deprioritized, since we simply do not have the manpower to effectively control it (assuming manpower was the critical weakness).

Helmand is obviously a different story. It does need to be controlled, but what Helmand is showing is one of three possible things:

1) If you throw enough troops at an area—any area—you can control it and at least restore the vestiges of order and control;

2) Despite throwing a tremendous number of extra troops—more than 10,000 in the last year alone—you cannot control it; or

3) Throwing so many troops at an area with relatively little change shows there is a fundamental flaw in the military’s strategy.

I used to think it was number 1; recent experience has inched me more toward number 3: our priorities and focus are wrong. Despite all the extra troops, Helmand is relatively stalemated; that tells me we can scale back our troops and maintain a relative stalemate, while sending troops at precipitous problems like Kunduz, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Herat, all of which I would prioritize over Helmand if we’re talking about culture, population, religion, and economic centers of gravity.

I hope that makes sense. I don’t think we should abandon Helmand, just remove it as the keystone of our entire effort.

By: Capt. Monkey

Capt. Monkey — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 03:34:17 +0000

Josh-
Boy, this reminds me of what you and I were just discussing earlier this week by email. There is no evidence to support that things are stabilizing here. Taking a peek at the SigAct databases (CIDNE, TIGR, Etc) show that things are still intensifying.

Also, one of your links is to an earlier blog about trying to fight a rural-based insurgency using pop-centric techniques. I’m a little confused. I’ve recently come to a similar conclusion that we’re trying to do that, and will be unsuccessful. Yet you also seem to advocate moving troops from rural areas (Helmand). Is that because you view Helmand as just not strategically important, despite the numbers? The Alingar and Tagab valleys are also considered to be “sparsely” populated but remain strategically important because they’re part of the smuggling route from Chitral into Kabul and provide the insurgency the ability to get close to the capital, right?