Establishing an effective government takes time. This is even more so in a local environment, where officials have to understand what their constituents want above all else: public projects and jobs.

If steps 2 and 3 of the McChrystal counterinsurgency plan fails (holding and building) in Marjah, I don’t see any way the United States can save face before troops withdraw in July of 2011.

I don’t really have a solution that would answer your question, which is probably why I’m sitting here spouting at the mouth. Let’s consult David Killcullen or the State Department (oooh that’s right, not enough staff).

Afghanistan has neither of these. The Dev-in-a-Box in Afghanistan has given the Karzai gov’t and the Roads=security meme. So sure, that may turn into a success story in 20 years or so, but then there’s a whole lot of noise in the machine as to what caused the turn-around.

So I’m as skeptical as Josh, it just seems like a way to open up a country to free markets and a few westernized locals. I just don’t think that way forward applies here.

On the civilian capacity side; I would also be interested in what’s planned by Gov. Mangal, the GIRoA, and Helmand PRT.

Josh, why don’t you interview Gov. Mangal and ask him some of these Helmand reconstruction and Helmand civilian institution building questions? Wouldn’t ask him as much about the ANP; would prefer to ask MoI and Helmand’s police chief about that.

Look at South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macoa, India, Bangladesh, Iran (1955-1973 Iran was one of the fastest growing economies in the world; unfortunately Iran entered a deep depression in 1973 with per capita real income declining by over a quarter), Germany, Italy. It is also working now in Iraq.

Look at it as “institution building” and “capacity building” led by locals, strategically planned by locals; with substantial foreign collaboration and help.

By this metric, you might add Chile to the mix; since it was the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the Western Hemisphere; and institution building help from abroad. Chile is now a Latin American successful free market country. An “Asian tiger” in Latin America so to speak.

I don’t understand why Afghan institutions can’t be built as long as foreigners pay for and assist them. Afghan institutions were comparable to their Indian counterparts in 1973. [Iran was a much wealthier country in 1973 than it is today; so I couldn't compare Iran to Afghanistan.]

The real challenge in Afghanistan is that GIRoA annual revenue = $600 million. Long term annual steady state GIRoA expenditure = more than $10,000 million a year.

Why do you say that Afghan institutions are being rebuilt in “our” image? Were Afghan institutions in 1973 “built in our image”? Are Indian and Chinese institutions “built in our image”? I would have mentioned Iran; but their institutions–especially the military–are more similar to America’s than than India’s institutions are. China seems to be trying to copy America more than India is; but they too are not blindly rebuilding their society in America’s image.

My reading of Burnett is to rebuild Afghanistan in China’s and India’s image more than in America’s image. China as Afghan’s largest trading and investment partner will likely influence Afghan reconstruction more than anyone else.

“armed development officers to re-create society in our image” If I could rephrase; it would be FID to build capable local security forces and enable them to provide security that enables all other types of institution building and local capacity enhancement. The US military isn’t bad at training civilian governance institutions. They are more expensive than Asian reconstruction workers are, however. :LOL:

The thing is, it’s never worked. Not once. Barnett’s examples, the Balkans, are a shining example of how badly they do work even under ideal conditions (that is, a familiar country with easy logistics and lots of resources). In a place like Afghanistan, it’s ridiculous.

So yeah, I think it’s at least an unconscious echo of Barnett. He is wildly popular in the DOD, and no matter the evidence or arguments, no one at the top is willing to ignore or go against his ideas.

I’m wondering whether anybody else has picked up on the resemblance, whether McChrystal’s phrase is an unconscious or conscious echo of Barnett’s, and indeed whether there might be a more than verbal parallelism at work here.